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Abstract
This dissertation is comprised of three independent essays that address, respectively,
spousal violence and female employment in Colombia, inequality of opportunity in adult
health in Colombia, and welfare of rural Peruvian households. The evidence presented
in the first essay, ”Intimate Partner Violence and Women’s Employment: Evidence from
Colombia,” suggests that victims of intimate partner violence are more likely to work.
This relationship is likely mediated by a wife’s decision-making power: women seem to
engage in paid work to escape violent situations at home by enhancing their decision-
making power. The second essay, ”Inequality of Opportunity in Adult Health in Colom-
bia,” suggests that differences in parental educational attainment and household socioe-
conomic status during childhood are the most important dimensions of inequality of
opportunity in adult health. The third essay, ”Foods and Fads: The Welfare Impacts of
Rising Quinoa Prices in Peru,” shows that increases in the international price of quinoa,
which have been driven by a high international demand of quinoa, are associated with
a significant yet modest increase in the welfare of households in areas where quinoa is
consumed and produced in Peru.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
This dissertation contains three independent essays in development economics that
address, respectively, gender-biased violence and female employment in Colombia, in-
equality of opportunity in adult health in Colombia, and the welfare effects of rising
quinoa prices in Peru.
The first essay, ”Intimate Partner Violence and Women’s Employment: Evidence from
Colombia,” studies the relationship between intimate partner violence (IPV) and women’s
employment using data from the Colombian Demographic and Health Survey. There is
a positive relationship between IPV and employment, which persists when husband’s
childhood experience of domestic violence is exploited as a source of plausibly exogenous
variation for the incidence of IPV. The incidence of IPV increases the likelihood of female
employment by about 16 percentage points. This result is robust to small departures
from the exclusion restriction. To explain these findings, this chapter explores the role
of women’s decision-making power. Women may enter or increase their participation in
the labor force to escape violent situations at home by enhancing their decision-making
power. In particular, the effect of IPV on employment appears to be lower among abused
women with higher initial decision-making power.
The second essay, ”Inequality of Opportunity in Adult Health in Colombia,” uses the
2010 Colombian Living Standards and Social Mobility Survey, a rich household survey
that provides unique information about individual childhood circumstances in the coun-
try. This chapter provides calculations for a dissimilarity index and a Gini-opportunity
index, two measures of inequality of opportunity, using a self-reported variable for health
status. To obtain the relative contribution of various circumstances, such as parental ed-
ucation and household socioeconomic status in childhood, to the variation in the dis-
similarity index, this chapter uses the Shapley-value decomposition. In addition to a
national-level analysis, separate estimations for residents in urban and rural areas are
provided. The findings suggest that 8% to 10% of the initial opportunities enjoyed by
those who are healthier should be redistributed among those who are less healthy in
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order to achieve equality of opportunity. Differences in household socioeconomic status
during childhood and parental educational attainment appear to be the most important
dimensions of inequality of opportunity in adult health.
The third essay, ”Foods and Fads: The Welfare Impacts of Rising Quinoa Prices in
Peru,” explores the effects of increasing quinoa prices on changes in consumption of
rural households using data from the Peruvian Encuesta Nacional de Hogares.1 Riding on a
wave of interest in “superfoods” in rich countries, quinoa went in less than a decade from
being largely unknown outside of South America to being an upper-class staple in the
United States. Because of that rapid rise in the popularity of quinoa, the price of quinoa
more than tripled between 2006 and 2014. This chapter studies the impact of rising quinoa
prices on the welfare of Peruvian households. Using 11 years of a large-scale, nationally
representative household survey, and pseudo-panel methods, this chapter examines the
relationships between: (i) the purchase price of quinoa and the value of real household
consumption, which proxy for household welfare; and (ii) household quinoa production
and household welfare. The findings suggest that increases in the purchase price of
quinoa are associated with a significant increase in the welfare of the average household
in areas where quinoa is consumed, which suggests that the quinoa price increase has
had general equilibrium effects extending to non-producers. The results in this chapter
also suggest a significant increase in the welfare of quinoa–producing households.
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 estimates the effects of intimate
partner violence against women on women’s employment in Colombia. Chapter 3 pro-
vides the theoretical and empirical framework for the measurement of inequality of op-
portunity in adult health in Colombia. Chapter 4 presents analysis of the effects of rising
quinoa prices on the welfare of rural households in Peru. Chapter 5 concludes.
1This essay is co-authored with Marc F. Bellemare and Seth Gitter
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Chapter 2
Intimate Partner Violence and
Women’s Employment: Evidence
from Colombia
4
2.1 Introduction
The World Health Organization reports striking findings on the prevalence and effects
of violence against women. Almost one third of all women worldwide who have been
in a marital relationship have experienced physical or sexual violence perpetrated by
their male partners (World Health Organization, 2013). Most of these women report
serious physical and mental health consequences, which include permanent injuries,
pregnancy-related complications and impaired social functioning. In Latin America and
the Caribbean, according to the World Health Organization estimates, about 24% of ever-
partnered women report some exposure to physical intimate partner violence. Colombia
is one of the countries in the region where violence against women is highly prevalent;
in 2010, 37% of Colombian women reported physical or sexual spousal abuse over their
lifetime, as well as several physical and psychological consequences associated with it
(Profamilia, 2011). Intimate partner violence also affects labor market outcomes: victims
reported that spousal violence affected their performance in daily activities and their
labor productivity.
Most empirical studies focus on the determinants of spousal violence, including women’s
employment, with mixed results. Aizer (2010) exploits variation in industry-specific la-
bor demand and finds that decreases in the male-female wage gap reduce violence per-
petrated by domestic partners. Bhattacharyya, Bedi, and Chhachhi (2011) suggest that
boosting a wife’s economic status generates struggle within the household and leads to
more violence. Heath (2014) focuses on access to factory jobs and finds that women with
low bargaining power face increased risk of domestic violence upon entering the labor
force. Other studies investigate the consequences of IPV and show that violence against
women is related to higher rates of female unemployment (Lloyd, 1997; Lloyd and Taluc,
1999) and women working less hours (Meisel, Chandler, and Rienzi, 2003; Swanberg and
Logan, 2005; Tolman and Wang, 2005). Other studies, on the contrary, find that spousal
violence appears to lead to increased labor market participation (Farmer and Tiefenthaler,
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2004) and more hours of work (Staggs and Riger, 2005). Studies in Latin America and
the Caribbean are similarly inconclusive; some find that abused wives are more likely to
work (Morrison and Orlando, 1999; Agu¨ero, 2013), while others find that they more likely
to exit the labor force (Rios-Avila and Canavire-Bacarreza, 2017).
In this paper, I estimate the relationship between reporting having experienced in-
timate partner violence (IPV) and women’s employment. Further, I explore the role of
women’s decision-making power in mediating this relationship.
The main contributions of this study are twofold. First, using household survey data,
I show that the effect of IPV on woman’s employment is positive in Colombia and that
this result persists after using the plausibly exogenous variation in the husband’s child-
hood exposure to domestic violence as an instrumental variable for IPV. Women victims
of intimate partner violence may decide to spend more time away from home and seek
employment more actively to reduce their vulnerability by improving their economic sit-
uation. My findings support this notion as reported spousal violence does not prevent
women from being active in the labor force: Women who experience IPV are 16 percent-
age points more likely to work than women who do not.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the economics of the family and on
women’s empowerment by exploring the role of women’s decision-making power. Wives
may need to increase their power within the relationship and gain control of their deci-
sions to increase their ability to escape domestic violence or, at least, lessen its intensity.
To provide an exploratory assessment of the role of bargaining power, I conduct three
analyses. First, I study the relationship between IPV, employment and initial bargaining
power of the wife to assess whether the effect of IPV on employment differs by her educa-
tion or age at marriage, which proxy for initial bargaining power. Second, I examine the
relationship between employment and whether a woman can make spending decisions
for herself and participate in household decision-making. The last exercise consists of a
mediation analysis using sequential g-estimation, a method recently proposed by Acharya,
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Blackwell, and Sen (2016). With this method, I am able to calculate the controlled direct
effect of IPV on employment, if I were to fix a woman’s decision-making power at a par-
ticular level. I do not find strong evidence that decision-making power, as proxied in
this paper, is the mechanism at work. Nonetheless, a woman’s outside option and her
decision-making power are so highly correlated, that I explore the mediating role of her
willingness to divorce. I find suggestive evidence that willingness to divorce is mediating
the positive relationship between IPV and employment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the 2010 Colom-
bian Demographic and Health Survey data. Section 2.3 explains the empirical methods
and discusses the identification strategy. I present results in Section 2.4, and conduct
robustness checks in Section 2.5. I explore the role of women’s bargaining power and
willingness to divorce in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 provides concluding remarks.
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The 2010 Colombian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) provides demographic,
socio-economic and health information for women and children and is representative
of the population at the national level and for urban and rural areas in all regions and
departments.1 The DHS is a three-stage stratified cluster sample that covers all but the
two most sparsely populated departments in Colombia. The DHS also provides detailed
information on intimate partner violence for the female population aged 15 to 49 years
who are currently married or living in a consensual union. The DHS selected 52,952
women for the domestic violence module, but women who had never been married or
in a de facto union, as well as divorced and widowed women, were all excluded by the
DHS team during this part of the survey.2 Of the 33,728 women finally interviewed, 8,200
1The DHS program is funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
2Another 1.06% of women were also excluded from the DHS because they could not be safely interviewed
in private. Not being able to characterize this excluded part of the sample may be of concern if these women
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were married more than once and 25,528 were married only once. Given that the domes-
tic violence module of the questionnaire refers to abuse by the current or previous male
partner without distinction, I focus on the sub-sample of women who have been married
or in a consensual union only once. This is because, in the data released by the DHS,
it is not possible to obtain any information on previous marriages or consensual unions.
The final sample includes 25, 528 partnered women (8,180 are married and 17,348 are in
a consensual union) who responded to the domestic violence module in the 2010 DHS.
Although most of the women in the sample are not married, I refer to them as husband
and wife, for convenience.
Intimate partner violence (IPV) is measured using the modified Conflict Tactics Scale
(CTS) (Straus, 1979; Straus et al., 1996). The DHS team elicits information on domestic
violence by administering this set of questions to one randomly selected woman in each
household. The DHS team also obtains informed consent from the respondent at the
beginning of the interview. The respondents are also reminded throughout the interview
of the confidentiality of their responses.
I use three dummy variables for reported IPV. The first dummy, “Physical IPV”, in-
dicates whether the woman reported any experience of physical abuse in the past 12
months. That is, whether a husband or male partner: (1) Pushed or shook or threw some-
thing at her; (2) Slapped her; (3) Punched her with fist or something harmful; (4) Kicked
or dragged her; (5) Tried to strangle or burn her; (6) Threatened her with knife/gun or
other weapon; (7) Attacked her with knife/gun or other weapon; (8) Physically forced sex
when not wanted; or (9) Bit her. The second dummy, “Emotional IPV”, indicates whether.
in the past 12 months, a husband or male partner: (1) Was jealous if the wife was talking
with other men;(2) Accused her of unfaithfulness; (3) Did not permit her to meet her
girl-friends; (4) Tried to limit her contact with her family; (5) Insisted on knowing where
she was; or (6) Did not trust her with money. The third dummy, “Any IPV”, indicates
are affected the most by IPV.
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whether the woman reported any experience of physical and/or emotional IPV in the
past 12 months.
In the sample, about 44.6% of women were victims of intimate partner violence. By
type of incident, 14.6% of women reported physical/sexual abuse3 and 41.5% reported
emotional abuse in the past 12 months. This survey is also informative of intergenera-
tional events of domestic violence. About 34.7% of these women report that their fathers
had beat their mothers at least once during their childhood. Although no information
is reported for whether the husband’s father beat his mother, about 30% of wives in the
sample report their male partners were mistreated during childhood.
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables used
in this study. Although the DHS is not a comprehensive labor force survey, it collects data
on the labor market status of women by inquiring about the following: (1) Current work
status (including work in own and family-owned businesses); (2) Work status in the past
12 months if not currently working; and (3) Whether the woman has ever worked if she
did not work in the past 12 months. In this sample, over 69% of wives are currently
working or worked at least one month in the 12 months prior to the survey, and about
12% had never worked. For this study, I focus on the woman’s work status now and in
the past 12 months. Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine from the DHS data the
timing of employment and violence: it is unknown whether the woman was working
before the first event of IPV or whether she started to work after being abused.
3About 5% of the women in the sample were sexually abused.
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2.3 Empirical Framework
2.3.1 The Equation of Interest
One contribution of this paper lies in the estimation of the impact of intimate partner
violence on women’s employment. This section discusses the equations to be estimated
and the identification strategy used here in an attempt to provide an unbiased estimate
of the relationship between women’s employment and IPV.
Let Lir be a dummy variable that indicates whether a woman is currently working or
worked in the past 12 months. The first equation to be estimated in this paper is:
Lir = α+ X′irΦ+ β · IPVir + θr + eir (2.1)
where the subscripts denote individual i in department r. IPVir is a dummy variable
that indicates whether the woman reported being a victim of IPV in the past 12 months;
Xir is a vector of individual and spousal characteristics including wife’s and husband’s
age and educational attainment, wife’s ethnicity, husband’s work status, quantiles from a
wealth index, and a dummy for urban residence. Other variables in Xir include an indi-
cator for whether the husband consumes alcohol, a dummy for current pregnancy, and
dummies for presence of young and old children in the household. The θr term denotes
department4 fixed effects that are included to address potential bias due to unobserved
heterogeneity across departments. The eir term is an error term with mean zero. If IPV is
exogenous with respect to employment, the estimate of β represents the average treatment
effect (ATE) of IPV on women’s employment status.
Because some of the husband’s information could be missing, I also include two
dummy variables indicating whether his education or his work status are unknown to
4Departments are the first administrative division in Colombia. There are 32 departments, including the
capital city of Bogota.
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the wife. It cannot be assumed that the missing information on the husband is unrelated
to his wife’s employment status. Therefore, I include these missing indicators as regular
controls in both the first and second stage equations.
I estimate Equation (2.1), weighting each observation with the associated probability
weights provided in the data. Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, my use
of OLS means that every equation estimated in this paper is a linear probability model
(LPM). In estimating an LPM rather than a logit or a probit model, I follow the recom-
mendations of Angrist and Pischke (2008). The primary benefits of using a LPM are: (i)
LPM does not rely on distributional assumptions required by the logit and probit spec-
ifications; and (ii) LPM does a much better job than probit models at handling a large
number of fixed effects. The primary drawback to using a LPM is that it produces er-
rors that are heteroscedastic. I use robust Huber-White standard errors in all estimations
in order to address this concern. These standard errors are further clustered at the pri-
mary sampling unit level,5 given the sampling scheme, to account for further sources of
heteroscedasticity within sampling units.
The primary objective of this paper is to assess whether IPV has an impact on women’s
employment, as discussed in the introduction. Since IPV is likely endogenous to a
woman’s employment, the next section discusses the identification strategy used in this
paper.
2.3.2 Identification Strategy
IPV is unlikely to be exogenous in Equation (2.1). Three sources of endogeneity are of
particular concern. The first source is the potential for reverse causality or simultaneity:
an improvement in a wife’s employment opportunities or an increase in her labor in-
5Primary sampling units (PSU) are the first stage of selection in a multi-stage sampling procedure. In the
DHS data, these units typically correspond to an enumeration area or a segment of an enumeration area. In
this sample, there are 3,965 PSUs.
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come may lead her husband to inflict violence on her. The second source is unobserved
heterogeneity or non-random selection into violent relationships based on unobservable char-
acteristics. Unobserved variables such as social norms or characteristics of the wife and
her partner can influence both intimate partner violence and female employment, so that
IPV and employment can be correlated even if the former does not have a causal effect
on the latter. For example, husbands’ characteristics such as drug or alcohol use or in-
volvement in crime may directly affect the wife’s decisions to work and directly lead to
IPV. The third source of endogeneity is measurement error, which is particularly driven by
under-reporting of incidents of domestic violence in survey data. Any of these sources of
endogeneity will cause IPV to be correlated with the error term in Equation (2.1).
The identification strategy used in this paper relies on the use of an instrumental vari-
able (IV). To produce consistent estimates, this variable must be conditionally correlated
with reported IPV, but uncorrelated with the error term in Equation (2.1). The first as-
sumption, that the IV is correlated with IPV, can be ascertained using a test of the null
hypothesis that the instrument has no explanatory power with respect to the endogenous
variable. The result of this test is presented in section 2.4. The second assumption, or the
exclusion restriction, requires that the IV affects women’s employment only through IPV.
This restriction is not directly testable but this section discusses its validity in this context.
The instrumental variable I use for reported IPV is a dichotomous variable that indi-
cates whether a woman reports that her husband was mistreated or regularly beaten by
his parents or stepparents as a child. The identifying assumption is thus that husband’s
childhood experience of domestic violence is uncorrelated with eir in Equation (2.1). The
second-stage equation is:
Lir = α+ X′irΦ+ β · ÎPVir + θr + eir (2.2)
where ÎPVir denotes the predicted probability of IPV conditional on the instrument Zir
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and Xir, obtained from the first-stage regression of IPV on the husband’s childhood expe-
rience of domestic violence and the control variables included in Equation (2.2), which is
given by:
IPVir = α1 + X′irΠ+ ρ · Zir + ϕr + µir (2.3)
where Zir is a dichotomous variable for the husband’s childhood experience of domestic
violence, µir is an error term with mean zero, and all other variables are defined as above.
If the instrument has conditional predictive power for IPV and satisfies the exclusion
restriction and the monotonicity assumption (which are discussed below), the IV estimate
of the coefficient β is a local average treatment effect (LATE) of reported IPV on women’s
employment, i.e., the increase in the probability of work (as measured by the dependent
variable) due to IPV for those couples for whom a husband being abused by his parents
during childhood induces a change in IPV. This is the treatment effect on the group
of “compliers”. In this application, compliers are couples in which the husband’s IPV
propensity is affected by his exposure to violence as a child. The compliers group is a
subset of all couples, and it is impossible to determine whether the effect of IPV estimated
for this group is the same as that for the population as a whole.
The husband’s childhood experience of domestic violence has predictive power for
IPV, and this satisfies the “relevance” assumption in this setting, for various reasons.
Children who are exposed to domestic violence have higher levels of internalizing (de-
pression, anxiety) and externalizing (physical aggression) behaviors and post-traumatic
stress disorder (Evans, Davies, and DiLillo, 2008; Graham-Bermann et al., 2012). Fur-
ther, some studies suggest that childhood exposure to domestic violence becomes a risk
factor for being a victim and/or perpetrator of violence later in life, both in developed
(Whitfield et al., 2003) and developing countries (Martin et al., 2002). Previous stud-
ies for Colombia (Assaad, Friedemann-Sanchez, and Levison, 2016; Friedemann-Sa´nchez
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and Lovato´n, 2012) show that a partner’s experience of violence against him as a child is
highly associated with the incidence of intimate partner violence in adulthood.
One argument for why the instrumental variable proposed in this paper is likely to sat-
isfy the exclusion restriction is that it affects a husband’s potential engagement in violent
behavior long before the couple’s formation, as supported by the studies on intergenera-
tional transmission mentioned in the previous paragraph. Therefore, with the inclusion
of appropriate controls for household socioeconomic characteristics, it is plausible that
a husband’s childhood experience of violence is uncorrelated with unobserved variables
affecting the wife’s current employment status. It is still possible that the correlation be-
tween Zir and eir is non-zero due to the effect of assortative, endogenous matching, i.e.,
husbands and wives choose each other on the marriage market (Ackerberg and Botticini,
2002). I include in the regression various controls for the wife’s and husband’s character-
istics that are variables on which the matching may occur such as their education, their
age and the occupation of the husband. The inclusion of these variables increases the
likelihood that the exclusion restriction holds.
The estimated treatment effect could be different from the effect for the couples where
the husband would be violent either way (the “always takers”) or the couples where
the husband does not commit IPV whether exposed to violence as a child or not (the
“never takers”). “Defiers” would be cases where the man turns out violent if he was
not exposed to violence as a child, but if he were exposed he would be peaceful in his
marriage. Perhaps being exposed to violence makes him commit to never being violent.
The empirical evidence, however, suggests that the potential for a husband consciously
choosing to avoid perpetuating violence as an adult, despite being abused as a child, may
be ruled out in most cases (Whitfield et al., 2003; Kishor and Johnson, 2004; Flake and
Forste, 2006; Friedemann-Sa´nchez and Lovato´n, 2012). This evidence further suggests
that I can rule out the existence of “defiers” and that the monotonicity assumption is
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likely to be satisfied.6 If, however, the effect of the IV on the endogenous regressor is non-
monotonic, one must assume homogenous treatment effects (i.e., the treatment effect is
the same for everyone) and the LATE interpretation of the IV estimate on β may no longer
be valid. In such a case, one cannot guarantee that IV estimates a weighted average of the
underlying causal effects of the affected group.
Though instrumenting for IPV using the husband’s childhood experience of domestic
violence can mitigate simultaneity as a source of endogeneity, it does not fully address
endogeneity coming from measurement error in reports of domestic violence. In this
regard, note that throughout my analysis, I estimate the relationship between reported
IPV, as opposed to actual IPV, and employment status.
2.4 Results
The main empirical results are reported in Tables 2.2 to 2.5. Demographic characteristics
such as age, ethnicity, educational attainment, household wealth,7 department of resi-
dence and urban residence are included to capture earnings potential that may affect a
woman’s decision to work. I include fixed effects for the department of residence and
a dummy for urban residence to control for different labor demand conditions. Fertility
characteristics (presence of children between 6 and 18 years old, presence of children 5
years old or less, and dummy variables for having had a child in the past 12 months)
and husband’s characteristics (age, educational attainment, work status, and whether he
drinks alcohol) are also included to control for other potential factors that impact employ-
ment by affecting the costs and benefits of working relative to not working.
6The instrument may have no effect on some individuals, but all those who are affected are affected in the
same way, so that all individuals who change their treatment status as a result of a change in the instrument
either get all shifted into treatment, or get all shifted out of treatment.
7Household wealth is measured with the DHS wealth index readily available in the dataset and calculated
using the methodology of Filmer and Pritchett (2001)
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Recall that three IPV variables are used in this analysis: (1) Whether the wife expe-
rienced any physical and/or emotional IPV in the past 12 months; (2) Whether the wife
experienced physical IPV in the past 12 months; and (3) Whether the wife experienced
emotional IPV in the past 12 months.
As a baseline, I first estimate the probability that a woman works, treating IPV as
fully exogenous, using a linear probability model (LPM) to estimate Equation (2.1). The
OLS results from the linear probability model are presented in Table 2.2. I find that being
physically and/or emotionally abused by a husband in the past 12 months appears to
increase the likelihood that a wife currently works or has worked in the past 12 months
by between 3.4 and 4.4 percentage points, when the full set of controls are included in the
regressions (see columns 2, 4 and 6). Because of the potential endogeneity problems dis-
cussed in section 2.3, these results should be considered to be (conditional) associations
between women’s employment and IPV, and so they cannot be given a causal interpreta-
tion.
In an effort to provide an unbiased estimate of the impact of IPV on women’s em-
ployment, I rely on two-stage least squares estimation. For this, husband’s childhood
experience of domestic abuse is used to instrument IPV. As with the LPM, I control for
wife’s and husband’s characteristics, and cluster the standard errors at the primary sam-
pling unit level. This estimation strategy allows me to conduct a number of tests on
the validity of the instrument. The first test is a diagnostic regression of the dependent
variable on the IV as the only regressor, suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2008), to pro-
vide evidence in favor of a relationship flowing from the husband’s childhood experience
of domestic abuse to women’s employment. Table 2.3 presents the results from such a
reduced-form regression and suggests that the relationship is positive and statistically
significant. The second test is whether the instrument has sufficient explanatory power
in the first stage equation. The F-statistics for the instrument in the first stage for any
experience of IPV, shown in Table 2.4, as well as for physical and emotional IPV, are all
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well above the threshold level of 10 for an instrument not to be considered weak.
For an additional test the strength of the instrument, I use a test proposed by Mon-
tiel Olea and Pflueger (2013), which is appropriate to test for weak instruments with
one endogenous regressor. This test also allows for errors that are not conditionally ho-
moscedastic and not serially uncorrelated. Upon testing the instrument in the regression
where any experience of IPV is the endogenous variable, I obtain an effective F-stat of
368.9 with a bandwidth threshold of 10% and a 2SLS critical value of 23.1. These test
results suggest rejection of the null hypothesis of weak instruments. Similarly, I reject
the null hypothesis of weak instruments when the regressions for physical and emotional
IPV are studied separately (the effective F-stats are at 159.3 and 260.4, respectively.)
Results from regressing the indicator for IPV on the instrument and various controls,
the first stage of the 2SLS analysis, are shown in Table 2.4. Having a male partner who
was abused by his parents as a child increases the probability of experiencing IPV by
14.6 percentage points. The effects are similar when physical and emotional violence are
examined separately, with estimated increases of 8.2 and 12.7 percentage points, respec-
tively.
Instrumental variable results from the estimation of Equation (2.2) suggest that IPV
is significant and positively associated with women’s employment (see Table 2.5). The
experience of any event of spousal violence increases the likelihood of work by 16.1 per-
centage points, and this estimate is significant at the 1% level. Considering physical
violence alone the increase is of 28.7 percentage points, whereas for emotional violence it
is 18.5 percentage points, and both of these estimates are significant at the 1% level.
These IV estimates of the effect of IPV on women’s employment are much higher than
the OLS estimates in Table 2.2. When considering the magnitude of these results, it is
important to keep in mind that IV estimates a local average treatment effect (LATE). This
is the effect of IPV on the likelihood of employment for wives in couples in which the
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husband’s IPV propensity is affected by his exposure to violence as a child.
2.5 Sensitivity to Potential Violations of the Exogeneity of Hus-
band’s Childhood Exposure to Domestic Violence
2.5.1 Plausibly Exogenous Instrument
The instrument, husband’s childhood experience of violence, may fail to satisfy the ex-
clusion restriction. That is, it is possible that the husband’s experience with violence in
childhood is directly correlated with the wife’s labor status in other ways, mainly via
assortative matching. Assortative matching does not have to work through a direct impact
of husband’s childhood experiences on his wife’s employment. It could work through his
choice of wife, i.e., a man with certain childhood experiences chooses a wife who has cer-
tain personality traits that have an effect on her employment. This constitutes a potential
threat to the exclusion restriction assumption upon which the validity of the instrument
depends. The regression, however, includes a variety of husband’s and wife’s observ-
able characteristics that will partly control for assortative matching. These variables are:
age; ethnicity; educational attainment; husband’s occupation; and wife’s own childhood
exposure to violence. The inclusion of controls for household socioeconomic status also
support the exclusion of the husband’s childhood experience of violence from the wife’s
labor status equation.
To estimate the sensitivity of the two-stage least squares estimates to violations of the
exclusion restriction, I follow Conley, Hansen, and Rossi (2012). The effects of the failure
of the exclusion restriction can be seen by re-estimating Equation (2.2) as follows:
Lir = α+ Xir ′Φ+ βIV IPVir + γZir + θr + eir (2.4)
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The exclusion restriction in the usual IV model holds when γ = 0. In this section,
I consider two methods for inference about βIV without assuming γ is exactly zero. In
the first method, the union of confidence intervals (UCI) method, I assume only that the
support of γ is known. In the second method, the local-to-zero (LTZ) approximation, I
assume that γ is as a random parameter that can be described by a prior distribution.
2.5.1.1 The Union of Confidence Intervals Method
If the true value of γ is a value γ0 in the bounded support for γ, Γ, then one could
estimate via two stage least squares, using Z as instruments, the following equation:
Lihr − γ0Zir = α+ Xir ′Φ+ βIV IPVir + θr + eir (2.5)
Further, using all points in Γ and based on the asymptotic variance of the two-stage
least squares estimator, one could obtain a (1− α)% confidence interval for βIV . Conley,
Hansen, and Rossi (2012) explain that, by construction, the union of confidence intervals,
for all values of γ in Γ, will cover the true parameter value of βIV with at least a probability
(1− α)%, asymptotically.
To implement the UCI approach, one needs to make some assumptions about the
interval for Γ. I assume that γ is close to zero since, a priori, I do not expect the direct
effect of IPV on employment to be very large. Moreover, I assume a symmetric support
centered at zero, so that Γ = {−δ, δ} for different values of δ, a parameter in the [0, α]
interval.
Graphical results are shown in Figure 2.1. I compute 95% confidence bounds for the
coefficient on IPV. The figure shows how large the exclusion restriction violation would
need to be to invalidate my results in the previous section. I provide results for the IPV
variable that includes both physical and emotional violence as well as for the physical and
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emotional variables taken separately. For the first IPV variable, I find that the exclusion
restriction violation is small (i.e., δ is small) since the UCI excludes zero up to a delta
value of about 0.012. The figure also shows that the true value of the coefficient on IPV
is positive, which is consonant with my main results. Similar conclusions can be derived
for physical and emotional IPV.
2.5.1.2 The Local-to-Zero (LTZ) Approximation
Under this approach, the exclusion restriction requirement is relaxed by allowing for
uncertainty in the priors about γ. Conley, Hansen, and Rossi (2012) explain that treating
γ as local-to-zero, produces the following approximation to the distribution of βIV :
βˆ ∼approx N(β, V2SLS) + Aγ (2.6)
A = (X′Z(Z′Z)−1(Z′X))−1(X′Z) (2.7)
γ ∼ F (2.8)
where V2SLS is the variance-covariance matrix from the two-stage least squares estimation
and F is the specified prior distribution. The A term reflects the influence of exogeneity
error.
If one further assumes that the prior for γ is Gaussian, say, N(µγ,Ωγ), then
βˆ ∼approx N(β+ Aµγ, V2SLS + AΩγA′) (2.9)
In the application, I assume a prior Gaussian distribution for γ centered at zero so that
γ ∼ N(0, δ2) and compute 95% confidence bounds, with δ defined as in the previous
section. Once the 95% upper limit crosses the zero-line, that is, once confidence bounds
include zero, the 2SLS estimates are no longer significant at the 5% significance level.
Figure 2.2 summarizes the estimated results for each type of IPV. This figure shows how
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adjusted confidence intervals vary with δ and show how much uncertainty the 2SLS es-
timates can handle and still remain statistically different from zero. In all cases, the 95%
LTZ confidence intervals include a zero value up to a δ value of 0.009− 0.01. For the
physical and/or emotional IPV variable, the 2SLS estimate of the relationship between
IPV and women’s employment is found to be in the [0.064, 0.299] 95% confidence in-
terval. For physical and emotional IPV, the intervals are [0.095, 0.458] and [0.076, 0.356],
respectively. It thus looks as though my 2SLS results are robust to small departures from
the exclusion restriction assumption.
2.5.2 IPV as an Imperfect Instrumental Variable
In this section, I implement the Imperfect Instrumental Variable approach developed by
Nevo and Rosen (2012) to relax the exclusion restriction assumption and bound the esti-
mates for the parameter of interest.
The method of Nevo and Rosen (2012) relies on two critical assumptions. First, the
correlations between the endogenous regressor and the error term in Equation (2.2) and
between the instrument and the error term in the same equation have the same sign. This
implies that
ρZ,e · ρIPV,e ≥ 0 (2.10)
where ρZ,e denotes the correlation between the instrument, Z, and the error term e, and
ρIPV,e the correlation between IPV and the error term.
The second assumption is that the correlation between the instrument and the error
term is less strong in absolute terms than the correlation between the endogenous variable
and the error term. This last assumption weakens the usual assumptions for instrumental
variables which would require the correlation between the instrument and the error term
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to be zero. This is,
|ρIPV,e| ≥ |ρZ,e| (2.11)
In my application, the above assumptions are likely to be satisfied. Unobserved char-
acteristics of the husband and his wife influence women’s employment through positive
assortative matching. The assortative matching literature suggests that when choosing
a spouse individuals look for partners who share common productivity traits, work sta-
tus or earnings potential (Lam, 1988; Kalmijn, 1994; Jepsen and Jepsen, 2002). Some of
the studies mentioned in section 2.3 suggest that individuals abused in childhood may be
more likely to exhibit adverse psychosocial outcomes in adulthood, which are unobserved
but may be negatively correlated with the woman’s labor productivity or propensity to
work. The potential for positive assortative matching then suggests that the correlation
between the endogenous regressor (IPV) and the error term is likely negative, as well as
the correlation between the instrument and the error term.
Since I am controlling for a large number of factors affecting employment, I expect
the correlation between the error and the instrument to be negligible and at least smaller
than the correlation between the endogenous regressor and the error term. When this
condition is satisfied, one can estimate the lower bound of the parameter estimate using
a generated instrumental variable suggested in Nevo and Rosen (2012). In my case, the
generated instrumental variable is defined as
V(λ) = σIPV × Z− λ× σZ × IPV (2.12)
where σIPV and σZ denote standard deviations. The λ term denotes the ratio between the
correlations between the instrument and the endogenous regressor with the error term:
λ =
ρZ,e
ρIPV,e
. This term is in principle unknown; however, Nevo and Rosen (2012) show
that, under the above assumptions, its value lies between 0 and 1. With λ = 1 one has
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the worst case in which the IV is as endogenous as the endogenous regressor. In contrast,
when λ = 0, one has the IV valid case.
The first stage estimates show that the instrument has a positive effect on the endoge-
nous regressor, IPV. If the first and second assumptions hold and, as in my case, the
covariance between the endogenous variable and the instruments is positive, Nevo and
Rosen (2012) show that the bound for the true parameter value is one-sided.8 The estimate
obtained using the imperfect instrumental variable proposed in Equation (2.12) will be a
lower bound of the true parameter estimate of the effect of IPV on female employment.
That is,
β ≥ max {βIVV(λ=1), βIVZ } (2.13)
Results without covariates are displayed in Table 2.6. I estimate that the lower bound
of the true parameter is 0.15, when any event of IPV is the endogenous regressor of
interest. The lower bounds for physical and emotional IPV are 0.21 and 0.18, respectively.
These results suggest that the 2SLS estimation using husband’s childhood experience of
domestic violence as an imperfect instrument is robust, since the estimated coefficients
are not substantially modified when high levels of correlation between this imperfect
instrument and unobservables in the main equation are allowed.
Controlling for other covariates in IV regressions is often important because the as-
sumption of exogeneity may hold only after conditioning on all exogenous variables. In
the Nevo and Rosen approach, the assumptions on the correlation structure do not change
for the more general version of the model where there are additional covariates. To es-
timate the lower bound of the IPV effect using covariates, I also use 2SLS. Results with
covariates, which are displayed in Table 2.7, do not change drastically. The lower bounds
for any type, physical and emotional IPV are 0.16, 0.29 and 0.19, respectively. That is,
8If the correlation between the instrument and the endogenous regressor were negative, then the true
parameter would be bounded between the IV estimate with the Nevo-Rosen instrument and the original IV
estimate.
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the Nevo-Rosen bounds for the effect of physical and/or emotional IPV on employment
are [0.16,∞). The bounds for the effect of physical IPV and emotional IPV are [0.29,∞)
and [0.19,∞), respectively. When I relax the exogeneity assumption, the effect of IPV on
women’s employment is still positive and larger than the effect estimated with OLS.
2.6 A Possible Explanation for the IPV effect on Women’s Em-
ployment
In this section, I study the role of women’s decision-making power in explaining the
positive effect of IPV on women’s work.
2.6.1 Women’s Decision-making Power and Autonomy
Women’s decision-making power may mediate the positive relationship between IPV and
employment. In order to increase their ability to escape domestic violence, wives may
need to increase their power within the relationship and gain (more) control of their deci-
sions and earnings. This behavior is consistent with the game-theoretic model of Farmer
and Tiefenthaler (2004), which includes a threat point that is increasing in a woman’s
income and other outside opportunities.9 To achieve this, abused women may be more
likely to work.
In order to provide an exploratory assessment of the role of women’s decision-making
power, I do three things. First, I study the relationship between IPV, employment and
initial bargaining power of the wife to assess whether the effect of IPV on employment
differs by her age at marriage or education, which proxy for initial bargaining power.
Second, I examine the relationship between employment and whether a woman can make
9If an increase in a woman’s threat point increases her chances of leaving and lowers the violence when
she stays, then she would seek employment to improve her alternatives.
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spending decisions for herself and participate more in household decision-making. Last, I
use mediation analysis to assess whether decision-making power is a possible mechanism.
2.6.1.1 IPV, Employment and Initial Bargaining Power of the Wife
The relationship between IPV and employment may vary with the wife’s age, education
and age at marriage, which are variables that suggest the initial bargaining power of the
wife upon entering the labor force, as shown in the study of Heath (2014). In order to
assess whether the effect of IPV on employment differs by the initial bargaining power
of the wife, I estimate OLS regressions, because of the potential endogeneity of the initial
bargaining power variables. In these regressions, I include interactions of the IPV variable
(which includes physical or emotional abuse) with the variables for age at marriage and
years of education, along with the covariates used in previous sections.
The first column of Table 2.8 show that a one year increase in the age at marriage is
associated with a statistically significant 0.3 percentage-point increase in the probability of
employment. Among abused women, compared to those who have not been abused, the
increase in the probability of employment is negligible. Similarly, column 5 suggests that
an additional year of education is associated with a statistically significant 2.2 percentage-
point increase in the probability that a woman has worked in the past 12 months, and it
is almost the same for abused women. These results suggest that the correlation between
IPV and employment is positive although this effect may be lessened among abused
women with higher initial bargaining power.
The association between IPV and employment may be lessened among women with
higher initial bargaining power due to marriage matching. To investigate this channel, I
include husband’s education or his age relative to his wife as controls. If marriage match-
ing changes the relationship between IPV, employment and decision-making power, then
the inclusion of the variables for difference in age or difference in years of education
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will decrease the magnitude of the interaction term between the wife’s education or age
at marriage and IPV. Results in columns 2 and 5 in Table 2.8, however, show that condi-
tional on the husband’s characteristics, the relationship between a wife’s initial bargaining
power, IPV and employment remain almost identical. That is, the effect of a woman’s age
at marriage and education on bargaining power may not depend on her husband’s age
or education. This result is also observed when variables for intergenerational domestic
violence (whether the husband was mistreated during childhood or whether the wife’s
mother was abused by her husband) are included as controls, as displayed in columns 3
and 6 in the same table.
2.6.1.2 IPV, Employment and Wife’s Decision-Making Power
In order to increase their ability to escape domestic violence, wives may need to increase
their power to make decisions within the household. Instrumental theories of domestic
violence suggest that men use violence to counteract the increase in decision-making
power that women get upon working (Eswaran and Malhotra, 2011), but women with
sufficiently high decision-making power are more able to escape abusive marriages and
thus do not face such increase in violence (Heath, 2014).10 Although I am not able to
observe transitions in and out of the labor force and the timing of violence relative to
labor market decisions, I provide suggestive evidence on how employment may have
affected a woman’s decision-making power.
The measures of decision-making power that I use are: (i) whether a wife has the final
10Heath (2014) provides a brief summary of the predominant economic and social theories of domestic
violence. These theories are broadly categorized between theories of expressive violence and of instrumental
violence. In expressive violence theories, “male backlash” occurs in response to improvements in a woman’s
economic opportunities. A husband who feels less economically empowered than his wife may resort to
violence to reassert his identity as the most powerful member of the household. In instrumental violence
theories, domestic violence is a tool used by husbands to control household resources or the behavior of their
wives. These theories usually employ household bargaining models, wherein a woman’s outside option is a
key determinant of bargaining power and the actions taken by the household members. Thus, in situations
where the outside option improves sufficiently, an abused woman may be better able to leave the abusive
relationship.
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say in own health care; (ii) whether the wife has a final say in large household purchases;
and (iii) whether the wife has a final say in purchases for daily needs. To construct
these measures, I use the wife’s reports of who makes the decisions in the household.
Specifically, I assess a woman’s decision-making ability using her answer to the question:
“Who has the final say in [X] in your household?”. If the woman alone has the final say,
then each of the measures above equals one, and zero otherwise.
Initial bargaining power seems to play an important role in determining the employ-
ment effects on woman’s decision-making power. Heath (2014) shows that women with
higher bargaining power before entering the labor force are less likely to face domestic
violence upon entering the labor force. In order to assess how the employment effects
may differ by a wife’s initial bargaining power, I also include the wife’s age at marriage
and education, and interactions of these with employment, as controls in the regression
of employment on the decision-making power measures.
Previous evidence for Colombia suggests that women working in the cut-flower indus-
try, via formal jobs, increased their self-esteem and gained higher decision-making power
within the household Friedemann-Sa´nchez (2006). My results are consistent with these
findings. Columns 1, 4, 7 and 10 in Table 2.9 suggest that employment is associated with
higher decision-making power. The results also show that education and age at first mar-
riage are also positively correlated with higher decision-making power (age at marriage
is only statistically significant in the regression where the outcome is final say in own
health care and where the outcome captures overall bargaining power.) Notably, columns
3, 6, 9 and 12 suggest that employment is associated with less decision-making power in
women with more education (coefficient on interaction term is negative).11 These results
suggest that employment and education do not interact positively in raising a woman’s
decision-making power.
11The point estimates on the interaction between employment and education do not change drastically
after controlling for husband’s characteristics such as his age and education or after adding an interaction
term of employment with husband’s education.
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2.6.1.3 Women’s Empowerment as a Potential Mediator
As noted above, one potential explanation for my results is that they are driven by
women’s economic empowerment. To assess this, I check how much of my baseline
results can be explained by decision-making power, the mediator. I do so in two ways.
First, I include the mediator as a covariate in the 2SLS specification, along with IPV, the
treatment of interest. This analysis is shown in Tables 2.10 to 2.13, columns 1,3 and 5. The
coefficient on IPV remains significant, suggesting that its direct effect may not operate
through decision-making power.
To gain a deeper understanding of the mechanism, I also use a causal mediation anal-
ysis in this section. Imai et al. (2011) explain that the goal of this analysis is to decompose
the causal effect of IPV into an indirect effect, which represents the hypothesized causal
mechanism, and a direct effect, which represents all the other mechanisms. My hypoth-
esized causal mechanism is woman’s decision-making power. One problem with using
decision-making power in a causal mediation approach, however, is that it violates the key
assumption of no intermediate confounders, which are consequences of IPV that also affect
the mediator (decision-making power) and outcome (employment). To address this con-
cern, I employ a method recently developed by Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2016) that
allows the identification of causal direct effects in the face of intermediate confounders.
With this method, I am able to calculate the controlled direct effect of IPV on employment,
if I were to fix a woman’s decision-making power at a particular level (that is, decision-
making power has the same fixed value for all units). The indirect effect, in contrast, is the
portion of the total effect of IPV due to the IPV effect on the mediator and the mediator’s
subsequent effect on employment.
To calculate the controlled direct effect, I use a two-stage estimate: the sequential g-
estimator. For this, it is assumed that one can control for a set of covariates that satisfies
the sequential unconfoundedness assumption that there exist no omitted variables for two
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relationships: one between employment and IPV and the other between employment
and bargaining power (Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen, 2016). The first group of variables,
whihc relate employment and IPV, is denoted as the group of “pre-treatment” covariates,
whereas variables in the second group, which relate employment and bargaining power,
are denoted as intermediate covariates. Including intermediate covariates help make the
sequential unconfoundedness assumption more plausible.
To estimate the direct effect of IPV using mediation analysis, I first estimate the effect
of decision-making power on employment, controlling for “pre-treatment” covariates12
and intermediate covariates,13 as well as IPV. I then transform the outcome variable by
subtracting the (predicted) effect of decision-making power to create counterfactual es-
timates of the outcome as if all women had the same decision-making power. Finally, I
estimate the effect of IPV on this transformed variable using 2SLS with husband’s child-
hood exposure to domestic violence as the instrument, along with the intermediate co-
variates. The 2SLS estimator gives the controlled direct effect of IPV on employment.
One note of caution: in the context of this paper, the results from this mediation analysis
are only exploratory. Although it is possible to use instrumental variables in the second
stage of the sequential g-estimation, when I estimate the effect of IPV on the transformed
variable, that decision-making power is a potential endogenous variable would require
another estimation strategy that relies on further compliance and selection-on-observables
assumptions14 that are beyond the scope of this paper.
Estimates from this mediation analysis are reported in Tables 2.10 to 2.13. Bargaining
power is proxied here with variables for final say on own health care (Table 2.10), on large
purchases (Table 2.11) and on purchases for daily needs (Table 2.12). Table 2.13 presents
12This set of covariates include: Female’s characteristics: age, ethnicity, age at first marriage, years of ed-
ucation, woman’s father hit her mother when she was a child, woman’s mistreated by parents when she was
a child. Spouse/partner’s characteristics: age, years of education,, occupation (7 cat), alcohol consumption.
Household characteristics: urban/rural area.
13This set of covariates include: Female’s characteristics: presence of children 6-18 years old, presence of
children less than 6 years old.,any childbirths past year. Household characteristics: wealth quintile group
14For a reference, see work in progress by Blackwell (2016) on causal interaction between two treatments.
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the results for a bargaining power variable that equals 1 if the woman has a final say on
any of the three variables previously described. Overall, compared to the baseline esti-
mates of Table 2.5 and the estimates in columns 1, 3 and 5 in Tables 2.10 to 2.13, these
results suggest that the measures of decision-making power used have little influence on
the IPV effect on work. The direct effects of IPV are similar to those in Table 2.5 and are
still significant. I do not find strong evidence that the IPV positive effect on employment
may operate via the decision-making power variables here considered. Nonetheless, it is
still possible that these proxies for decision-making power are imperfect, but data limi-
tations prevent me from studying other potentially better measures of decision-making
power.
The last potential explanation for my results is a woman’s willingness to separate/divorce
from her husband in the past 12 months, the same time period for which work and abuse
are reported. If, theoretically, women’s decision-making power comes from their outside
option, then decision-making power is still a channel in the results, which are explained
by a willingness to divorce, since this also comes from increases in their outside option.
To test this mechanism, I also use the sequential g-estimation method and calculate
the controlled direct effect of IPV on employment using willingness to divorce as the
hypothesized mediator. Estimates from this analysis are reported in Table 2.14. The
results indicate that willingness to separate seems to have an important influence on the
IPV effect on employment as the IPV estimate is no longer statistically significant, despite
willingness to separate itself not being statistically significant in any regression.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
This paper estimates the effect of reported experience of intimate partner violence on
women’s employment. An econometric estimation that ignores the potential endogeneity
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problem between IPV and employment leads to biased estimates of the effects of IPV.
Two sources of endogeneity are of particular concern: reverse causality and unobserved
heterogeneity. In an attempt to deal with these sources of endogeneity, I employ an
instrumental variables approach. I use as an instrument for IPV a dummy variable that
indicates whether a husband was mistreated by his parents as a child. I find that any
event of intimate partner violence is associated with a 16.1 percentage-point increase in
the likelihood of employment, whereas physical and emotional violence are associated
with a 28.7 and 18.5 percentage-point increase, respectively. The results suggest that the
incidence of IPV does not restrain women from being active in the labor force, and instead
have the opposite effect.
The evidence presented in this paper supports the hypothesis that women may behave
strategically in their labor market decision-making and seek employment to improve their
outside alternatives when faced with intimate partner violence, as suggested by Farmer
and Tiefenthaler (2004). Women with higher initial bargaining power (proxied by age
at marriage and education) are more likely to work, and employed women also seem
to enjoy higher decision-making power within the household. However, upon explor-
ing whether a woman’s decision-making power mediates the positive impact of IPV on
employment, using the sequential g-estimation method of Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen
(2016), I find little evidence of this being the mechanism behind my results. This result,
however, may reflect that the variables for decision-making power used in this paper are
actually imperfect measures. To further explore this channel, I explore the mediating
role of a woman’s willingness to divorce, which is increasing in her outside options and
perhaps in her decision-making power. Using the mediation analysis, I find suggestive
evidence that willingness to divorce is mediating the positive relationship between IPV
and employment.
While the wife’s partner’s childhood experience of violence may not be a perfect
instrument because of some remaining concerns about its excludability and monotonicity,
31
it provides an alternative way to control for selection. If the instrument violates the
exclusion restriction, its effect would be to bias the effect of IPV on women’s work. That
is, the effect would capture both any effect of IPV itself and also effects operating through
pathways relating to the husband’s direct impact on the wife due to marriage matching,
for instance.
That the IPV measure used in this paper is self-reported posits another problem. Al-
though the DHS program attempts to minimize the underreporting and measurement
error of this variable by “building rapport with the respondent, ensuring privacy, provid-
ing the respondent with multiple opportunities for disclosure [. . . ] not only by asking
them many different times about any experience of violence, but also by asking them
about many different forms of violence” (Kishor and Johnson, 2004), my estimates of the
effect of IPV on employment should be interpreted cautiously. Still, despite the number
of caveats to the results presented, this study sheds new light on the impact of intimate
partner violence on female labor market decisions.
My findings may suggest some important policy implications. That women victims
of IPV are more likely to work suggests that they may benefit from counseling and legal
help inside and outside the workplace. This is particularly important since previous
studies (Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 2004) suggest that IPV has negative effects on labor
productivity. Provision of women’s shelters and better enforcement of the law may also
help women facing IPV to lessen the severity of the violence. Although the Comisarias de
Familia program has been available to abused women in Colombia for more than 20 years,
no rigourous, economic evaluation of the program has been conducted yet.
Possibilities for future research include tackling the remaining methodological issues
using administrative data to study the effect of IPV on the transitions in and out of the
labor market, which also requires being able to observe the full labor history of a woman.
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Figure 2.1: Conley-Hansen-Rossi Bounds Test for Instrument Validity: Union of Confi-
dence Intervals
Note: All the reported bounds are for the 95% confidence intervals which have been generated from robust PSU clustered
standard errors. The estimates are obtained using the STATA command plausexog by Clarke (2014).
This figure presents 95% confidence intervals for the estimated coefficient of IPV under the assumption that the
instrumental variable has an baseline influence on employment. On the horizontal axis, I vary the baseline influence of
husband’s childhood experience of domestic violence on employment.
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Figure 2.2: Conley-Hansen-Rossi Bounds Test for Instrument Validity: Local-to-Zero Ap-
proximation
Note: All the reported bounds are for the 95% confidence intervals which have been generated from robust PSU clustered
standard errors. The estimates are obtained using the STATA command plausexog by Clarke (2014).
This figure presents 95% confidence intervals for the estimated coefficient of IPV under the assumption that the
instrumental variable has an baseline influence on employment. On the horizontal axis, I vary the baseline influence of
husband’s childhood experience of domestic violence on employment.
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of Women in Sample (N=25,528)
Variable All Women IPV Victims Non-Victims
Difference in
means
P-value for
t-test of diff in
means
Wife worked in past 12 months 0.690 0.716 0.669 0.046 0.000
Quintile 1 of household wealth 0.200 0.184 0.213 -0.029 0.000
Quintile 2 of household wealth 0.200 0.206 0.195 0.010 0.115
Quintile 3 of household wealth 0.200 0.219 0.186 0.033 0.000
Quintile 4 of household wealth 0.202 0.214 0.193 0.020 0.003
Quintile 5 of household wealth 0.197 0.178 0.212 -0.034 0.000
Urban residence 0.766 0.792 0.746 0.046 0.000
Age of wife 33.642 32.189 34.812 -2.623 0.000
Wife’s Ethnicity: No ethnicity 0.858 0.853 0.862 -0.009 0.134
Wife’s Ethnicity: Indigenous 0.043 0.042 0.044 -0.002 0.483
Wife’s Ethnicity: Afro-Colombian 0.099 0.104 0.094 0.010 0.044
Wife’s Ethnicity: Other 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.303
Wife’s education 9.090 9.047 9.124 -0.077 0.265
Wife’s age at marriage 20.864 20.341 21.286 -0.945 0.000
Any children aged 6+ at home 0.590 0.567 0.610 -0.043 0.000
Any children aged 5 or less at home 0.397 0.428 0.373 0.055 0.000
Wife currently pregnant 0.044 0.045 0.043 0.003 0.383
Any childbirth in past year 0.084 0.087 0.082 0.005 0.230
Wife has final say on own health care 0.791 0.816 0.771 0.045 0.000
Wife has final say on making large household purchases 0.298 0.328 0.274 0.054 0.000
Wife has final say on making household purchases for daily
needs 0.456 0.475 0.441 0.034 0.000
Husband’s age 38.194 36.712 39.294 -2.582 0.000
Husband’s education 10.818 10.870 10.776 0.094 0.281
Husband currently working 0.929 0.925 0.932 -0.008 0.100
Husband drinks alcohol 0.663 0.715 0.621 0.094 0.000
Wife’s mother ever beaten by husband 0.359 0.417 0.312 0.105 0.000
Wife mistreated by parents in childhood 0.210 0.215 0.206 0.009 0.207
Husband mistreated by parents in childhood 0.335 0.412 0.274 0.139 0.000
Source: 2010 Colombian DHS
Table 2.2: OLS Estimates for the Likelihood of Women’s Employment
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Work in past 12 months
Physical and/or emotional IPV 0.044∗∗∗
(0.008)
Physical IPV in past 12 months 0.034∗∗∗
(0.012)
Emotional IPV in past 12 months 0.043∗∗∗
(0.008)
Urban Residence 0.054∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Quintile 2 of household wealth 0.074∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Quintile 3 of household wealth 0.079∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Quintile 4 of household wealth 0.082∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Quintile 5 of household wealth 0.068∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Wife’s Age Group: 26-35 0.084∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Wife’s Age Group: 36-49 0.093∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Wife’s Ethnicity: Indigenous 0.080∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Wife’s Ethnicity: Afro-Colombian 0.025∗ 0.026∗ 0.025∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Wife’s Ethnicity: Other 0.211∗ 0.220∗∗ 0.210∗
(0.109) (0.107) (0.109)
Wife’s Education: Incomplete primary 0.015 0.013 0.014
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Wife’s Education: Complete primary 0.034 0.033 0.033
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Wife’s Education: Incomplete secondary 0.032 0.031 0.031
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Wife’s Education: Complete secondary 0.104∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Wife’s Education: Higher 0.242∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Any children aged 6+ in the household 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Any children aged 5 or less in the household -0.068∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Any childbirth in past year -0.150∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Husband’s Age Group: 25-35 0.015 0.013 0.015
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Husband’s Age Group: 35-49 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Husband’s Age Group: 50-65 -0.069∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Husband’s Age Group: 65+ -0.032 -0.034 -0.032
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Husband’s Age Group: Unknown 0.186∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Husband’s Education: Incomplete primary 0.018 0.016 0.018
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Husband’s Education: Complete primary 0.038 0.036 0.039
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Husband’s Education: Incomplete secondary 0.034 0.032 0.034
Continued on next page
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Table 2.2 continued
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Work in past 12 months
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Husband’s Education: Complete secondary 0.045 0.043 0.046
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
Husband’s Education: Higher 0.053∗ 0.049∗ 0.052∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Husband’s Education: Unknown 0.008 0.004 0.009
(0.046) (0.047) (0.046)
Husband currently working -0.033∗∗ -0.034∗∗ -0.033∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Husband drinks alcohol 0.020∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Constant 0.291∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Department Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.126 0.124 0.126
Observations 21,345 21,345 21,345
Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the PSU level
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2010 Colombian DHS
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Table 2.3: OLS Estimation Results for the Reduced Form Relationship between Women’s
Work and Husband’s Childhood Exposure to Domestic Violence
(1)
Dependent Variable: Work in past 12 months
Husband mistreated by parents in childhood 0.023∗∗∗
(0.008)
Constant 0.686∗∗∗
(0.006)
R− squared 0.001
Observations 22,668
Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the PSU level
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2010 Colombian DHS
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Table 2.4: First-Stage Estimates for the Likelihood of Intimate Partner Violence
(1) (2) (3)
Any IPV Physical IPV Emotional IPV
Dependent Variable: Victim of IPV in past 12 months
Husband mistreated by parents in childhood 0.146∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
Urban Residence 0.047∗∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.010) (0.015)
Quintile 2 of household wealth 0.026∗ 0.012 0.022
(0.015) (0.010) (0.016)
Quintile 3 of household wealth 0.048∗∗ 0.019 0.045∗∗
(0.019) (0.013) (0.020)
Quintile 4 of household wealth 0.046∗∗ 0.009 0.046∗∗
(0.021) (0.014) (0.021)
Quintile 5 of household wealth 0.016 -0.003 0.014
(0.023) (0.014) (0.023)
Wife’s Age Group: 26-35 -0.099∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.011) (0.015)
Wife’s Age Group: 36-49 -0.166∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.013) (0.017)
Wife’s Ethnicity: Indigenous -0.004 0.015 -0.007
(0.021) (0.015) (0.020)
Wife’s Ethnicity: Afro-Colombian 0.038∗∗ 0.011 0.040∗∗
(0.017) (0.010) (0.017)
Wife’s Ethnicity: Other 0.116 -0.080∗∗∗ 0.133
(0.226) (0.031) (0.221)
Wife’s Education: Incomplete primary -0.060∗ -0.043∗ -0.027
(0.035) (0.024) (0.034)
Wife’s Education: Complete primary -0.066∗ -0.037 -0.025
(0.036) (0.024) (0.035)
Wife’s Education: Incomplete secondary -0.055 -0.045∗ -0.013
(0.036) (0.025) (0.036)
Wife’s Education: Complete secondary -0.088∗∗ -0.063∗∗ -0.045
(0.036) (0.025) (0.036)
Wife’s Education: Higher -0.082∗∗ -0.051∗∗ -0.043
(0.037) (0.025) (0.037)
Any children aged 6+ in the household 0.028∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.023∗∗
(0.011) (0.006) (0.011)
Any children aged 5 or less in the household 0.021∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.011
(0.011) (0.007) (0.011)
Any childbirth in past year -0.072∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.011) (0.016)
Husband’s Age Group: 25-35 -0.047∗∗∗ -0.023∗ -0.047∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.014) (0.017)
Husband’s Age Group: 35-49 -0.067∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.015) (0.020)
Husband’s Age Group: 50-65 -0.081∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.017) (0.024)
Husband’s Age Group: 65+ -0.099∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.089
(0.058) (0.024) (0.057)
Husband’s Age Group: Unknown 0.033 0.136∗∗∗ 0.014
(0.023) (0.020) (0.023)
Husband’s Education: Incomplete primary -0.049∗ 0.004 -0.052∗
(0.028) (0.017) (0.028)
Husband’s Education: Complete primary -0.056∗∗ -0.004 -0.059∗∗
(0.029) (0.018) (0.029)
Husband’s Education: Incomplete secondary -0.037 0.001 -0.040
(0.029) (0.018) (0.029)
Husband’s Education: Complete secondary 0.002 0.055∗∗ -0.008
(0.035) (0.024) (0.036)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.4 continued
(1) (2) (3)
Any IPV Physical IPV Emotional IPV
Dependent Variable: Victim of IPV in past 12 months
Husband’s Education: Higher -0.079∗∗ -0.017 -0.074∗∗
(0.031) (0.019) (0.031)
Husband’s Education: Unknown -0.161∗∗∗ -0.038 -0.159∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.037) (0.053)
Husband currently working -0.011 -0.003 -0.012
(0.018) (0.012) (0.018)
Husband drinks alcohol 0.088∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.006) (0.009)
Constant 0.508∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.030) (0.050)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.447 0.146 0.415
Department Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat 211.533 142.933 165.472
R-squared 0.019 0.015 0.015
Observations 19,085 19,085 19,085
Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the PSU level
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2010 Colombian DHS
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Table 2.5: 2SLS Estimates for the Likelihood of Women’s Employment
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Work in past 12 months
Physical and/or emotional IPV in past 12 months 0.161∗∗∗
(0.059)
Physical IPV in past 12 months 0.287∗∗∗
(0.107)
Emotional IPV in past 12 months 0.185∗∗∗
(0.068)
Urban Residence 0.046∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Quintile 2 of household wealth 0.071∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Quintile 3 of household wealth 0.076∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
Quintile 4 of household wealth 0.076∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Quintile 5 of household wealth 0.068∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
Wife’s Age Group: 26-35 0.089∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Wife’s Age Group: 36-49 0.104∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Wife’s Ethnicity: Indigenous 0.067∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Wife’s Ethnicity: Afro-Colombian 0.022 0.025∗ 0.021
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Wife’s Ethnicity: Other 0.212 0.254∗∗ 0.206
(0.133) (0.119) (0.135)
Wife’s Education: Incomplete primary 0.024 0.026 0.019
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
Wife’s Education: Complete primary 0.044 0.044 0.038
(0.038) (0.037) (0.038)
Wife’s Education: Incomplete secondary 0.042 0.047 0.036
(0.038) (0.037) (0.038)
Wife’s Education: Complete secondary 0.112∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Wife’s Education: Higher 0.252∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Any children aged 6+ in the household -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Any children aged 5 or less in the household -0.072∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Any childbirth in past year -0.142∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Husband’s Age Group: 25-35 0.022 0.021 0.023
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Husband’s Age Group: 35-49 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Husband’s Age Group: 50-65 -0.053∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.052∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Husband’s Age Group: 65+ -0.021 -0.017 -0.020
(0.055) (0.056) (0.055)
Husband’s Age Group: Unknown 0.187∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.026) (0.020)
Husband’s Education: Incomplete primary 0.013 0.004 0.014
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
Husband’s Education: Complete primary 0.032 0.024 0.034
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
Husband’s Education: Incomplete secondary 0.031 0.025 0.032
Continued on next page
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Table 2.5 continued
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Work in past 12 months
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
Husband’s Education: Complete secondary 0.041 0.025 0.042
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
Husband’s Education: Higher 0.056∗ 0.048 0.057∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
Husband’s Education: Unknown -0.002 -0.017 0.001
(0.054) (0.053) (0.055)
Husband currently working -0.026∗ -0.027∗ -0.026
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Husband drinks alcohol 0.010 0.011 0.009
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Constant 0.240∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.052) (0.059)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.682 0.682 0.682
Department Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-stat 211.533 142.933 165.472
R-squared 0.108 0.095 0.102
Observations 19,085 19,085 19,085
Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the PSU level
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2010 Colombian DHS
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Table 2.6: 2SLS Estimates for Women’s Employment: Nevo-Rosen Approach with no Covariates
OLS 2SLS: Imperfect IV 2SLS: Nevo-Rosen IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable: Work in past 12 months
Physical and/or emotional IPV in past 12 months 0.046∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.015∗
(0.007) (0.054) (0.009)
Physical IPV in past 12 months 0.064∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.062
(0.010) (0.076) (0.042)
Emotional IPV in past 12 months 0.045∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.016∗
(0.008) (0.064) (0.009)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682
Observations 25,528 25,528 25,528 22,668 22,668 22,668 22,668 22,668 22,668
Note: No covariates included. Imperfect Instrument: Husband’s Childhood Experience of Domestic Violence.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Clustered at the PSU level for OLS and IIV models. Bootstrap (200 reps.) for Rosen-Nevo instrument
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2010 Colombian DHS
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Table 2.7: 2SLS Estimates for Women’s Employment: Nevo-Rosen Approach with Covariates
OLS 2SLS: Imperfect IV 2SLS: Nevo-Rosen IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable: Work in past 12 months
Physical and/or emotional IPV in past 12 months 0.044∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.019∗
(0.008) (0.059) (0.010)
Physical IPV in past 12 months 0.034∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.097∗
(0.012) (0.107) (0.053)
Emotional IPV in past 12 months 0.043∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.020∗
(0.008) (0.068) (0.010)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682
Department Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household’s Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wife’s Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Husband’s Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21,345 21,345 21,345 19,085 19,085 19,085 19,085 19,085 19,085
Note: Imperfect Instrument: Husband’s Childhood Experience of Domestic Violence.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Clustered at the PSU level for OLS and IIV models. Bootstrap (200 reps.) for Rosen-Nevo instrument.
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2010 Colombian DHS
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Table 2.8: OLS Estimates: Relationship between Wife and Husband Characteristics, IPV and Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Wife worked in past 12 months
Physical and/or emotional IPV in past 12 months 0.099∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗
(0.036) (0.046) (0.050) (0.033) (0.034) (0.039)
Wife’s age at marriage 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IPV × Wife’s age at marriage -0.003∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age Difference Husband-Wife -0.003∗∗ -0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
IPV × Age Difference Husband-Wife -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Wife’s education 0.024∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IPV × Wife’s education -0.003 -0.003∗ -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Education Difference Husband-Wife 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
IPV × Education Difference Husband-Wife -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Wife’s mother ever beaten by her husband 0.025∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.008)
Husband mistreated in childhood 0.009 0.032∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.008)
Department Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.040 0.045 0.023 0.074 0.075 0.061
Observations 25,528 20,595 17,994 25,528 25,090 21,711
Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the PSU level
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2010 Colombian DHS
Notes: Coefficients on Age and Age x IPV are not reported.
Columns 3 and 6 lose sample size because the wife did not report either her spouse’s age or her spouse’s education.
46
Table 2.9: OLS Estimates: Effects of Employment, Age at Marriage, and Education on Self-reported Autonomy
Own health care Large purchases Daily purchases All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent Variable: Wife has final say
Employment 0.104∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.040 0.006 0.098∗∗∗ 0.056 0.103∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.036) (0.032) (0.007) (0.034) (0.032) (0.009) (0.039) (0.035) (0.007) (0.032) (0.030)
Wife’s age at marriage 0.004∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Employment × Wife’s age at marriage -0.002 -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Wife’s education 0.019∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Employment × Wife’s education -0.008∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.772∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.030 0.376∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ -0.003 0.812∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.033) (0.028) (0.013) (0.029) (0.026) (0.016) (0.036) (0.032) (0.011) (0.030) (0.027)
Department Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.048 0.049 0.067 0.035 0.053 0.052 0.017 0.043 0.046 0.034 0.037 0.054
Observations 25,528 25,528 25,528 25,528 25,528 25,528 25,528 25,528 25,528 25,528 25,528 25,528
Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the PSU level
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2010 Colombian DHS
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Table 2.10: OLS Estimates: Effects of IPV on Work Net the Effect of Women’s Decision-Making Power on Her Own Health
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Work in past 12 months
Physical and/or emotional IPV in past 12 months 0.120∗∗
(0.054)
Direct effect any IPV 0.118∗∗
(0.055)
Physical IPV in past 12 months 0.198∗∗
(0.090)
Direct effect physical IPV 0.194∗∗
(0.092)
Emotional IPV in past 12 months 0.142∗∗
(0.064)
Direct effect emotional IPV 0.139∗∗
(0.065)
Wife has final say on own health care 0.049∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Model 2SLS Seq. g-est 2SLS Seq. g-est 2SLS Seq. g-est
Department Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.083 0.078 0.079
Observations 17,652 17,652 17,652 17,652 17,652 17,652
Notes: For 2SLS estimation: Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the PSU level.
For sequential g-estimation: Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the PSU level; 200 replications.
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2010 Colombian DHS
Pre-treatment covariates: Female’s characteristics: age, ethnicity, age at first marriage, years of education
Spouse/partner’s characteristics: age, years of education, work status, alcohol consumption.
Household characteristics: urban/rural area
Intermediate covariates: Female’s characteristics: presence of children 6-18 y.o., presence of children less than 6 y.o.,
any childbirths past year. Household characteristics: wealth quintile group
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Table 2.11: OLS Estimates: Effects of IPV on Work Net the Effect of Women’s Decision-Making Power on Large Purchases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Work in past 12 months
Physical and/or emotional IPV in past 12 months 0.130∗∗
(0.054)
Direct effect any IPV 0.130∗∗
(0.056)
Physical IPV in past 12 months 0.215∗∗
(0.090)
Direct effect physical IPV 0.214∗∗
(0.092)
Emotional IPV in past 12 months 0.153∗∗
(0.064)
Direct effect emotional IPV 0.153∗∗
(0.066)
Wife has final say on making large household purchases 0.066∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Model 2SLS Seq. g-est 2SLS Seq. g-est 2SLS Seq. g-est
Department Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.083 0.077 0.078
Observations 17,652 17,652 17,652 17,652 17,652 17,652
Notes: For 2SLS estimation: Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the PSU level.
For sequential g-estimation: Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the PSU level; 200 replications.
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2010 Colombian DHS
Pre-treatment covariates: Female’s characteristics: age, ethnicity, age at first marriage, years of education
Spouse/partner’s characteristics: age, years of education, work status, alcohol consumption.
Household characteristics: urban/rural area
Intermediate covariates: Female’s characteristics: presence of children 6-18 y.o., presence of children less than 6 y.o.,
any childbirths past year. Household characteristics: wealth quintile group
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Table 2.12: OLS Estimates: Effects of IPV on Work Net the Effect of Women’s Decision-Making Power on Daily Purchases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Work in past 12 months
Physical and/or emotional IPV in past 12 months 0.132∗∗
(0.054)
Direct effect any IPV 0.130∗∗
(0.056)
Physical IPV in past 12 months 0.217∗∗
(0.090)
Direct effect physical IPV 0.214∗∗
(0.092)
Emotional IPV in past 12 months 0.155∗∗
(0.064)
Direct effect emotional IPV 0.153∗∗
(0.066)
Wife has final say on making household purchases for daily needs 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Model 2SLS Seq. g-est 2SLS Seq. g-est 2SLS Seq. g-est
Department Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.080 0.074 0.075
Observations 17,652 17,652 17,652 17,652 17,652 17,652
Notes: For 2SLS estimation: Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the PSU level.
For sequential g-estimation: Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the PSU level; 200 replications.
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2010 Colombian DHS
Pre-treatment covariates: Female’s characteristics: age, ethnicity, age at first marriage, years of education
Spouse/partner’s characteristics: age, years of education, work status, alcohol consumption.
Household characteristics: urban/rural area
Intermediate covariates: Female’s characteristics: presence of children 6-18 y.o., presence of children less than 6 y.o.,
any childbirths past year. Household characteristics: wealth quintile group
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Table 2.13: OLS Estimates: Effects of IPV on Work Net the Effect of Women’s Decision-Making Power on Own Health, Large
Household Purchases and Daily Household Purchases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Work in past 12 months
Physical and/or emotional IPV in past 12 months 0.118∗∗
(0.055)
Direct effect any IPV 0.116∗∗
(0.056)
Physical IPV in past 12 months 0.194∗∗
(0.090)
Direct effect physical IPV 0.190∗∗
(0.092)
Emotional IPV in past 12 months 0.139∗∗
(0.064)
Direct effect emotional IPV 0.136∗∗
(0.066)
Wife has final say on various dimmensions 0.057∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Model 2SLS Seq. g-est 2SLS Seq. g-est 2SLS Seq. g-est
Department Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.084 0.079 0.080
Observations 17,652 17,652 17,652 17,652 17,652 17,652
Decision making power equals 1 if the wife has final say on at least one of own health, large household purchases
and daily household purchases.
Notes: For 2SLS estimation: Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the PSU level.
For sequential g-estimation: Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the PSU level; 200 replications.
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2010 Colombian DHS
Pre-treatment covariates: Female’s characteristics: age, ethnicity, age at first marriage, years of education
Spouse/partner’s characteristics: age, years of education, work status, alcohol consumption.
Household characteristics: urban/rural area
Intermediate covariates: Female’s characteristics: presence of children 6-18 y.o., presence of children less than 6 y.o.,
any childbirths past year. Household characteristics: wealth quintile group
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Table 2.14: OLS Estimates: Effects of IPV on Work Net the Effect of Women’s Willigness to Separate in Past Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Work in past 12 months
Physical and/or emotional IPV in past 12 months 0.118
(0.090)
Direct effect any IPV 0.077
(0.055)
Physical IPV in past 12 months 0.203
(0.156)
Direct effect physical IPV 0.111
(0.091)
Emotional IPV in past 12 months 0.143
(0.110)
Direct effect emotional IPV 0.089
(0.064)
Considered separating from husband in past 12 months 0.016 0.012 0.013
(0.033) (0.036) (0.035)
Model 2SLS Seq. g-est 2SLS Seq. g-est 2SLS Seq. g-est
Department Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.082 0.075 0.077
Observations 17,652 17,652 17,652 17,652 17,652 17,652
Notes: For 2SLS estimation: Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the PSU level.
For sequential g-estimation: Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the PSU level; 200 replications.
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: 2010 Colombian DHS
Pre-treatment covariates: Female’s characteristics: age, ethnicity, age at first marriage, years of education
Spouse/partner’s characteristics: age, years of education, work status, alcohol consumption.
Household characteristics: urban/rural area
Intermediate covariates: Female’s characteristics: presence of children 6-18 y.o., presence of children less than 6 y.o.,
any childbirths past year. Household characteristics: wealth quintile group
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3.1 Introduction
The 2006 World Development Report on Equity and Development highlights that health is
not only an important dimension of welfare, but that inequality in health often reinforces
and reproduces over time inequality in domains such as income, education or labor (The
World Bank, 2005). The traditional focus of policies that aim to reduce health inequity in
both developed and developing countries is the reduction of inequality in specific health
outcomes as well as in access to health care services and health insurance. Differences
in opportunities driven by individual characteristics such as gender, ethnicity or place
of origin have not received such consideration. However, they seem to play a key role
in determining how health inequality reproduces over time and across generations. For
that reason, the study of alternative policies to reduce health inequality has led to an
increasing interest in the equality of opportunity literature and its empirical application
to health equity (Rosa Dias and Jones, 2007; Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009; Rosa Dias,
2009; Jusot, Tubeuf, and Trannoy, 2010; Donni, Peragine, and Pignataro, 2014).
Roemer (1998)’s theoretical approach to equality of opportunity is based on the idea
that the sources of an individual’s desirable outcome, like good health, can be separated
into circumstances and efforts. Circumstances are factors that are beyond an individ-
ual’s control and inequalities emerging from such circumstances should be compensated.
Conversely, effort is affected by individual choice and inequalities arising from different
efforts are morally and normatively acceptable. The most important implication derived
from the equality of opportunity approach is that an equal-opportunity policy should aim
to provide everyone with the same opportunity to achieve or enjoy an excellent outcome.
A social planner, therefore, would seek to equalize opportunities rather than outcomes
and would allow individuals to be fully responsible for their own choices and final results.
Inequality of opportunity, from a theoretical stance, rests on two principles: the com-
pensation principle and the reward principle (Ramos and Van de Gaer, 2015). The com-
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pensation principle indicates that inequalities due to circumstances must be compensated,
whereas the reward principle indicates that individual efforts must be rewarded. The ex-
ante approach to compensation suggests that equality of opportunity holds as long as all
individuals face the same opportunities, regardless of each one’s circumstances. Under
this approach, the observation of all possible efforts is not required for empirical analysis
as inequality of opportunity can then be studied focusing on the outcome distributions
for different sets of circumstances.
Following an ex-ante approach, inequality of opportunity in adult health has been
studied mainly in the context of developed countries. For instance, Rosa Dias (2009)
finds that about 21% of health inequality in adulthood, for a cohort of British individ-
uals born in 1956, is related to circumstances in childhood such as maternal education,
spells of financial difficulties, as well as poor health and obesity in childhood. The em-
pirical analysis developed in this chapter is also grounded on Trannoy et al. (2010) and
Donni, Peragine, and Pignataro (2014). Trannoy et. al study inequality of opportunity
among French adults and suggest that such inequality might be halved if the effects of
individual circumstances were removed. Donni, Peragine and Pignataro, in contrast to
Rosa-Dias, apply an alternative empirical approach to data from various waves of the
British Household Panel Survey and estimate that about 30% of adult health inequality is
due to circumstances. For developing countries, the literature is very scarce. For instance,
Jusot, Mage, and Menendez (2014) study inequality of opportunity in adult health in In-
donesia. The authors construct a synthetic index of global health status using information
on biomarkers and self-reported health. Their most striking finding is that the existence
of long-term inequalities in adult health is related mainly to variables that indicate a sense
of community such as religion and language spoken.
This chapter fits in this line of research. Specifically, I address the following research
question: among the set of observed circumstances, which particular earlylife circum-
stances have a salient long-term association with observed inequality of opportunity in
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adult health Colombia as a whole, and in both rural and urban areas of the country? This
study is among the first to answer this question using data from a developing country.
Colombia is undergoing rapid demographic changes. The Colombian population pre-
dominantly lives is urban areas, is aging as life expectancy at birth has increased from
65 to 75 years in the last 35 years, and a fertility rate decreasing from 4.0 in 1980 to 2.0
births per woman in 2015. Additionally, health outcomes appear to be worse in rural
areas than in urban areas. Health status varies greatly between rural and urban residents:
32% of the rural population reports a poor or fair health status whereas 22% of the urban
population reports a similar status. It is worth noting that access to health care services
has considerably increased in the country. The The World Health Organization (2006)
reports that the Colombian health system achieved 96% coverage of the population in
2013. Yet, some important differences persist between urban and rural areas. Findings
from a few studies (Restrepo et al., 2007; Flo´rez et al., 2007) suggest that the area of resi-
dence is an important determinant of the use of health services in Colombia. Differential
health care use between urban and rural residents may reflect both a major difficulty in
securing the availability of health care providers in rural areas and a large concentration
of private health care providers in urban areas (Vargas-Lorenzo, 2009). Besides important
differences in the density of medical care access or income, exposure to different child-
hood circumstances may still play an important role in adult health outcomes currently
observed in urban and rural areas.
I use data from the 2010 Colombian Living Standards and Social Mobility Survey, a
rich dataset that provides retrospective information about individual childhood. In the
empirical analysis, I use first-order stochastic dominance analysis to provide a weak test
of inequality of opportunity in the conditional distributions of self-assessed health status,
following Lefranc, Pistolesi, and Trannoy (2009). I also compute a dissimilarity index
and a Gini-opportunity index as direct measures of inequality of opportunity (Paes De
Barros, Vega, and Saavedra, 2008; Paes De Barros et al., 2009; Rosa Dias, 2009). I then use
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the Shapley-value decomposition to calculate the specific contribution of childhood cir-
cumstances such as parental education and household socioeconomic status at age 10 to
inequality of opportunity. The findings suggest that 8% to 10% of the circumstance-driven
opportunities distinctively enjoyed by those who are healthier should be compensated for
or redistributed among those who are less healthy in order to achieve equality of oppor-
tunity. Differences in household socioeconomic status during childhood and parental
educational attainment appear to be the most important dimensions of inequality of op-
portunity in adult health. Household socioeconomic status at age 10 contributes between
15% and 22% to the dissimilarity index, whereas parental education between 10% and
13%. In contrast, Jusot, Mage, and Menendez (2014) suggest ethnicity and region of birth
are more important factors for health inequity in Indonesia.
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 2010
Living Standards and Social Mobility Survey and provides some descriptive statistics.
Section 3 explains the empirical methods. Estimation results are presented in Section 4.
Section 5 provides a discussion of the limitations of this study and concluding remarks.
3.2 Data
The main data source is the 2010 Colombian Living Standards and Social Mobility Survey
(LSSM – Encuesta de Calidad de Vida y Movilidad Social) carried out by the Colombian
Bureau of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica – DANE.) This
survey provides current and retrospective measures of socioeconomic characteristics. The
LSSM is representative for the entire country, urban and rural areas, and for nine differ-
ent subnational regions.2 The LSSM includes recall questions on living conditions when
the respondent was 10 years old. This set of questions provides information on parental
2The regions are: Atlantic, Eastern, Central, Pacific, Orinoquia-Amazonia, Antioquia, Valle del Cauca,
San Andrs and Providencia, and Bogota. Rural areas in the regions of Orinoquia-Amazonia and San Andrs
and Providencia were not surveyed due to prohibitive costs and poor road access.
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educational attainment and ownership of durable assets during childhood. The social
mobility module in the LSSM only considers heads of household who are between 25
and 65 years old. The sample design ensures that the final sample of 2,253 individuals
represents about 9.57 million heads of household in Colombia. Table 3.1 displays a sum-
mary of descriptive statistics for the full sample. Table A.1 and Table A.2 in Section A.1
in the Appendix C show the summary statistics for the urban and rural sub-samples.
The outcome of interest is health status in adulthood. It is measured by self-assessed
health status, which has been demonstrated to be effective in predicting mortality (Idler
and Benyamini, 1997; Van Doorslaer and Gerdtham, 2003) and health care utilization (De
Salvo et al., 2005). In the survey, individuals rank their health as either poor (1), fair
(2), good (3) or excellent (4) when answering the question “In general, how do you rate
your health status?.” Around 73% of the respondents reported a good or an excellent
health status whereas 2.2% reported a poor health status. By area, 78% of urban residents
reported at least a good health status whereas 68% of rural residents reported a similar
status.
Self-reported health status has some limitations that have been previously identified
in the health literature (Jusot, Mage, and Menendez, 2014). The first limitation is that
sub-groups of the population may use different thresholds and reference points when
assessing their health status, although their objective health conditions are probably the
same, leading to a problem known as reporting bias. The second limitation is the lack of
cardinality and continuity of the self-assessed health status variable. This problem proves
difficult for the use of standard inequality measures.
The set of early-life circumstances includes parental educational level and household
socioeconomic status at age 10. Parental educational attainment is a categorical variable
that indicates whether a parent completed or not a specific level (primary school, sec-
ondary school or higher education). In this sample, approximately 60% of the heads of
household reported that their parents did not attend school or did not complete primary
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education. In contrast, less than 9% indicated that their parents completed secondary
school or a higher education level. In urban areas, 46% of fathers and 51% of mothers
did not complete primary education. In rural areas, the%ages for incomplete primary
education are even higher: 54% for fathers and 62% for mothers.
Household socioeconomic status at age 10 is a categorical variable that indicates the
quintile group in which a household falls into, based on an asset index following the
methodology by Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006).3 For the full sample, about 25%4 of the
heads of household are assigned to the first quintile group of the socioeconomic index,
according to their reports of assets ownership.5 In urban areas, each of the five quintile
groups has approximately the same number of individuals. In rural areas, in contrast,
25% of individuals belong in the first quintile group. Retrospective data are far from
ideal and measurement error and recall bias could be problematic, in particular when
income or earnings data are asked. It is still possible to argue that the variables for assets
ownership could be remembered with some reasonable accuracy despite observing longer
recall intervals for older adults, as suggested by Angulo et al. (2012).
Other variables that are likely to affect individual health status are also considered.
In the set of demographic controls, I include ethnicity, urban or rural location of birth, and
region of birth. About 9% of heads of household reported being a member of an eth-
nic minority. Indigenous minorities are mostly located in rural areas, in contrast with
African-Colombian minorities who are uniformly distributed between urban and rural
areas..6 Regarding location of birth, about 28.4% of current residents in urban areas
3Variables in the socioeconomic status index include type of floor materials, source of water supply,
type of toilet available, availability of electricity, and ownership of appliances like washing machine, vacuum
cleaner, refrigerator, gas or electric stove, gas or electric oven, television set, as well as ownership of dwelling,
automobile, or motorcycle.
4Quintiles of the wealth index do not contain equal numbers of individuals, since many respondents in
rural areas have the same or very similar index scores in the lower part of the distribution.
5One potential concern that arises from the use of these data is the recall nature of the early-life circum-
stances. A threat to this analysis comes from the possibility that the information reported is less accurate for
longer recall intervals, in particular, for older adults regarding assets ownership in their childhood.
6The choice between ethnicity and region is not of particular concern here. The correlation between these
variables is low. Predicting ethnicity from region of birth, or vice versa, gives a variance inflation factor of 1,
which is well below the rule of thumb of 10.
58
were born in rural areas, with the younger urban cohorts exhibiting a smaller proportion
of rural-born adults. There are substantial socio-economic differences between regions
within the country. The World Bank (The World Bank, 2015)(pp.45) documents the main
regional differences in growth and inequality, which show, in particular, a Gini coeffi-
cient of inequality across regions of 0.3 and a large per capita income gap with Bogota.
Throughout the analysis, additional controls include gender and age group. In the full
sample, about 71% of household heads are males. The proportion of male household
heads is larger in urban (79%) than rural areas (64%).
The LSSM does not provide information on individual or parental health-related be-
haviors. The only circumstance in the data that is partly affected by individual effort
is years of education. Educational attainment is an important variable in the analysis
of health inequality, as it has been shown to have a positive and large association with
health status (Lleras-Muney, 2005; Arendt, 2005; Cutler, Lleras-Muney, and Vogl, 2008).
The average number of years of education of the heads of household in this sample is
seven years, being larger at 8.4 years for the youngest cohort (25–35 years of age).
3.3 The Measurement of Inequality of Opportunity in Adult Health
This section explains the parametric approach used to test for inequality of opportu-
nity following Paes De Barros et al. (2009).7 I obtain direct estimates of inequality of
opportunity, controlling for age and gender, using a non-linear model for health status.
The predicted probability of reporting at least a good health status is used to calculate
a dissimilarity index. The index is then decomposed using the Shapley-value. The de-
composition measures the contribution of each circumstance to the observed inequality
of opportunity in adult health. To provide an alternative measure of inequality of oppor-
7Section A.2 in the Appendix C provides a theoretical framework and estimates of inequality of oppor-
tunity using a stochastic dominance approach (Lefranc, Pistolesi, and Trannoy, 2009). The empirical tests
follow the methodology proposed by (Yalonetzky, 2013).
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tunity, I also calculate a Gini-Opportunity Index.
3.3.1 Parametric Model of the Relationship between Health Status and Early-
Life Circumstances
The predicted probability of achieving a good or excellent health status is obtained after
the estimation of a logit model in which the dependent variable is the dichotomous health
status indicator previously defined. Thereafter, I use the predicted probability to calculate
the dissimilarity index. This procedure is performed for the entire sample, and for the
sub-samples of urban and rural residents.
First consider a health production function such as
H = f (C, D, e, u) (3.1)
where C is a vector of individual circumstances, D a vector of demographic controls and
e a vector of effort. The residual term u captures luck and other random factors that are
not measured by the other variables in the health production function.
Efforts can also be affected by individual circumstances and in most cases are unob-
served. In Roemer’s definition of equality of opportunity, efforts are assumed orthogonal
to circumstances. This assumption suggests that any other determinant of health status
that is correlated with circumstances is also understood as a circumstance. One of such
variables is educational attainment.
This relationship can be empirically approximated using a non-linear specification.
Pr [H∗ = 1 | Ci, Di] = exp{d + Cia + Dib}1 + exp{d + Cia + Dib}
(3.2)
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where H∗ denotes a dichotomous health outcome for individual i, Ci the vector of
individual circumstances, and Di demographic characteristics.
The following circumstances are observed in the 2010 LSSM data: ethnicity (E), fa-
ther’s highest educational level (FE), mother’s highest educational level (ME), quintile
groups of household socioeconomic status index during childhood (WS), urban or rural
area of birth (LB), and region of birth (RB). The only circumstance partly affected by in-
dividual choice that is observed in the dataset is years of education (ED). Demographic
controls include gender (M) and age group (AG). Therefore, Ci ≡ {Ei, FEi, MEi, WSi, LBi,
RBi, EDi} and Di ≡ {Mi, AGi}.
To estimate the global effect of observed circumstances on health status, I also clean
years of education of any influence coming from the other observed circumstances. In a
related study, Trannoy et al. (2010) proposed a two-step procedure to estimate the correla-
tion of circumstances and health status in a non-linear model. The first step involves the
estimation of the residuals from an auxiliary regression of each of the circumstance vari-
ables affected by individual effort on the full set of observed circumstances. In the second
step, these residuals are included in the estimable health status equation along with the
same vector of observed circumstances. Trannoy et al. emphasize that the residuals from
step one represent effort, luck and unobserved circumstances that allow an individual
to reach a higher education level, for a given vector of observed circumstances. In this
chapter, I adopt Trannoy et al. (2010)’s empirical strategy.
The logistic regression model now takes the following form:
Pr
[
H∗ = 1
∣∣ C′i, εˆei , Di] = exp{d + C′ia1 + εˆei a2 + Dib}1 + exp{d + C′ia1 + εˆei a2 + Dib}
Pr
[
H∗ = 0
∣∣ C′i, εˆei , Di] = 1− Pr[H∗ = 1|C′i, εˆei , Di]
(3.3)
where C′i ≡ {Ei, FEi, MEi, WSi, LBi, RBi}. Vector Ci includes years of education,
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whereas vector C′i does not.
The logistic regression model now contains the term εˆei , which corresponds to the
residuals obtained from the OLS estimation of the following model:
EDi = k + C′i g + Diw + ε i (3.4)
where ε i is a disturbance assumed to be normally distributed.
By construction, the residuals εˆei are orthogonal to circumstances in the equation for
health status and represent the share of individual educational attainment explained by
individual responsibility, luck and unobserved characteristics and circumstances, for the
given vector of observed circumstances, as shown by Trannoy et al. (2010).
My interest is to gauge what circumstances are more correlated with the health status
reported by residents in rural areas and respondents living in urban areas. Therefore,
I estimate logistic regression models for the subsample of individuals residing in rural
areas and the subsample of individuals residing in urban areas using similar specifica-
tions to those presented in equations 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.8 Note that I do not perform this
analysis for the full sample controlling for a dichotomous variable that indicates current
urban or rural residence status, because current residence is considered an effort variable
in Roemer’s framework that may not be controlled for in the ex-ante approach followed
in this chapter.
One contribution of this study comes from the estimation of equations 3.3 and 3.4.
I provide suggestive evidence regarding the possible transmission channels of health in-
equalities by defining whether the effect is direct or indirect. For instance, if the estimated
coefficient on a particular circumstance is only statistically significant in the estimation of
8I retain both significant and insignificant coefficients in the estimation of the dissimilarity index, follow-
ing Paes De Barros, Vega, and Saavedra (2008)
62
the education equation but not so in the estimation of the health status equation, then it
can be argued that the circumstance has an indirect effect. That is, the circumstance only
has an effect on self-reported health through its effect on education. Alternatively, if the
coefficient on a circumstance is significant in the health status equation only, then it can
be argued that the effect is direct. Note that a circumstance may also have both direct
and indirect effects. In my view, this type of analysis is consistent with the transmission
channels proposed by Trannoy et al. (2010). More specifically, the authors suggest that
human capital investments during childhood and the transmission of parental socioeco-
nomic status have an indirect influence on health status in adulthood, whereas a specific
risk that takes place during childhood has a direct influence on adult health following a
latency period.
3.3.2 The Dissimilarity Index of Inequality of Opportunity
The calculation of the dissimilarity index first requires the estimation of a logistic regres-
sion model to obtain the predicted probability of achieving a good or excellent health
status ( pˆi). In the LSSM sample, 2.2% of the respondents report a poor health status (cat-
egory 1) whereas 7.1% report an excellent health status (category 4.) For the subsequent
analysis, I group the two lower categories (1 and 2) and the two upper categories (3 and
4) to define a dichotomous variable which equals 0 if the respondent reports a poor or
fair health status, and equals 1 if the respondent reports a good or excellent health status.
I measure inequality of opportunity using the dissimilarity index, which has been
used in inequality analysis using binary outcomes (Paes De Barros et al., 2009; Paes De
Barros, Vega, and Saavedra, 2008). The dissimilarity index is a measure proportional to
the absolute distance between the distribution of circumstances among those with high
outcomes (i.e., excellent health) and the distribution among those with low outcomes (i.e.,
poor health.)
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Paes De Barros, Vega, and Saavedra (2008) show that a consistent estimator for the
dissimilarity index for binary outcomes is given by
Dˆ =
1
2p
n
∑
i=1
wi| p̂i − p| (3.5)
where p̂i is the predicted probability of achieving a good or excellent health status
for individual i=1,. . . ,n. The estimated conditional probability is p = ∑ni=1 wi p̂i, where wi
denote sampling weights.
The dissimilarity index of inequality of opportunity can be interpreted as the min-
imum fraction of the number of healthier persons that need to be redistributed across
circumstance groups in order to achieve equal opportunity, that is, an equal proportion
of less healthy persons in all circumstance groups Paes De Barros, Vega, and Saavedra
(2008).9 The index ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating a situation with equality of
opportunity.
Paes De Barros et al. (2009) and Yalonetzky (2012) show that the dissimilarity index
for binary outcomes satisfies some important properties of inequality indexes. First, the
index equals 0 if the conditional distributions of health given circumstances are identical
(that is, perfect between-type equality in access to opportunities), and equals 1 when one
individual always attains an excellent health status while others do not. Second, the dis-
similarity index is scale-invariant, so that rescaling the outcome by some scalar does not
alter the index. Third, the index exhibits anonymity as it does not vary when individuals
switch between two dichotomous states of health status. Fourth, the index is invariant to
population replication. Fifth, the dissimilarity index is insensitive to balanced increases in
opportunities, which suggests that the index does not change when the predicted prob-
ability of achieving a better health status increases for each type in such a way that the
9An alternative interpretation: the index indicates the%age of available opportunities for enjoying a
better health status that need to be reallocated from the adults who are healthier to the adults who are less
healthy, in order to achieve equality of opportunity.
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original distribution is preserved. That is, the index is insensitive to transfers of oppor-
tunities between circumstance groups that are above or below the average population
achievement because the balanced increases do not alter the proportion of the population
in each type or the proportion of the population enjoying an excellent health status.
Ersado and Aran (2014) also show that the index can only increase when new circum-
stances are added. Elaborating on the last property, Ferreira and Gignoux (2014) show
that the measure of inequality of opportunity obtained with a set of observed circum-
stances is a lower bound on the true inequality of opportunity that would be captured if
the full vector of circumstances was observed.
3.3.3 Gini-Opportunity Index
In order to provide a measure of inequality of opportunity that is sensitive to transfers of
opportunities between circumstances (Lefranc, Pistolesi, and Trannoy, 2009), I calculate
a Gini-opportunity index. This index computes the weighted sum of all the differences
among areas of opportunity sets and then divides that sum by the mean outcome of the
entire population.
The Gini-opportunity index has been applied to the study in health inequalities by
Rosa Dias (2009). The index was first proposed by Lefranc, Pistolesi, and Trannoy (2009)
to quantify the Gini index for each type Gc, so that the opportunity set for each type
is denoted by hc(1 − Gc), where hc represents the average health outcome for type c.
Rosa Dias (2009) then defines the Gini-Opportunity index in health for k types as:
Gopp =
1
h
k
∑
i=1
∑
i<j
pi pj[hj
(
1− Gj
)− hi(1− Gi)] (3.6)
where h denotes the mean of the health distribution, p the population share, G the
Gini coefficient, and i the set of circumstances.
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Lefranc, Pistolesi, and Trannoy (2009) show that the index is bounded between 0 and
1, and that it satisfies almost all of the required properties of inequality indexes. The
index, in particular, is not invariant to the scale in which the health outcome is measured.
The most salient limitation is that the index, as currently applied, does not account for
the ordinal nature of the health status measure. Moreover, the Gini opportunity index is
shown to be highly sensitive to the number of types considered by the researcher (Rosa
Dias, 2014).
3.3.4 Decomposition of the Dissimilarity Index through the Shapley Value
The Shapley value decomposition allows estimating what circumstances correlate the
most with the observed inequality of opportunity. The Shapley value is a central solu-
tion concept in cooperative game theory and has been extended to inequality analysis by
Shorrocks (2013). I follow the methodology of Hoyos Suarez and Narayan (2012) to per-
form the decomposition. These authors explain that the change in inequality that arises
when a new circumstance is added to a set of circumstances depends on the sequence of
inclusion of the different circumstance variables. The contribution of each circumstance
is measured by the average change in inequality over all possible inclusion sequences.
Formally, the change in the dissimilarity index when circumstance c is added to a subset
M of circumstances is given by
4Dc= ∑
M⊂C \{c}
|m| ! (κ− |m| −1) !
!
[D(M ∪ {c} )−D(M)] (3.7)
where C denotes the entire set of κ circumstances, and M is a subset of C that includes
m circumstance variables except c. D(M) is the dissimilarity index for the subset M and
D(M ∪ {c} ) is the index obtained after adding circumstance c to subset M.
Let D(κ) be the dissimilarity index for the set of κ circumstances. Therefore, the
66
contribution of circumstance κ to D(κ) is defined by
Sc =
4Dc
D(κ)
(3.8)
where ∑i∈C Si = 1
As a result, I have an additive decomposition of the dissimilarity index that measures
the contribution (in terms of correlation, not causation) of each circumstance to observed
health inequality.
3.4 Results
This section first presents a brief summary of the results obtained using non-parametric
statistic tests for stochastic dominance.10 Lefranc, Pistolesi, and Trannoy (2009) propose
a criterion to assess inequality of opportunity using stochastic dominance, and show
that inequality of opportunity is satisfied if and only if the distributions of health status
conditional on different sets of circumstances can be ordered by first-order stochastic
dominance (Please see section A.2 in the Appendix C for further details of the test.)
A non-parametric test suitable for categorical variables was introduced by Yalonetzky
(2013), and I provide here an extension to assess inequality of opportunity in adult health.
I then examine the estimation results of the logistic regression model for the corre-
lates of self-assessed health status, as well as the calculation and decomposition of the
dissimilarity index of inequality of opportunity. I also provide an estimation of the Gini
opportunity index, a measure that is sensitive to transfers of opportunities between cir-
cumstances, in contrast to the dissimilarity index.
10Please see section A.2 in the Appendix C for further details.
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3.4.1 Stochastic Dominance Tests
In the LSSM data, health status is an ordinal variable which takes on values h=1, 2, 3,
4. Responses to the health status question concentrate in categories 2 (fair) and 3 (good).
Thus, for the stochastic dominance analysis, I group the lower two categories together
(1 and 2) to define a new categorical variable which equals 1 if the respondent reports a
poor or a fair health status, and equals 2 and 3 if the respondent reports a good and an
excellent health status, respectively.
In order to compare the conditional distributions of health status, I rely on a non-
parametric test proposed by Yalonetzky (2013). This test is implemented for every pair
of categories within a variable of interest. In this subsection, the variables of interest are
parental and maternal educational attainment and socioeconomic status at age 10.
The test results, summarized in Table 3.2, firstly show that the health distribution for
the fifth quintile group of socioeconomic status at age 10 dominates the health distribu-
tion for all but the first quintile group (comparing the fifth and first quintile groups, the
zlk statistics are all larger than -1.96, for a confidence level of 95%) and that the fourth
quintile group dominates the distribution for the first and second socioeconomic status
quintile groups (the zlk statistics are smaller than -1.96, for a confidence level of 95%).
These dominance relationships are statistically significant at the 5% level. In urban areas,
I find that the health distribution for the fifth quintile group dominates each of the dis-
tributions for the four remaining quintile groups. In contrast with the urban sample, the
statistical tests results for rural areas suggest that the only statistically significant domi-
nance relationship is that of the health distribution for quintile group 5 relative to the first
and second quintile groups.
Concerning parental education, Table 3.2 (panel b and panel c) suggests that the higher
the levels of paternal and maternal education, the better health opportunities are, espe-
cially, in urban areas. The distribution of the health status of individuals whose fathers
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have some degree of education dominates the health distribution of individuals whose
fathers have no education at all, which is suggestive of inequality of opportunity. These
results also suggest that there is inequality of opportunity in adult health after compar-
ing the health distribution of individuals whose mothers attained more than secondary
education relative to individuals whose mothers attained no more than some primary
education.
3.4.2 Estimation Results from the Logistic Regression Model for Health Status
The calculation of the dissimilarity index first requires the estimation of a logistic regres-
sion model since health status is defined as a binary outcome. In this subsection, I briefly
describe the estimation results in order to suggest the potential direction of the association
between reporting at least a good health status and the observed early-life circumstances.
I first examine the results obtained from the estimation of Equation 3.4, where the
variable for individual years of education is cleaned from the effect of circumstances.
Note that the coefficients reported in Table 3.3 on household socioeconomic status at age
10 and parental education are all statistically significant at the 5% level. In particular, the
coefficient on socioeconomic status is positive, increasing with quintile group. This result
suggests how relevant is the capacity of richer households to make more investments in
the education of their children. A similar relationship is found for higher education levels
attained by both parents. These two results hold for the urban and rural sub-samples also.
Considering the remaining individual characteristics in the estimation of the corre-
lates of years of education, being male and born in the Central region is positively as-
sociated with higher educational attainment in the urban subsample, while the opposite
is observed in rural areas. There is an important cohort effect in educational attainment
in Colombia: younger cohorts in rural areas have had better access to primary and sec-
ondary schooling in the past thirty years. A similar trend was documented for Guatemala
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and other developing countries by ?(Chapter 6).
3.4.2.1 Correlates of health status in the full sample
The first two columns in Table 3.4 display the estimation results of the logistic regres-
sion model for the full sample. In column 1, the results correspond to the estimation of
the model controlling for years of education as an additional circumstance (as given in
Equation 3.2). In this sample, on average, males are more likely to report a good health
status than females. The estimated correlation between an individual’s educational at-
tainment, measured in years of education, and reporting a good adult health status is
positive and highly significant. The coefficient on the age-group variables is negative, sta-
tistically significant, and increasing with age. The effect of parental education is positive
but not significant, with or without the inclusion of own years of education. Regional dif-
ferences are slightly important. Being born in the Pacific or Bogota has a negative effect
on perceived health status, with the Atlantic and San Andres islands being the reference
region. No significant difference is observed by area of birth.
Column 2 in Table 3.4 presents the results for the binary logistic regression model
controlling for years of education purged from the effect of the other observed circum-
stances (as given in Equation 3.3.) The variable for years of education purged from cir-
cumstances has the same point estimate and standard error as years of education, by
construction. Controlling for the correlation between years of education and the circum-
stance variables, does not change the direction of the basic relationships described in the
previous paragraph, except for socioeconomic status during childhood, which becomes
highly significant and increasing with the quintile group of household wealth at age 10.
Cleaning years of education from the influence of the observed circumstances allows ob-
taining significant and positive coefficient estimates for almost all quintile groups of the
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socioeconomic status variables.
3.4.2.2 Correlates of Health Status in the Rural and Urban Subsamples
Table 3.4 also presents the estimation results for urban and rural areas. Regarding the
results for the urban sub-sample (columns 3 and 4), I find that early life circumstances
like household socioeconomic status and parental education have a significant effect on
the likelihood of reporting at least a good health status, although the relationship is not
very strong. In particular, when I purge years of education from the influence of observed
circumstances, I find a positive relationship between reporting a good health status and
coming from the fifth quintile group of the socioeconomic status variable.
Regarding the effect of parental education, individuals whose fathers attained no more
than some years of secondary education are also more likely to report a good health
status, relative to those individuals whose fathers did not complete primary education.
In the case of maternal education, the only significant and positive association to better
health status is that of mothers having completed secondary education or more, relative
to mothers with no education or some years of primary education.
Using the sample for rural residents, I only find a positive and significant relationship
between reporting a good health status and high socioeconomic status during childhood,
only in the comparison of quintile groups 3, 4 and 5 against quintile group 1, which is
the excluded category (columns 5 and 6.) Considering the region of birth, being born in
the Eastern, the Pacific, or Antioquia has a negative effect on self-assessed health status,
relative to those born in the Atlantic and San Andres islands.
I now turn to the discussion on the potential transmission channels of health inequal-
ities in adulthood. In what follows, I refer to the results presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4.
Parental socioeconomic status and parental education attainment have both direct and
indirect effects through the effect of education on self-reported health. Note that being
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born in urban areas has an indirect effect, through educational attainment.
The estimated results for the sample of urban residents also support that parental
socioeconomic status and parental education have both a direct and an indirect effect. In
contrast, in rural areas, the effect of parental socio-economic status and parental education
is realized through years an education, which is an indirect effect.
3.4.3 Dissimilarity Index of Inequality of Opportunity and the Gini-Opportunity
Index
I use the predicted probabilities from the estimation of the logistic regression models,
given by Equations 3.3 and 3.4, to calculate the dissimilarity index. Table 3.5 displays the
index value as well as its decomposition for the full sample, and for the rural and urban
subsamples.11 The Gini-opportunity index is also tabulated in Table 3.5. In the calculation
of the Gini-opportunity index, I have used two definitions of the health status variable.
First, I use the four-category variable where 1 indicates that the health status is poor and
4 that the health status is excellent. Second, I use the dichotomous variable for health
status to calculate the Gini-opportunity index. I present the index for the full sample and
for the urban and rural subsamples.
I begin with the analysis of the results for the full sample. The dissimilarity index
obtained with the LSSM data is about 8.4%. The dissimilarity index is usually interpreted
as the share of total opportunities for enjoying a better health status that would need to
be redistributed from individuals who feel healthier to individuals who feel less healthy
for equality of opportunity to prevail.
The Shapley decomposition of the dissimilarity index shows that the early life cir-
cumstances that have the largest contributions to the dissimilarity index are: household
socioeconomic status at age 10 (16%), mother’s education (10%) and father’s education
11For the decomposition of the dissimilarity index, I use the user-written command in Stata hoishapley
(Hoyos Suarez, 2013).
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(10.2%). Once I clean years of education from the influence of circumstances, the decom-
position of the index shows a slight increase in the contributions of socioeconomic status
at age 10 (22.2%), mother’s education (12.4%) and father’s education (13%).
The Gini-opportunity index is 0.10 when the variable for health status with four cate-
gories is taken as the outcome of interest. The index is three times larger when the out-
come of interest is a dichotomous variable for self-assessed health status (which equals
0.318.) The Gini-opportunity index, likewise the Gini index, ranges between 0 and 1, so
that the closer to 1 the most unequal the distribution of health status among the individ-
uals is. Although the Gini-opportunity index could be decomposed using the Shapley-
value, I do not provide estimates of the contribution that each circumstance makes to the
index as this chapter focuses on the dissimilarity index.
The Gini-opportunity index obtained for the full sample is also slightly larger than that
calculated for the United Kingdom by Rosa Dias (2009). In the British household panel,
inequality of opportunity in adult health ranges between 0.009 and 0.018. In contrast
with Rosa Dias, who only uses parental socioeconomic status as a circumstance, I use the
full set of circumstances (except for the demographic variables, gender and age group) to
calculate the Gini-opportunity index.
Turning to the results for the urban sample, I calculate a dissimilarity index of 7.9%,
when I include years of education in the vector of circumstances. That is, 7.9% of to-
tal opportunities would need to be redistributed from individuals who are healthier to
individuals who are less healthy for equality of opportunity to prevail. In rural areas,
the index is relatively larger: about 10.1% of total opportunities would need to be re-
distributed from individuals who are healthier to individuals who are less healthy for
equality of opportunity to prevail. The calculated indexes do not change considerably
once I clean years of education from the influence of circumstances. For urban areas, the
decomposition of the index shows a slight increase in the contributions of socioeconomic
status at age 10 (from 10.5% to 13.7%), mother’s education (12.9% to 16.5%) and father’s
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education (13% to 14.6%). For rural areas, the decomposition of the index shows a slight
change in the contributions of region of birth (from 20.2% and 21.1%) and socioeconomic
status at age 10 (from 35% to 40.5%), the two circumstances that are most influential in
inequality of opportunity in health status in rural areas.
I present two additional sets of results in section A.3 in Appendix C. The first set of
results include chronic illness and disability as control variables in the logistic regression
model. These objective measures of health status have a negative and significant effect
on the likelihood of reporting a good health status. This result is consistent across the
full sample and the subsamples of urban and rural areas. The addition of these measures
does not change the association between circumstances and adult health status previously
described.
The use of self-reported and retrospective recall data could bias the results obtained
here. In order to gauge if there is a systematic bias in how health status is reported, I ex-
amine how people perceive their own health status based on their economic conditions,
after controlling for the set of circumstances and the presence of chronic illness and per-
manent disability. Self-reported health status and household income per capita (defined
in both levels and logs) are strongly correlated, but once I control for circumstances and
objective measures of health status this correlation attenuates at conventional significance
levels. Thus, the bias created by self-reported measures should be reduced as long as
more objective measures are included in the model.
In the second set of results, I analyze whether the age of an individual affects their
recall of early-life circumstances in a certain direction. I estimate the logistic regression
models for three age cohorts: 25–35, 36–50, and 51–65 years old. There are substantial
differences by age group. For instance, maternal education seems to be more important
for the 50–65 group than for the 35–50 group, for which socio-economic status at age 10
is the most prominent circumstance in inequality of opportunity. Region of birth and
ethnicity are more important for the 25–35 age group than for any other group.
74
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This study measures the degree of inequality of opportunity in adult health in Colombia
by employing stochastic dominance tests and a decomposition of a dissimilarity index.
The empirical results suggest that household socio-economic status and parental educa-
tion are the most salient early-life circumstances that affect health inequality in adulthood.
These circumstances, however, do not reflect how important region of birth or ethnicity
may be for different socio-economic groups. Ethnicity, for instance, is highly associated
with inequality of opportunity in health in urban areas but not so in rural areas. In
contrast with urban areas, region of birth is potentially one of the most important cir-
cumstances in rural areas.
Even though this study provides suggestive evidence on the various sources of adult
health inequality, it has several limitations. Scholars are usually skeptical with the use of
self-reported health status in developing countries. For instance, Sen (2002) argues that
socially disadvantaged individuals fail to perceive and report the presence or absence
of certain health conditions because they are constrained by their social environment.
Moreover, their own understanding and appraisal of their health status may not agree
with that of their physicians.
Self-reported health status may suffer from individual reporting heterogeneity. To the
best of my knowledge, no study has provided evidence, appropriate for the Colombian
context, in favor of or against the use of self-reported health in health research. Objective
measures of adult health status are not observed in the LSSM dataset. Unfortunately,
surveys like the Demographic and Health Survey do not provide intergenerational infor-
mation for adults. The study of inequality of opportunity in adult health in Colombia
faces the usual problem of data availability.
An additional problem is the use of retrospective questions about circumstances.
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Household ownership of assets during childhood may not be accurately reported. This
misreporting introduces bias in the estimates of the correlation between early-life circum-
stances and adult health. The analysis in this chapter does not allow to disentangle the
effects of either genetic inheritance or parental health on investments in child’s health
capital, which is a weakness also identified in previous research (Trannoy et al., 2010).
The estimation of the dissimilarity index is also likely to be biased due to omitted
variables if any of the unobserved circumstances is correlated with any of the observed
circumstances included in the analysis. Abras et al. (2013) showed that this problem
is potentially mitigated by one of the properties of the dissimilarity index: it can only
increase when more circumstances are added. Of course, this property does not imply
that the estimated contributions to the index also increase when more circumstances are
included.
The inequality of opportunity analysis provides suggestive evidence of the lasting
effects of childhood circumstances on adult health. The results presented in this study
constitute a first step towards the identification of the potential channels through which
health inequalities are transmitted from one generation to the next. The results in this
chapter also suggest that the transmission channels of health inequality across generations
operate differently in rural and urban areas. In order to achieve the goal of equality of
opportunity in health, more specific policies should be designed to offset the effects of
different circumstances in Colombia as a whole and in both rural and urban areas of the
country.
Further research on inequality of opportunity in health in Colombia and Latin Amer-
ica should be based on novel longitudinal and administrative data that collect compre-
hensive information on the parents of tomorrow’s children. Recall bias, a limitation of
the data used in this study, could be minimized through a proper combination of admin-
istrative records and longitudinal information.
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Heads of Household between 25 and 65 years old. Total Number of Observations: 2,253 
Variable Observations Mean or Proportion Std. Dev. 
Outcome    
Self-assessed Health Status  2,253 2.78 0.60 
   Poor 49 2.2% 0.15 
   Fair 556 24.7% 0.43 
   Good 1,487 66.0% 0.47 
   Excellent 161 7.1% 0.26 
Early-life Circumstances    
Household Socioeconomic Status at Age 10 
   Quintile 1 569 25.3% 0.43 
   Quintile 2 533 23.7% 0.43 
   Quintile 3 441 19.6% 0.40 
   Quintile 4 355 15.8% 0.36 
   Quintile 5 316 14.0% 0.35 
   No Information on Assets 39 1.7% 0.13 
Education Level of Father 
   None or Incomplete Primary 1,258 55.8% 0.50 
   Complete Primary and Incomplete Secondary 377 16.7% 0.37 
   Complete Secondary or More 194 8.6% 0.28 
   Unknown Father's Education 422 18.7% 0.39 
   No Information on Father's Education 2 0.1% 0.03 
Education Level of Mother 
   None or Incomplete Primary 1,345 59.7% 0.49 
   Complete Primary and Incomplete Secondary 447 19.8% 0.40 
   Complete Secondary or More 171 7.6% 0.26 
   Unknown Mother's Education 288 12.8% 0.33 
   No Information on Mother's Education 2 0.1% 0.03 
Other circumstances    
Ethnicity 
   Indigenous 59 2.6% 0.16 
   Black, mulato, raizal or palenquero 144 6.4% 0.24 
   No ethnic minority 2,050 91.0% 0.29 
Years of Education 2,253 7.02 4.65 
Born in Urban Area 1,103 49.0% 0.50 
Born in Rural Area 1,144 50.8% 0.50 
No Information on Area of Birth 6 0.3% 0.05 
Region of Birth 
   Atlantic 507 22.5% 0.42 
   Eastern 518 23.0% 0.42 
   Pacific 255 11.3% 0.32 
   Orinoquia-Amazonia  6 0.3% 0.05 
   Antioquia 251 11.1% 0.31 
   Valle del Cauca 160 7.1% 0.26 
   Bogotá 159 7.1% 0.26 
   San Andrés islands 2 0.1% 0.03 
   Central 395 17.5% 0.38 
Additional Controls    
Male 1,598 70.9% 0.45 
Age 2,253 44.77 11.01 
Age group 
   25-35 504 22.4% 0.42 
   35-45 594 26.4% 0.44 
   45-55 646 28.7% 0.45 
   55-65 509 22.6% 0.42 
    
Source: 2010 Colombian LSSM Survey    
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics: Full Sample
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a. Household socioeconomic status at age 10 
Quintile group 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) 
Full sample 
1 (lowest)  ~ ~ ~ ~ 
2 ~  ~ ~ ~ 
3 ~ >  ~ ~ 
4 > > ~  ~ 
5 (highest) ~ > > >  
      
Urban Areas 
1 (lowest)  ~ ~ ~ ~ 
2 ~  ~ ~ ~ 
3 ~ ~  ~ ~ 
4 > ~ ~  ~ 
5 (highest) > > > >  
      
Rural Areas 
1 (lowest)  ~ ~ ~ ~ 
2 ~  ~ ~ ~ 
3 ~ ~  ~ ~ 
4 ~ ~ ~  ~ 
5 (highest) > > ~ ~   
      
b. Paternal Education           
Level None Primary Secondary and higher 
Full sample 
None *  ~ ~ 
Primary ** >  ~ 
Secondary and higher > ~  
      
Urban Areas 
None *  ~ ~ 
Primary ** >  ~ 
Secondary and higher > ~  
      
Rural Areas 
None *  ~ ~ 
Primary ** ~  ~ 
Secondary and higher ~ ~   
      
c. Maternal Education           
Level None Primary Secondary and higher 
Full sample 
None *  ~ ~ 
Primary ** >  ~ 
Secondary and higher > >  
      
Urban Areas 
None *  ~ ~ 
Primary ** ~  ~ 
Secondary and higher > >  
      
Rural Areas 
None *  ~ ~ 
Primary ** ~  ~ 
Secondary and higher ~ ~   
      
Note: The symbol ">" indicates that the distribution of the type in the row first-order-stochastic 
dominates the distribution of the type in the column. The symbol "~" indicates that the distributions 
cannot be ranked using first-order stochastic dominance. 
* None or incomplete primary education    
** Complete primary or incomplete secondary education   
Source: 2010 Colombian LSSM Survey      
 
Table 3.2: Stochastic Dominance Tests for Inequality of Opportunity
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Dependent Variable: Years of Education All Individuals  Urban Areas  Rural Areas 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
            
Male 0.2172  0.6416***  −0.4885* 
 (0.1885)  (0.2204)  (0.2690) 
Age group (Ref. 25–35 years old):  
35–45 years old −0.1058  0.0440  −0.7039** 
 (0.2245)  (0.2749)  (0.3049) 
45–55 years old −0.2316  −0.3117  −0.8309** 
 (0.2394)  (0.2849)  (0.3324) 
55–65 years old −1.1098***  −1.2353***  −1.8467*** 
 (0.2668)  (0.3243)  (0.3329) 
Ethnicity (Ref. Not a minority):  
Indigenous −0.0621  −0.0304  0.1704 
 (0.5613)  (0.8450)  (0.6265) 
Black/mulato/raizal/palenquero 0.3016  0.1005  0.2613 
 (0.3615)  (0.4651)  (0.4410) 
Region (Ref. Atlantic and San Andres islands): 
Eastern 0.0011  −0.3190  −0.1385 
 (0.2681)  (0.3290)  (0.3445) 
Pacific 0.4841  1.0698*  0.2100 
 (0.3596)  (0.5568)  (0.3465) 
Orinoquia- Amazonia −0.5957  −1.0903  −0.2360 
 (0.5788)  (0.7468)  (0.9172) 
Antioquia −0.0747  −0.2467  −0.0174 
 (0.3158)  (0.3802)  (0.4452) 
Valle 0.5982  0.5387  0.3399 
 (0.4001)  (0.4505)  (0.5239) 
Bogota −0.3089  −0.5637  2.0025 
 (0.3279)  (0.3598)  (1.6562) 
Central 0.5395*  0.7487**  0.0573 
 (0.2971)  (0.3669)  (0.3522) 
Born in urban area 1.0276***  0.4466  0.3522 
 (0.2204)  (0.2849)  (0.2865) 
Household socioeconomic status at age 10 
(Ref. Quintile group 1):  
Quintile group 2 0.7084***  1.0493***  −0.3497 
 (0.2732)  (0.3525)  (0.3114) 
Quintile group 3 2.0127***  2.1206***  0.4408 
 (0.2874)  (0.3614)  (0.3432) 
Quintile group 4 3.4114***  3.1020***  0.7434** 
 (0.3255)  (0.3848)  (0.3549) 
Quintile group 5 4.5999***  4.2618***  2.2478*** 
 (0.3554)  (0.4055)  (0.4083) 
Paternal education level (Ref. None):  
Complete primary and incomplete secondary 0.9560***  0.7741**  1.2467** 
 (0.3064)  (0.3550)  (0.5217) 
Complete secondary or more 1.8947***  1.5467***  3.8638*** 
 (0.4034)  (0.4459)  (0.7869) 
Unknown father's level of education −0.7116**  −0.7402**  −0.5352* 
  (0.2907)   (0.3766)   (0.2938) 
  
 
  
Table 3.3: Purging Years of Education from Circumstances: OLS Results
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Dependent Variable: Years of Education 
All Individuals  Urban Areas  Rural Areas 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
      
Maternal education level (Ref. None):  
Complete primary and incomplete secondary 1.0363***  1.1135***  0.6089 
 (0.2906)  (0.3392)  (0.4195) 
Complete secondary or more 2.5173***  2.5426***  2.4073** 
 (0.4135)  (0.4612)  (1.0519) 
Unknown mother's level of education −0.4045  −0.1635  −0.2143 
 (0.3553)  (0.4703)  (0.3390) 
Constant 4.6050***  5.5638***  4.9071*** 
 (0.3564)  (0.4646)  (0.4833) 
      
Observations 2,204  1,242  962 
R squared 0.430  0.396  0.246 
 ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Source: 2010 Colombian LSSM Survey 
  
Table 3.3: Purging Years of Education from Circumstances: OLS Results (continued)
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Dependent variable: 
Self−reported health 
status (0 = poor or fair, 
1 = good or excellent) 
All Individuals Urban Areas Rural Areas 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Male 0.5690*** 0.5932*** 0.6489*** 0.7217*** 0.5281** 0.4781** 
 (0.1277) (0.1280) (0.1560) (0.1566) (0.2104) (0.2089) 
Age group  
(Ref. 25−35 years old):  
35−45 years old −0.5462*** −0.5579*** −0.5281* −0.5231* −0.5544** −0.6264** 
 (0.2005) (0.2005) (0.2748) (0.2748) (0.2481) (0.2474) 
45−55 years old −0.7550*** −0.7808*** −0.7587*** −0.7941*** −0.8692*** −0.9542*** 
 (0.1948) (0.1946) (0.2650) (0.2647) (0.2516) (0.2527) 
55−65 years old −1.3172*** −1.4406*** −1.3481*** −1.4882*** −1.4127*** −1.6015*** 
 (0.1964) (0.1967) (0.2663) (0.2669) (0.2608) (0.2626) 
Ethnicity  
(Ref. Not a minority):  
Indigenous −0.2143 −0.2213 −0.7064 −0.7099 0.5513 0.5687 
 (0.4386) (0.4386) (0.5983) (0.5983) (0.4468) (0.4469) 
Black and other −0.2408 −0.2073 −0.3739 −0.3625 −0.0548 −0.0281 
 (0.2386) (0.2385) (0.2945) (0.2944) (0.3495) (0.3493) 
Region  
(Ref. Atlantic and  
San Andres islands): 
Eastern −0.2613 −0.2612 −0.2041 −0.2403 −0.5537** −0.5679** 
 (0.1826) (0.1826) (0.2370) (0.2371) (0.2488) (0.2494) 
Pacific −0.6624*** −0.6086*** −0.7622** −0.6409** −0.7878*** −0.7663*** 
 (0.2119) (0.2107) (0.3131) (0.3099) (0.2704) (0.2693) 
Orinoquia-  
Amazonia 0.3799 0.3136 0.8195 0.6959 −0.6004 −0.6246 
 (0.5176) (0.5175) (0.7804) (0.7804) (0.7997) (0.7999) 
Antioquia 0.0858 0.0775 0.2955 0.2676 −0.6974** −0.6992** 
 (0.2213) (0.2214) (0.2864) (0.2868) (0.3055) (0.3055) 
Valle 0.1610 0.2275 0.2359 0.2970 −0.3386 −0.3038 
 (0.3232) (0.3235) (0.3939) (0.3942) (0.4189) (0.4185) 
Bogota −0.4860* −0.5203* −0.4415 −0.5054*   
 (0.2795) (0.2801) (0.3047) (0.3060)   
Central −0.2169 −0.1569 −0.1171 −0.0322 −0.4650* −0.4591* 
 (0.2017) (0.2010) (0.2678) (0.2664) (0.2543) (0.2542) 
Born in urban area −0.0722 0.0420 −0.1611 −0.1105 0.1597 0.1957 
 (0.1371) (0.1360) (0.1794) (0.1793) (0.2370) (0.2366) 
Household 
socioeconomic  
status at age 10  
(Ref. Quintile group 1):  
Quintile group 2 0.1220 0.2008 0.1109 0.2299 0.1291 0.0934 
 (0.1618) (0.1604) (0.2248) (0.2211) (0.2500) (0.2498) 
Quintile group 3 0.3300* 0.5538*** −0.0288 0.2117 0.7877*** 0.8328*** 
 (0.1831) (0.1796) (0.2331) (0.2282) (0.2552) (0.2559) 
Quintile group 4 0.1149 0.4943** −0.2175 0.1342 0.7065*** 0.7825*** 
 (0.2148) (0.2044) (0.2707) (0.2540) (0.2576) (0.2564) 
Quintile group 5 0.4963* 1.0078*** 0.3021 0.7854** 0.7044** 0.9343*** 
 (0.2986) (0.2846) (0.3614) (0.3426) (0.2864) (0.2786) 
Paternal education level  
(Ref. None):  
Complete primary and 
incomplete secondary 0.3043 0.4106* 0.4688* 0.5566** −0.2181 −0.0906 
 (0.2216) (0.2217) (0.2618) (0.2628) (0.3625) (0.3596) 
Complete secondary or  
more −0.0745 0.1362 −0.0144 0.1610 0.4579 0.8531 
 (0.3773) (0.3788) (0.4069) (0.4085) (0.7744) (0.7731) 
Unknown father's level  
of education 0.1135 0.0344 0.3437 0.2597 −0.3095 −0.3642 
 (0.1950) (0.1948) (0.2674) (0.2668) (0.2480) (0.2464) 
   
Table 3.4: Log-odds Ratios for the Correlates of Health Status
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Dependent variable: 
Self−reported health status  
(0 = poor or fair, 1 = good or 
excellent) 
All Individuals  Urban Areas  Rural Areas 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Maternal education level (Ref. 
None):  
Complete primary and 
incomplete secondary −0.0212 0.0940  0.0231 0.1493  −0.3439 −0.2816 
 (0.2117) (0.2109)  (0.2558) (0.2546)  (0.3187) (0.3173) 
Complete secondary or more 0.5116 0.7915*  0.7245 1.0128**  −1.1600* −0.9138 
 (0.4441) (0.4398)  (0.5181) (0.5139)  (0.6946) (0.6867) 
Unknown mother's level of 
education −0.0382 −0.0831  −0.0705 −0.0891  0.0485 0.0266 
 (0.2310) (0.2307)  (0.3211) (0.3210)  (0.2663) (0.2664) 
Years of education 0.1112***   0.1134***   0.1023***  
 (0.0174)   (0.0219)   (0.0262)  
Years of education purged from 
circumstances  0.1112***   0.1134***   0.1023*** 
  (0.0174)   (0.0219)   (0.0262) 
Constant 0.6589*** 1.1709***  0.7384** 1.3694***  0.6988** 1.2006*** 
 (0.2437) (0.2368)  (0.3416) (0.3290)  (0.3528) (0.3408) 
         
Observations 2,204 2,204  1,242 1,242  956 956 
Log−likelihood −4.477e+06 −4.477e+06  −3.328e+06 −3.328e+06  −1.085e+06 −1.085e+06 
Pseudo R squared 0.126 0.126   0.136 0.136   0.113 0.113 
 ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Source: 2010 Colombian LSSM Survey 
  
Table 3.4: Log-odds Ratios for the Correlates of Health Status (continued)
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  All individuals   
Residents in  
Urban Areas   
Residents in  
Rural Areas 
         
Gini-Opportunity Index (1) 0.1019   0.1148   0.0720  
Gini-Opportunity Index (2) 0.3182   0.3550   0.2604  
Dissimilarity Index (3) 0.0838 0.0839  0.0793 0.0793  0.1016 0.1016 
 Decomposition of the Dissimilarity Index (in %) 
Educational attainment 46.59   45.25   30.13  
Education purged from 
circumstances  33.31   36.76   22.53 
         
Circumstances 53.41 66.69  54.75 63.24  69.87 77.47 
         
Early-Life Circumstances 35.80 47.71  36.42 44.85  44.13 49.99 
Mother's education 10.04 12.93  12.90 16.50  3.54 2.20 
Father's education 10.21 12.49  12.98 14.57  5.64 7.30 
Household 
socioeconomic status at age 
10 15.56 22.28  10.53 13.77  34.96 40.49 
         
Demographics 17.61 18.98  18.33 18.39  25.73 27.49 
Region of birth 11.64 11.95  13.13 13.17  20.19 21.10 
Born in urban area 4.56 5.61  1.00 0.97  3.87 4.71 
Ethnicity 1.42 1.42  4.20 4.25  1.67 1.69 
         
Observations 2,204   1,242   962 
         
Notes:  
(1) The Gini-opportunity index is calculated using a self-assessed health status variable in which 1 = poor, 
2 = fair, 3 = good, and 4 = excellent.  
A categorical variable for the individual's years of education has also been used in this calculation. Gender 
and age group are not included. 
(2) The Gini-opportunity index is calculated using a self-assessed health status variable in which 0 = poor 
or fair, and 1 = good or excellent.  
(3) The index in the first, third and fifth columns include years of education as a circumstance, whereas the 
second, fourth, and sixth columns include years of education purged from circumstances.  
  
Source: 2010 Colombian LSSM Survey
Table 3.5: Gini-Opportunity index and Dissimilarity Index of Inequality of Opportunity,
with its Decomposition
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4.1 Introduction
Riding on a wave of interest in so-called “superfoods”4 in the United States and other rich
countries, quinoa—a relatively high-protein grain that has been grown for millennia in
the Andean regions of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru—went in less than a decade
from being a largely unknown commodity outside of South America to being an upper-
class staple in those same rich countries.5 As quinoa imports to the US increased more
than tenfold, from about 5 million pounds per year in 2004 to almost 65 million pounds
per year in 2013 (DePillis, 2013), the price of quinoa tripled (Blythman, 2013).
Some have questioned the consequences of this increase in the popularity of quinoa,
citing concerns about the effects of rising quinoa prices on the welfare of individuals and
households in places where quinoa had traditionally been produced and consumed. A
January 2013 article in the Guardian (Manchester) made the following claim (Blythman,
2013):
[T]here is an unpalatable truth to face for those of us with a bag of quinoa in
the larder. The appetite of countries such as ours for this grain has pushed up
prices to such an extent that poorer people in Peru and Bolivia, for whom it
was once a nourishing staple food, can no longer afford to eat it.
Three days later, an article in the Globe and Mail (Toronto) made the opposite claim (Saun-
ders, 2013):
The people of the [Andean plateau] are indeed among the poorest in the
Americas. But their economy is almost entirely agrarian. They are sellers—
4The Oxford English Dictionary defines superfoods as foods “considered especially nutritious or other-
wise beneficial to health and well-being” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2014).
5With 50% of Peruvian quinoa going to the United States, the United States is the commodity’s largest
export market (Andina, 2016). It is followed by Canada (8%), Australia (7%), Germany (6%), the United
Kingdom (6%), the Netherlands (4%), France (3%) and Israel (3%).
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farmers or farm workers seeking the highest price and wage. The quinoa price
rise is the greatest thing that has happened to them.
As one might expect from media accounts, neither claim was based in serious empiri-
cal analysis. That net buyers of a commodity are made worse off and net sellers better off,
at least in the short run, by an increase in the price of that commodity is well-understood
by economists (Deaton, 1989a).
But what are the longer-term,6 general equilibrium effects of that price increase for
consumers? And what is the effect of an international, positive price shock on the wel-
fare of producers-cum-consumers of that commodity? We study the welfare impacts of
rising quinoa prices on those households that have traditionally produced and consumed
it. To do so, we use 11 years of the Peruvian Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO), a
large-scale, nationally representative household survey, to look at whether: (i) there is
a systematic relationship between the value of household consumption (which we use
here as a proxy for household welfare; see Deaton (1989a)) and the local purchase price
of quinoa for those households that report consuming quinoa; and whether (ii) there is
a systematic relationship between household welfare and the price of quinoa for those
households that report producing quinoa.
Our study period (i.e., 2004-2014) covers years both before and after the price of quinoa
rose sharply. Because the ENAHO is a repeated cross-section and is thus not longitudi-
nal, we use pseudo-panel techniques (Deaton, 1985; McKenzie, 2004; Christiaensen and
Subbarao, 2005; Antman and McKenzie, 2007a,b; Cuesta, N˜opo, and Pizzolitto, 2011) ,
wherein we average over household-level measures within each geographical unit and
then treat those geographical units as our primary units of observation.7 To study the re-
6By “longer-term,” we are referring to a time horizon that is longer (i.e., up to one year, given the
frequency of our data) than (Deaton, 1989a)’s short-term measure of welfare, and not to the long-term as
it is typically understood in economics, i.e., the length of time required for all factors of production to be
variable.
7Peru is divided in 1,838 districts in 195 provinces in 25 departments.
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lationship between the international price of quinoa and household consumption, we rely
in turn on geographical unit fixed effects with: (i) year fixed effects and (ii) higher-order
geographical unit-year fixed effects.8
Our work is most closely related to the literature on the effects of commodity price
shocks. This is a sizeable literature wherein scholars look at the effects of commodity
price shocks on a host of outcome variables, from child outcomes (Cogneau and Jedwab,
2012) to conflict (Dube and Vargas, 2013) and almost everything in between. Specifically,
our work relates to the literature on the effects of commodity price shocks—usually, food
price shocks—on welfare. In a seminal contribution, Deaton (1989b) studies the effects
of higher rice prices on welfare and inequality in Thailand. He finds that higher prices
redistribute income towards households in the middle of the rural income distribution,
with marked regional variations. More recently, Ivanic and Martin (2008) study the effects
of higher global food prices on poverty in low-income countries. Using household surveys
from nine low-income countries, they find that the effects of higher food prices on poverty
vary by country, but also by commodity. Wodon and Zaman (2010) review the evidence
looking specifically at sub-Saharan Africa, and they find that higher food prices tend to
increase the extent of poverty given that net consumers tend to outnumber net producers
of food. The study that is perhaps closest in spirit to our work is a study by Zezza et al.
(2008), who rely on household surveys in 11 countries to look at how different groups
of households are affected differently when food prices increase in an effort to look at
the distributional impacts of food price changes. One notable difference between our
work and the majority of studies in the commodity price shocks literature, however, is
that while that literature typically focuses on major food staples (e.g., maize, rice, wheat,
etc.), we focus on a non-staple. Additionally, the production of quinoa is concentrated
in a specific region of the world, and little quinoa is produced in the United States or
Europe. This makes quinoa similar to other regionally produced commodities, such as
8At the district level, this means province-year fixed effects. At the provincial level, this means
department-year fixed effects.
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teff in Ethiopia and millet in Central Africa or India. The only other economic study
of the effect of rising quinoa prices has been by Stevens (2015), who finds that cultural
preference for quinoa in certain areas of Peru has not led to a worsening of nutritional
outcomes.
Our results suggest that the increased international demand for quinoa and the result-
ing quinoa price boom have had beneficial effects for consumers as well as for producers
of quinoa in Peru. First, we find a positive relationship between the price of quinoa and
household welfare within the average geographical unit-year wherein quinoa was con-
sumed, which suggests that the sharp increase in the price of quinoa has had positive
general equilibrium effects on the welfare of the average household in those geograph-
ical unit-year observations.9 Specifically, we find that for a 25% increase in the price of
quinoa–a change that is commensurate to the change in the purchase price of quinoa be-
tween 2013 and 2014, when international demand spiked–total household consumption
increases on average by about 1.25%.
Second, and in line with theoretical expectations (Deaton, 1989a), we find a positive
relationship between household welfare and household quinoa production. More specifi-
cally, the 25% increase in the price of quinoa between 2013 and 2014 would be associated
with a 3.5% to 4% increase in consumption of quinoa producing households.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we present the
data as well as some descriptive statistics. Section 4.3 presents the empirical framework
we develop to study the impacts of rising quinoa prices on welfare, with particular em-
phasis on our identification strategy. In section 4.4, we present and discuss our estimation
results. Section 4.5 concludes with some policy recommendations and directions for fu-
ture research.
9We focus on quinoa-consuming districts, households, and departments because those are the geograph-
ical units for which quinoa prices are available.
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4.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use data from Peru’s Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO), an annual household sur-
vey conducted by the Peruvian government’s Instituto Nacional de Estadı´stica e Informa´tica
(National Institute of Statistics and Informatics). Because of their high quality and na-
tionally representative character, ENAHO data have been used frequently by economists.
Among others, Dell (2010) has used the ENAHO to study the long-term consequences of
an extractive institution operating during colonial times in Peru, Arago´n and Rud (2013)
have used the ENAHO to study the effects of a gold mine on local incomes, and Galdo
(2013) has used the ENAHO to study the long-run labor-market impacts of civil war.
The ENAHO sample is selected every year so as to be nationally representative. The
data include household-level sampling weights, which we use throughout our analysis.
We use repeated cross sections from 2004 to 2014 inclusively, which encompass 277,759
household-year observations. We discuss in Section 4.3 how the repeated cross-sectional
nature of the data allows the construction of a pseudo-panel.
Our outcome of interest is the total value of household consumption,10 Annual total
consumption is computed by INEI as the sum of (i) purchases of food, clothing, hous-
ing, fuel, electricity, furniture, housewares, health, transportation, communications, and
entertainment. Individuals reported information in past month or past three months de-
pending on expenditure group; (ii) expenditures on appliances, transport and others; (iii)
expenditures on food consumed outside the household; (iv) expenditures on food to be
consumed inside the household, and (v) the reported value of own consumption, gifts,
social programs, and payments in kind in the same expenditure groups. As we discuss
further, food consumption is reported via a two-week recall in a specific module of the
ENAHO. 11 In developing countries such as Peru, where many rural households produce
10We remove the value of quinoa that is produced and consumed by the household from our measure of
household welfare so as to avoid biasing the relationship between quinoa prices and consumption by way of
reverse causality. We explain our identification strategy further in section 4.3.
11ENAHO is a continuous, monthly survey. Every year, INEI visits the same primary sampling units
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food for their own subsistence, it is important to include the value of all consumption,
and not just purchases, in order to paint a more accurate portrait of welfare.
ENAHO also includes a battery of questions on agricultural production activities in
the past 12 months. Households report the quantity produced for about 200 products, as
well as the proportion of such production used for own consumption, selling, bartering,
seeding and sub-products. There is also information on the selling unit price and the
value of sales.
We divide our sample up into two non-mutually exclusive categories. “Quinoa pro-
ducers” refers to households that report producing quinoa over the previous year, whether
those households consumes quinoa or not; and “quinoa consumers” refer to households
that report consuming quinoa over the last two weeks, whether those households pro-
duces quinoa or not. Although it is common in the agricultural economics literature to
split households between net buyers and net sellers of a commodity (see, for example,
Bellemare, Barrett, and Just (2013)), the different recall periods for production (i.e., past
year) and consumption data (i.e., past two weeks) make this impossible in this chapter.
However, fewer than 2% of producers reported purchasing quinoa in the last two weeks,
and fewer than 1% of quinoa buyers reported producing quinoa in the past year.
A comparison of mean household consumption among households that produce quinoa
and those that consumed quinoa but did not produce it is shown in Table 4.1. The most
notable difference in Table 4.1 is that quinoa-producing households (third column of Table
1) consumed roughly 40 % of what quinoa-consuming households did at the beginning of
the sample period.12 Households that consumed but did not produce quinoa (fourth col-
umn of Table 4.1), however, had total household consumption about 30 % higher than that
of households that neither consumed quinoa nor produce it. In other words, consumers
(conglomerados) during the same survey month, but selects a different sample of dwellings to conduct the
survey.
12All monetary values are expressed in real terms in 2004 PEN. The 2004 PPP adjusted exchange rate was
1.3 Soles = $1 USD
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of quinoa look like they were substantially better off than the rest of the population. This
parallels how, at the international level, the demand from quinoa overwhelmingly comes
from rich countries.
For all households, purchased goods represented roughly 75% of the value of to-
tal consumption (which includes household food production). For quinoa-producing
households, that number was closer to 60%. In other words, 40% of the total household
consumption of quinoa-producing households is from non-purchased goods, including
household food production. Quinoa-producing households thus appear less integrated
in markets than non-producing households.
A comparison of mean household consumption among households that produce quinoa
(about 4%) and those that consumed quinoa but did not produce it (about 20%) is shown
in Table 4.1. The most notable difference in Table 4.1 is that quinoa-producing households
(fifth column of Table 4.1) consumed roughly 40% of what quinoa-consuming households
did at the beginning of the sample period.13 Households that consumed but did not pro-
duce quinoa (seventh column of Table 4.1), however, had total household consumption
about 30% higher than that of households that neither consumed quinoa nor produce it.
In other words, consumers of quinoa look like they were substantially better off than the
rest of the population. This parallels how, at the international level, the demand from
quinoa overwhelmingly comes from rich countries.
Figure 4.1 shows time series of the consumption levels of quinoa producers, quinoa
consumers, and those that neither produced nor consumed quinoa wherein, for ease of
comparison, baseline consumption is set equal to 1 for each groups.14 Up until 2009,
the welfare of quinoa consumers increased at a faster rate than that of quinoa producers.
Starting in 2010, however, quinoa producers saw their welfare increase faster than quinoa
consumers. In fact, and as the econometric analysis below will confirm, at the peak
13All monetary values are expressed in real terms in 2004 Peruvian Soles (PEN). The 2004 PPP adjusted
exchange rate was 1.3 PEN = $1 USD
14Yearly departmental-level deflators are used to control for price changes
91
of the quinoa price boom in 2013 and 2014, the welfare of quinoa producers increased
much faster than that of quinoa consumers. Comparing quinoa-producing households
one the one hand with quinoa-consuming and quinoa neither consuming nor producing
households on the other hand, the welfare of quinoa producers increased by over 50%
over the period 2004-2014, whereas it increased by about 25% for the other two groups of
households.
In Table 4.2, we take a closer look at quinoa consumers. Over the sample period,
one fourth to one third of the households in our sample reported consuming quinoa
in the two weeks before they were surveyed, as shown in the second column of Table
4.2.15 Over these same two weeks, conditional on purchasing, the average household in
the data purchased less than one kilogram of quinoa. Back-of-the-envelope calculations
based on Table 4.2 suggest that the total effect of price rises on consumers was small:
At the beginning of the sample period, households purchased roughly 22.6 kg per year
(or 0.87 kg every two weeks), but the real cost of this amount of quinoa rose roughly
200 Peruvian Soles (PEN) over the sample period, which is about 0.8% of the overall
consumption for those households that do not produce quinoa in 2014.
Over the sample period, quinoa purchases have fallen. Indeed, the third and fifth
columns of Table 4.2 show that the amount of quinoa purchased over the two weeks
before the survey fell by about 20%. Using the two-week purchase data, we estimated
annual purchases by multiplying by 26 to create an annual budget share. The budget
share of quinoa rose as the real price of quinoa paid by buyer more than doubled from
2004 to 2014. As noted above, quinoa represents a very small share (i.e., less than 1%) of
the budget of the average household in the data, and the change in budget share between
2004 and 2013 is roughly 0.5%. Compared to the budget share of staples in low-income
countries, which often average over 50% (see, for example, Barrett and Dorosh (1996)),
quinoa does not seem to be a staple for households in Peru, though Stevens (2015, tables
15Quinoa production in Peru is seasonal. The sowing season usually starts in September, peaking in
October-November. The harvest season usually takes place in April to June.
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1 and 3) notes that there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity; in particular, averages
in traditional quinoa-consuming areas such as Puno are higher than national averages,
with a food budget share of quinoa of 3.6% compared to the national food budget share
of quinoa of 0.5% in 2012.
Table 4.3 shows some descriptive statistics for quinoa producers and sellers. Over the
period 2004-2014, roughly 3.6% of all households in the data grew any quinoa. Counter
to what one might expect given the quinoa price boom of 2012-2013, the percentage of
producers in the data dropped from 3.4% in 2011 to 2.8% in 2012, and then to 2.6% in 2013.
In 2014, with the international quinoa price still at its peak, the proportion of producers
when back to the 2011 levels.
The second column of Table 4.3 shows that in any given year, less than 0.7% of the
households in our sample sold any quinoa. Most of the households who grow quinoa,
consume it all. More interestingly for our purposes, the percentage of households that
sold some of their quinoa production (column 2 of Table 3) almost doubled between
2010 and 2011. When looking only at the sub-sample of quinoa producers, the average
household produced less than 90 kg of quinoa in the last 12 months, and over time,
the volume of quinoa production has been U-shaped, with the highest output levels per
household at the beginning and at the end of our sample.
In our sample, over 98% of households that produced quinoa used at least some of
it for their own consumption. As shown in the fifth column of Table 3, however, the
percentage of production used for a household’s own consumption fell over the study
period, from around 85% in 2004 to about 65% in 2014.
We mentioned earlier that the international price of quinoa had more than tripled over
the period 2004-2014. Even more impressively, quinoa sellers have seen the real price of
quinoa experience a more than fourfold increase during that period. The rate at which the
purchase price of quinoa rose (column 4 of Table 4.2) was less than the growth in the sales
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price (column 6 of Table 4.3), and the farm -to-consumer price ratio has increased from
43% to 55% between 2004 and 2014.16 This suggests that quinoa producers have captured
some of the gains from rising quinoa prices, though this is obviously not a formal test of
that hypothesis, which is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Lastly, the revenue of quinoa sellers grew almost sevenfold over the period 2004-2014
(seventh column of Table 4.3), although that increase has not been steady. There are also
three jumps in revenue: the first occurring between 2008 and 2009, when revenue almost
doubled; the second one occurring between 2011 and 2012, when revenue increased by
over 80%; and the third occurring between 2013 and 2014, when revenue almost doubled.
This rise in revenue was even more pronounced when looking at all quinoa farmers
(eighth column of Table 4.3), and not just to quinoa sellers.
4.3 Empirical Framework
The ENAHO is a repeated cross-sectional household survey, so the usual panel methods
favored by applied microeconomists (i.e., household fixed effects) are not available in this
context. A standard strategy proposed by Deaton (1985) to overcome the type of data
limitations one faces with repeated cross-sections, is to rely on pseudo-panel methods.
Intuitively, pseudo-panel methods treat groups of observations (rather than the observa-
tions themselves) as units of analysis. In our application, instead of treating the household
as our unit of analysis, we treat geographical units as our units of analysis, and we use
geographical unit-level averages as our primary data. Recall that Peru is divided in 1,838
districts in 195 provinces in 25 departments. As a check on the robustness of our results,
we estimate each set of results three times, respectively treating districts, provinces, and
departments as our units of observation.
16Producers reported their annual sales in an agricultural production module in the ENAHO. Consumer
prices were taken from the two-week recall consumption model which included purchase prices.
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The ENAHO has data on all 25 departments, on all but one of the 195 provinces, and
on 1,401 of 1,838 districts. Given the random selection of communities and the nation-
ally representative nature of the ENAHO, those missing districts should not reduce the
external validity of our results.
Pseudo-panel methods like the ones we use in this chapter have been effectively used
to estimate economic mobility (McKenzie, 2004; Cuesta, N˜opo, and Pizzolitto, 2011) and
to study poverty in developing countries (Antman and McKenzie, 2007a,b; Christiaensen
and Subbarao, 2005; Cruces et al., 2015). Again, recall that in a pseudo-panel, the outcome
variable (here, household welfare) and the treatment variable (here, the price paid on av-
erage by a household for its quinoa when studying the welfare of consumers, and whether
a household grows quinoa when studying the welfare of producers) are averaged across
geographical unit. Because households are chosen at random within each geographic re-
gion, the average among sampled households should track the average among population
households.
Our variable of interest is the total real value of household consumption (deflated
using departmental deflators provided by INEI), which we use here as a proxy for house-
hold welfare. For each geographical unit g, we compute the regional sample mean of the
total value of household consumption cgt as the average of the total value of household
consumption cght over all observed households h in the set Hgt of all households sampled
in geographical unit g in year t, such that
cgt =
1
Hgt
Hgt
∑
i=1
chgt (4.1)
Here, pseudo-panel methods have two clear benefits. First, because the ENAHO cov-
ers over 20,000 households annually, the data is rich at both the national and sub-national
levels, and statistical power is not a concern. Second, as the number of households av-
eraged over increases when computing the geographical unit-level mean, the effect of
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potential error in the measurement of a particular household’s consumption is reduced
given that that error becomes spread out over more households. If they were available to
us, individual household fixed effects would allow correcting for time-invariant measure-
ment error; however, time-variant measurement error would still be present, and fixed
effects are thought to compound measurement error problems (Wooldridge, 2010).17 This
would be an issue especially regarding food consumption, where annual data is extrap-
olated from two weeks’ worth of food consumption. Our use of pseudo-panel methods
reduces this problem.
As with many of the decisions one has to make in applied econometrics, moving from
the largest (i.e., department) to the smallest (i.e., district) geographical unit involves a
tradeoff. As the geographical unit gets smaller, fewer observations go into making the
geographical level-unit average, which maximizes measurement error but also presents
the most amount of statistical power in this context. Conversely, as the geographical unit
gets larger, there are fewer units of observations available for analysis, which decreases
statistical power, but which also minimizes measurement error problems. In order to
examine this tradeoff, we estimate all of our specifications for each of the three levels of
geographic analysis.
We use two variables as our treatment variable, depending on whether we want to
study the welfare effects of rising quinoa prices on consumers or on producers of quinoa.
For consumers, the treatment variable is the proportion of quinoa consumers within a
geographical unit interacted with the annual international price of quinoa reported by the
FAO.18 For producers, the treatment variable is the proportion of quinoa producers within
a geographical unit interacted with the annual international price of quinoa reported.
Both treatment variables vary over time and across space, and it is this spatio-temporal
17More specifically, Wooldridge (2010, p. 365) writes: “It is widely believed in econometrics that . . . FE
transformations exacerbate measurement error bias (even though they eliminate heterogeneity bias). How-
ever, it is important to know that this conclusion rests on the classical errors-in-variables model under strict
exogeneity, as well as on other assumptions.”
18These are nominal prices received by farmers for quinoa sales as collected at the point of initial sale
(prices paid at the farm-gate). They are expressed in Soles per tonne.
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variation which we exploit here to identify the effects on welfare of rising quinoa prices.
For our analysis of quinoa consumers, we regress the logarithm of the total value of
household consumption on the proportion of quinoa consumers within a geographical
unit interacted with the annual international price of quinoa. The proportion of quinoa
consumers within a geographical unit allows the extent of quinoa consumption to vary
over time as households choose which products to consume each year (recall that this
measure comes from an annual extrapolation of a variable reported in a two-week recall
period.)
For our analysis of quinoa producers, we regress the logarithm of the total value of
household consumption on the proportion of quinoa producers within a geographical
unit interacted with the annual international price of quinoa. The proportion of quinoa
producers within a geographical unit allows the extent of quinoa production to vary over
time as households choose which crops to grow each year.
4.3.1 Estimation Strategy
4.3.1.1 Consumers
In the case of quinoa consumers, our equation of interest is such that
ln cgt = α0 + α1 ln pt · Sgt + δg + τt + egt (4.2)
where, in a slight abuse of notation, ln cgt is the mean of ln chgt in geographical unit g
in year t, pt is the international price of quinoa in year t, Sgt is the proportion of quinoa
consumers in geographical unit g in year t, δg is a vector of geographical-unit fixed effects,
and egt is an error term with mean zero. The term τt denotes either: (i) year fixed effects;
or (ii) higher-order geographical unit-year fixed effects, whenever feasible. We cluster the
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standard errors at the level of the geographical unit (i.e., district, province, or department)
we use as our unit of analysis.
4.3.1.2 Producers
In the case of quinoa producers, our equation of interest is
ln cgt = β0 + β1 ln pt · Dgt + γg + θt + υgt (4.3)
where ln cgt is the mean of ln chgt in geographical unit g, pt is the international price of
quinoa in year t, Dgt is the proportion of households that produce quinoa in geographical
unit g, γg is a vector of geographical unit fixed effects, and υgt is an error term with mean
zero. The term θt denotes either: (i) year fixed effects; or (ii) higher-order geographical
unit-year fixed effects, whenever feasible. We cluster the standard errors at the level of
the geographical unit we use as our unit of analysis.
4.3.2 Identification Strategy
4.3.2.1 Consumers
The error term in equation (4.2) contains everything that is unobserved in that equation.
Because the households surveyed in the ENAHO are randomly selected, when controlling
for the passage of time, the households in a given geographical unit in a given year are
similar to the households in the same geographical unit the following year, and this holds
both in terms of their observable and unobservable characteristics. Thus, provided we
account for the passage of time in our estimations, our use of geographical unit-level
fixed effects should take care of the time-invariant heterogeneity between households.
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To account for time-variant unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate several different
specifications, the idea being that if we find similar effects throughout, our results are
less likely to be biased. First, for our district-level analysis, on top of including district
fixed effects, we estimate specifications with: (i) year fixed effects; (ii) province-year fixed
effects; and (iii) department-year fixed effects. Second, for our provincial-level analysis,
on top of including province fixed effects, we estimate specifications with: (i) year fixed
effects; and (ii) department-year fixed effects. Finally, for our departmental-level analysis,
on top of including departmental fixed effects, we estimate specifications with year fixed
effects.
How do those specifications help identify the welfare effects of rising quinoa prices for
consumers? To help think through this, it helps to consider the three sources of statistical
endogeneity, viz. (i) reverse causality or simultaneity; (ii) unobserved heterogeneity; and
(iii) measurement error. As regards reverse causality or simultaneity, quinoa appears
to be a normal or a luxury good, and as consumers get better off, they are likely to
start consuming more quinoa, which might cause local quinoa prices to increase. Over
the period 2004-2014, however, quinoa price increases were largely due to an increased
international demand for quinoa rather than to an increased domestic demand for it.
Moreover, even if an increased domestic demand for quinoa had driven prices up, our
use of geographical unit fixed effects would control for the average demand for quinoa
in a given geographical unit, and the various means of controlling for the effect of time
enumerated above would absorb much of the evolution of that demand.
As regards unobserved heterogeneity, as we discussed above, our use of pseudo-panel
methods allows for matching the households in a given geographical unit from year to
year along both their observable and their unobservable characteristics. Our use of fixed
effects at the geographical unit level, along with the various methods we deploy to control
for the effect of time, purge the error term of most of its prospective endogeneity due to
unobserved heterogeneity.
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One potential source of unobserved heterogeneity comes from an increase in total
consumption from income effects. For example, if there is unobserved variation in income
that differs between geographic regions and is not consistent with geographic time-trends
this may bias the estimate through rising prices of all goods. To control for this issue
we use an annual departmental level deflator for the welfare measure. Unfortunately,
deflators at smaller geographic regions are not available. Our results, however, are mostly
consistent across the two lower geographical levels we study.
As regards measurement error, we noted earlier that this is a concern, especially at
the district level, where few observations go into making geographical unit-level averages.
For this reason alone, we estimate everything at higher administrative levels (i.e., province
and department). But our various layers of fixed effects and time controls control for the
measurement error that is systematic at those levels. What remains is likely to be classical
measurement error, which causes attenuation bias, in which case α̂1 is an estimate of the
lower bound on the true quinoa effect of household welfare.
4.3.2.2 Producers
The error term in equation (4.3) contains everything that is unobserved in the same equa-
tion. If those unobservable factors are correlated with the variables on the RHS of equa-
tion (4.3), our estimate of the impact of quinoa production on household welfare is biased.
Again, we discuss in turn the three potential sources of statistical endogeneity, viz.
(i) reverse causality or simultaneity, (ii) unobserved heterogeneity or omitted variables,
and (iii) measurement error. Reverse causality or simultaneity issues might arise if the
prospect of a higher welfare (as proxied by household consumption) induces some house-
holds who did not previously grow quinoa to do so, or if it induces quinoa producers to
grow more quinoa within a given year, through a price effect. Our use of geographical
unit fixed effects, however, would control for the average production for quinoa in a given
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geographical unit, and the various means of controlling for the effect of time enumerated
above would absorb the evolution of quinoa supply.
Unobserved heterogeneity issues might arise in this context if some unobservable fac-
tor is correlated with the variables on the RHS of equation (4.3). For example, it could
be that households whose primary decision maker is more risk averse are more likely
to grow quinoa, or that they grow more of it. In applied microeconomic studies such
as this one, unobserved heterogeneity is generally the most important problem plagu-
ing the identification of causal relationships. This problem is considerably lessened here
by our use of pseudo-panel techniques. Indeed, recall that each round of our data con-
sists of randomly selected households. Because the households selected at random in
each geographical unit in each year are representative of that geographical unit, our use
of geographical unit fixed effects should control for all things time-invariant within a
geographical-unit, both observable and unobservable.19 Of course, this does not control
for those factors that are time-variant within a geographical unit, which are unobserved
and correlated with the variables on the right-hand side of equation (4.3). Our use of year
dummies should partly obviate that issue.
Finally, measurement error issues can bias our estimate of the impact of quinoa pro-
duction on household welfare in two ways. With classical measurement error, our esti-
mate of the impact of quinoa production on household welfare would be biased toward
zero. With systematic measurement error, our estimate would be biased in a systematic
direction, which would depend on the direction of the measurement error. Time-invariant
measurement error that is systematic at the geographical unit level would be controlled
for by the geographical unit fixed effects. Here, the measurement errors we should be
most preoccupied with are: (i) classical measurement error; and (ii) time-variant sys-
tematic measurement error in our variable of interest, i.e., the proportion of households
that produce quinoa in a geographical unit. On the former, we have discussed above
19The ENAHO includes a subsample that is resurveyed as part of a panel. These households are randomly
chosen and the combination of the panel and non-panel households is nationally representative.
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how the extent of measurement error is dependent upon the geographical unit we use
as an observation. On the latter, there is no reason to believe that there is any system-
atic measurement error in this context, as there is really no incentive for respondents to
systematically over- or under-report whether they produce quinoa or not.
The change in welfare over time before the rapid increase in the price of quinoa is
likely similar for quinoa producers and non-producers. Figure 4.1, which plots the evo-
lution of household welfare for quinoa producers, consumers, and non-consumers show
that average household welfare followed a similar course from 2004 to 2010, after which
the welfare of net sellers of quinoa has clearly evolved faster than the welfare of the other
groups.
Another threat to identification when using pseudo-panel methods is the possibility
that the composition of the relevant groups—here, households that produce (consume)
quinoa versus households that do not produce (consume) quinoa—changes over time. In
our application, it is possible that some households that did not grow (consume) quinoa
decide to grow (consume) quinoa in response to higher expected levels of welfare. That
said, for producers, Table 4.3 shows that the proportion of quinoa producers is relatively
stable over the sample period. If anything, that proportion declines slightly toward the
end of the sample period. Similarly, given that the dramatic increase in the price of quinoa
in 2012-2014 was largely unpredictable and driven by an increased international demand
for quinoa, we are not worried about a potential Ashenfelter dip (see Heckman and
Smith (1995)).20 Looking at Figure 4.1, it does not look as though the welfare of quinoa-
producing households was significantly lower than that of other households before the
quinoa price increase of 2012-2014.
20In this context, an Ashenfelter dip would involve households self-selecting into quinoa cultivation ex
ante of the quinoa price spike, based on their expectation that the price of quinoa would increase significantly.
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4.4 Estimation Results and Discussion
4.4.1 The Welfare Effects of Rising Quinoa Prices on Consumers
Tables 4.4 to 4.6 present estimation results for the welfare (i.e., consumption) effects of
rising quinoa prices on consumers. In each table, the coefficient on the logarithm of
the international price of quinoa interacted with the proportion of quinoa consumers is
an estimate of the quinoa price elasticity of household welfare, on average, for those
households in geographical units where quinoa was consumed for the period 2004-2014.
In other words, this coefficient tells us how, for a 1% increase in the price of quinoa in
those districts, provinces, and departments where quinoa was consumed for the study
period, household welfare changed.
Tables 4.4 to 4.6 present estimation results at the district, provincial, and departmental
levels, respectively. In almost all cases (i.e., 5 out of 6), the quinoa price elasticity of
household welfare is statistically significant. In terms of economic significance, the quinoa
price elasticity of household welfare ranges from 0.04 (at the district level controlling for
year fixed effects, in column 2 of Table 4.4) to 0.06 (at the provincial level controlling for
department-year fixed effects, in column 3 of 4.5).
For the sake of brevity, we will discuss this elasticity as being equal to about 0.05
on average, which means that a 1% increase in the price of quinoa is associated with a
0.05% increase in household welfare on average in those geographical units where quinoa
is consumed in Peru for the period 2004-2014. From a macroeconomic perspective, this
suggests that the increase in the price of quinoa over the period 2004-2014 has had positive
general equilibrium effects extending to consumers of quinoa in addition to producers
of quinoa. More specifically, between 2013 and 2014, the international price of quinoa
rose by 25%, which would be associated with a 1.25% increase in household welfare.
Though it is impossible to determine the precise mechanism through which this might
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have happened, this likely took place via a multiplier effect.
4.4.2 The Welfare Effects of Rising Quinoa Prices on Producers
Tables 4.7 to 4.9 present estimation results for our analysis the welfare impacts of rising
quinoa prices on quinoa producers. In each table, the coefficient on the logarithm of
the international price of quinoa interacted with the proportion of quinoa producers is
an estimate of the quinoa price elasticity of household welfare, on average, for those
households in geographical units where quinoa was produced for the period 2004-2014.
The results from our core specification at the district level, shown in Table 4.7, suggest
that the elasticity of household welfare with respect to the price of quinoa ranges from
0.011 (controlling for district and department-year fixed effects, in column 2 of Table 4.8)
to 0.015 (controlling for district and province-year fixed effects, in column 2 of Table 4.7).
More specifically, between 2013 and 2014, the price of quinoa rose by 25%, which would
be associated with a 3.5% to 4% increase in household welfare of quinoa producers.
With that said, as the size of the geographical unit of observation increases, from dis-
trict to province (Tables 4.7 to 4.9), and then from province to department (Tables 4.7 to
4.9), we find that the size of the point estimate decreases and even turns negative (at
the provincial level controlling for year fixed effects in column 1 of Table 4.8, and at the
departmental level controlling for year fixed effects in column 1 of Table 4.9.) A compar-
ison of the average number of quinoa producers given that the region produces quinoa
may help explain some of these differences in the point estimates. For departments that
produce quinoa the average percentage of households that were producers was 6%, while
it is 16% and 29% for province and districts that have any quinoa production. This in-
crease in the point estimate as the geographical units get smaller is not surprising as
quinoa producing departments contain provinces or districts that do not produce quinoa.
Additionally, the decreasing statistical power is consistent with there being less classical
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measurement error the more observations go into making the relevant averages, and so
with there being less attenuation bias. The downside of considering larger geographical
units, as we mentioned earlier, is that the precision of our estimates declines with the size
of the geographical unit of observation, given the reduction in statistical power as the
number of observations falls.
As was the case for the effect of quinoa prices for consumers, we find that the esti-
mated coefficient on the interaction of international quinoa price and proportion of pro-
ducers reverses its sign when treating the department as our unit of observation. The fact
that this is similar to what we found in the case of consumers supports our hypothesis
that the lack of significance at this level is due to the fact that our sample size is drastically
decreased when moving from the province to the department.
4.5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
We have investigated whether the sharp rise in the international price of quinoa over
the period 2004-2014 has had any impact on the welfare of quinoa consumers and pro-
ducers in Peru. On the demand side, we find that an increase in the price of quinoa
translates into positive effects on the welfare of consumers. Specifically, a 1% increase
in the purchase price of quinoa is associated with a 0.04%-0.06% increase in the welfare
of quinoa-consuming households. On the supply side, we find evidence that the rising
price of quinoa has had a positive effect on the welfare of producer households. Specifi-
cally, a 1% increase in the international price of quinoa is associated with a 0.014%-0.016%
increase in the welfare of quinoa-producing households.
The findings in this chapter are important for several reasons. First, Peruvian quinoa
producers are particularly poor, with an average consumption that is still only about
half of that of households that do not produce any quinoa. Recall that in 2013, some
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people advocated that consumers in rich countries feel guilty about and reduce their
consumption of quinoa because the rising international demand for quinoa was hurting
those who had traditionally produced and consumed it. It is useful to know that the
claim that rising quinoa prices were hurting those who had traditionally produced and
consumed it—those households in our sample that produce quinoa—was patently false.
Second, the positive general equilibrium effects of rising quinoa prices that we identify
for those households that consume quinoa are interesting in and of themselves. Indeed,
though Deaton (1989a)’s short-term, partial-equilibrium measure of the welfare impacts
of an increase in the price of a commodity would suggest that quinoa consumers would
be hurt by rising quinoa prices, our longer-term estimates show that for a 1% increase
in the price of quinoa, household welfare increases by a modest 0.05%. These findings
should assuage rich-country consumers’ concerns about whether their growing demand
for quinoa is having a negative influence on Andean households.
With that said, our analysis raises important questions for future research that are
well beyond the scope of this chapter. For example, what about the indirect effects of
rising quinoa prices? These could include nutritional and health outcomes,21 agricultural
wages, technology adoption, or educational outcomes. Second, though quinoa producers
tend to be poorer, our analysis does not get into the distributional effects of rising quinoa
prices, nor does it look at changes in poverty rates. For now, we leave these questions to
future research.
21Stevens (2015) looks at whether the quinoa price boom has affected nutritional outcomes in the Peruvian
regions where quinoa has traditionally been consumed and finds no negative effects of rising quinoa prices
on nutrition.
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Figure 4.1: Total Consumption and International Prices of Quinoa, 2004-2014.
Ratio of value in year t to value in 2004
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Table 4.1: Household Welfare Trends in Constant Terms, 2004-2014
Year
Non-Consumers and
Non-Producers of Quinoa
Producers of Quinoa
Non-Producer
Consumers of Quinoa
% Households Value % Households Value % Households Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2004 76.0% 14,474.84 3.69% 6,183.24 20.5% 18,952.50
2005 74.1% 14,014.12 3.92% 5,857.40 22.3% 18,852.89
2006 73.5% 15,450.09 3.90% 6,338.86 22.8% 20,584.68
2007 74.2% 15,841.39 3.69% 6,706.97 21.8% 21,605.90
2008 77.1% 16,100.50 3.06% 7,094.08 19.3% 21,410.90
2009 78.2% 17,007.19 3.38% 7,427.77 17.9% 23,461.13
2010 76.7% 17,304.01 3.56% 7,839.03 19.0% 23,168.29
2011 75.9% 17,236.37 3.38% 8,748.95 20.5% 22,890.31
2012 74.9% 17,777.43 2.81% 8,483.50 22.0% 23,397.33
2013 73.0% 17,498.58 2.63% 9,595.53 24.0% 24,013.04
2014 74.4% 17,340.45 3.34% 9,901.29 21.9% 24,480.29
Note: Figures measured in 2004 PEN and exclude consumption of cultivated and purchased quinoa.
All descriptive statistics are weighted using the sampling weights provided in the ENAHO.
In addition to being expressed in constant (i.e., 2004) terms, all prices are deflated using departmental-level deflators.
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for Quinoa Consumers, 2004-2014
Year
Proportion of
Quinoa-Consuming
Households (%)
Kg of Whole
Quinoa Purchased,
Past 2 Weeks
Purchase Price of
Whole Quinoa
Per Kg, 2004 PEN
Budget Share of
Annual Total
Consumption
of Quinoa,
All Households (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2004 26.84% 0.87 3.15 0.36%
2005 30.70% 0.80 3.28 0.39%
2006 30.56% 0.84 3.17 0.37%
2007 29.60% 0.83 3.17 0.37%
2008 25.66% 0.75 4.18 0.53%
2009 24.64% 0.68 6.17 0.56%
2010 25.80% 0.73 6.29 0.54%
2011 27.90% 0.75 6.09 0.56%
2012 29.37% 0.71 6.10 0.57%
2013 30.83% 0.69 7.56 0.63%
2014 29.71% 0.64 11.27 0.73%
Note: Average purchase amount for households who purchased quinoa. In addition to being expressed
in constant (i.e., 2004) terms, all prices are deflated using annual departmental-level deflators.
Budget shares are imputed by multiplying the value of purchases in the previous two weeks by 26
and dividing by total household consumption.
109
110
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics for Quinoa Producers, 2004-2014
Year
Sample
Proportion of
Quinoa
Producers (%)
Sample
Proportion of
Quinoa
Sellers (%)
Quinoa
Production,
Past 12
Months (Kg),
Quinoa
Producers
Only
Quinoa
Production
for Own
Consumption
(%), Quinoa
Producers
Only
Average Sales
Price
(Per Kg,
2004 PEN)
Quinoa
Revenue
(Quinoa
Sellers Only,
2004 PEN)
Quinoa
Revenue
(All Quinoa
Farmers,
2004 PEN)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2004 3.69% 0.30% 69.02 85.10% 1.34 173.38 14.07
2005 3.92% 0.42% 63.15 81.96% 1.57 206.41 22.28
2006 3.90% 0.37% 70.49 81.75% 1.62 202.40 19.17
2007 3.69% 0.31% 56.44 68.34% 1.42 101.37 8.38
2008 3.06% 0.20% 39.60 74.76% 1.91 191.71 12.59
2009 3.38% 0.30% 49.15 68.84% 3.35 419.34 37.40
2010 3.56% 0.29% 51.80 68.54% 2.98 299.60 24.45
2011 3.38% 0.50% 70.58 63.19% 2.99 449.60 66.53
2012 2.81% 0.46% 86.53 62.53% 3.33 787.66 128.73
2013 2.63% 0.46% 75.85 67.04% 4.44 855.47 149.02
2014 3.34% 0.66% 158.64 64.58% 6.18 2045.47 403.49
Note: All descriptive statistics are weighted using the sampling weights provided in the ENAHO.
In addition to being expressed in constant (i.e., 2004) terms, all prices are deflated using departmental-level deflators.
Table 4.4: District-Level Pseudo-Panel Regression of Total Household Consumption on
the Price of Quinoa, 2004-2014
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: (Log) Total Value of Household Consumption
Quinoa Consumers x (Log) International Price of Quinoa 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.045***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 8.724*** 8.728*** 8.724***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Number of Districts 1,470 1,470 1,470
R-squared 0.204 0.455 0.283
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes No No
Province-Year Fixed Effects No Yes No
Department-Year Fixed Effects No No Yes
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. The sample
only includes district-year observations where quinoa was consumed. Standard errors clustered at the
district level are shown in parentheses. Each household is weighted according to the sampling weight
it was given in the ENAHO. In addition to being expressed in constant (i.e., 2004) terms, all prices are
deflated using departmental-level deflators.
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Table 4.5: Province-Level Pseudo-Panel Regression of Total Household Consumption on
the Price of Quinoa, 2004-2014
Variables (1) (2)
Dependent Variable: (Log) Total Value of Household Consumption
Quinoa Consumers x (Log) International Price of Quinoa 0.051*** 0.062***
(0.010) (0.011)
Constant 8.733*** 8.721***
(0.023) (0.025)
Number of Provinces 194 194
R-squared 0.381 0.507
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes No
Department-Year Fixed Effects No Yes
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. The sample
only includes district-year observations where quinoa was consumed. Standard errors clustered at the
district level are shown in parentheses. Each household is weighted according to the sampling weight
it was given in the ENAHO. In addition to being expressed in constant (i.e., 2004) terms, all prices are
deflated using departmental-level deflators.
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Table 4.6: Department-Level Pseudo-Panel Regression of Total Household Consumption
on the Price of Quinoa, 2004-2014
Variables (1)
Dependent Variable: (Log) Total Value of Household Consumption
Quinoa Consumers x (Log) International Price of Quinoa -0.010
(0.023)
Constant 9.117***
(0.046)
Number of Departments 25
R-squared 0.699
Department Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. The sample
only includes district-year observations where quinoa was consumed. Standard errors clustered at the
district level are shown in parentheses. Each household is weighted according to the sampling weight
it was given in the ENAHO. In addition to being expressed in constant (i.e., 2004) terms, all prices are
deflated using departmental-level deflators.
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Table 4.7: District-Level Pseudo-Panel Regression of Total Household Consumption on
the Price of Quinoa, 2004-2014
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: (Log) Total Value of Household Consumption
Quinoa Producers x (Log) International Price of Quinoa 0.014** 0.015*** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 8.783*** 8.793*** 8.788***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Number of Districts 1,470 1,470 1,470
R-squared 0.181 0.435 0.259
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes No No
Province-Year Fixed Effects No Yes No
Department-Year Fixed Effects No No Yes
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. The sample
only includes district-year observations where quinoa was consumed. Standard errors clustered at the
district level are shown in parentheses. Each household is weighted according to the sampling weight
it was given in the ENAHO. In addition to being expressed in constant (i.e., 2004) terms, all prices are
deflated using departmental-level deflators.
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Table 4.8: Province-Level Pseudo-Panel Regression of Total Household Consumption on
the Price of Quinoa, 2004-2014
Variables (1) (2)
Dependent Variable: (Log) Total Value of Household Consumption
Quinoa Producers x (Log) International Price of Quinoa -0.014 -0.012
(0.013) (0.014)
Constant 8.822*** 8.827***
(0.016) (0.016)
Number of Provinces 189 189
R-squared 0.414 0.491
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes No
Department-Year Fixed Effects No Yes
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. The sample
only includes district-year observations where quinoa was consumed. Standard errors clustered at the
district level are shown in parentheses. Each household is weighted according to the sampling weight
it was given in the ENAHO. In addition to being expressed in constant (i.e., 2004) terms, all prices are
deflated using departmental-level deflators.
115
Table 4.9: Department-Level Pseudo-Panel Regression of Total Household Consumption
on the Price of Quinoa, 2004-2014
Variables (1)
Dependent Variable: (Log) Total Value of Household Consumption
Quinoa Producers x (Log) International Price of Quinoa -0.058
(0.097)
Constant 9.116***
(0.034)
Number of Departments 25
R-squared 0.761
Department Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. The sample
only includes district-year observations where quinoa was consumed. Standard errors clustered at the
district level are shown in parentheses. Each household is weighted according to the sampling weight
it was given in the ENAHO. In addition to being expressed in constant (i.e., 2004) terms, all prices are
deflated using departmental-level deflators.
116
Chapter 5
Conclusion
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This dissertation studied three topics in development economics: (i) the effect of
gender-biased violence against women on female employment in Colombia; (ii) the contri-
bution of early life circumstances to inequality of opportunity in adult health in Colombia;
and (iii) the welfare effects of rising quinoa prices in Peru.
Chapter 2 showed that the incidence of intimate partner violence increases the like-
lihood of female employment by about 16 percentage points for a sample of women
in Colombia. Women’s decision-making power likely explains this finding, as abused
women may work to enhance their decision-making power and escape violent situations
at home. These results suggest some important policy implications. That women victims
of intimate partner violence are more likely to work suggests that they may benefit from
counseling and legal help inside and outside the workplace. This is particularly impor-
tant since previous studies suggest that intimate partner violence has negative effects on
labor productivity (Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 2004).
Chapter 3 provided suggestive evidence of the lasting effects of childhood circum-
stances on adult health in Colombia. This chapter also showed how the transmission
channels of health inequality across generations seem to operate differently in rural and
urban areas. To equalize the opportunity to achieve a healthy adulthood, more specific
policies should be designed to offset the effects of unequal circumstances, in particular
those related to human capital formation early in life.
Chapter 4 showed that the effects of increasing international prices of quinoa on
changes in the welfare of rural households in Peru are likely positive, although modest.
In particular, for quinoa-consuming households, longer-term estimates show that for a
1% increase in the price of quinoa, household welfare increases by a modest 0.05%, which
suggests that the quinoa price increase has had general equilibrium effects extending to
non-producers. This analysis raises important questions for future research. For example,
the effects of rising quinoa prices on nutritional and health outcomes, agricultural wages,
technology adoption, or educational outcomes are yet to be studied.
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Variable Observations Mean or Proportion Std. Dev. 
Outcome    Self-assessed Health Status  1,263 2.85 0.60 
   Poor 25 2.0% 0.14 
   Fair 258 20.4% 0.40 
   Good 856 67.8% 0.47 
   Excellent 124 9.8% 0.30 
Early-life Circumstances    Household Socioeconomic Status at Age 10 
Quintile Group 
   1 (Lowest) 265 21.0% 0.41 
   2 252 20.0% 0.40 
   3 253 20.0% 0.40 
   4 243 19.2% 0.39 
   5 (highest) 237 18.8% 0.39 
   No information on assets available 13 1.0% 0.10 
Education Level of Father 
   None or Incomplete Primary 585 46.3% 0.50 
   Complete Primary and Incomplete Secondary 289 22.9% 0.42 
   Complete Secondary or More 177 14.0% 0.35 
   Unknown Father's Education 210 16.6% 0.37 
   No information on father's education 2 0.2% 0.04 
Education Level of Mother 
   None or Incomplete Primary 647 51.2% 0.50 
   Complete Primary and Incomplete Secondary 333 26.4% 0.44 
   Complete Secondary or More 151 12.0% 0.32 
   Unknown Mother's Education 130 10.3% 0.30 
   No information on mother's education 2 0.2% 0.04 
Other circumstances    Ethnicity 
   Indigenous 22 1.7% 0.13 
   Black, mulato, raizal or palenquero 80 6.3% 0.24 
   No ethnic minority 1,161 91.9% 0.27 
Years of Education 1,263 8.83 4.54 
Born in Urban Area 899 71.2% 0.45 
Born in Rural Area 359 28.4% 0.45 
No information on area of birth 5 0.4% 0.06 
Region of Birth 
   Atlantic 259 20.5% 0.40 
   Eastern 325 25.7% 0.44 
   Pacific 74 5.9% 0.23 
   Orinoquia-Amazonia  5 0.4% 0.06 
   Antioquia 146 11.6% 0.32 
   Valle del Cauca 102 8.1% 0.27 
   Bogotá 153 12.1% 0.33 
   San Andrés islands 2 0.2% 0.04 
   Central 197 15.6% 0.36 
Additional Controls    Male 811 64.2% 0.48 
Age 1,263 45.13 10.96 
Age group 
   25–35 275 21.8% 0.41 
   35–45 315 24.9% 0.43 
   45–55 385 30.5% 0.46 
   55–65 288 22.8% 0.42 
Note: Heads of Household between 25 and 65 years old. Total Number of Observations: 1,263 
Source: 2010 Colombian LSSM Survey 
A.1 Additional Tables
Table A.1: Summary Statistics: Urban Subsample
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Variable Observations Mean or Proportion Std. Dev. 
Outcome    Self-assessed Health Status  990 2.69 0.58 
   Poor 24 2.4% 0.15 
   Fair 298 30.1% 0.46 
   Good 631 63.7% 0.48 
   Excellent 37 3.7% 0.19 
Early-life Circumstances    Household Socioeconomic Status at Age 10  
Quintile Group 
   1 (lowest) 246 24.8% 0.43 
   2 158 16.0% 0.37 
   3 181 18.3% 0.39 
   4 194 19.6% 0.40 
   5 (highest) 185 18.7% 0.39 
   No information on assets available 26 2.6% 0.16 
Education Level of Father 
   None or Incomplete Primary 673 68.0% 0.47 
   Complete Primary and Incomplete Secondary 88 8.9% 0.28 
   Complete Secondary or More 17 1.7% 0.13 
   Unknown Father's Education 212 21.4% 0.41 
Education Level of Mother 
   None or Incomplete Primary 698 70.5% 0.46 
   Complete Primary and Incomplete Secondary 114 11.5% 0.32 
   Complete Secondary or More 20 2.0% 0.14 
   Unknown Mother's Education 158 16.0% 0.37 
Other circumstances    Ethnicity 
   Indigenous 37 3.7% 0.19 
   Black, mulato, raizal or palenquero 64 6.5% 0.25 
   No ethnic minority 889 89.8% 0.30 
Years of Education 990 4.71 3.66 
Born in Urban Area 204 20.6% 0.41 
Born in Rural Area 785 79.3% 0.40 
No information on area of birth 1 0.1% 0.03 
Region of Birth 
   Atlantic 248 25.1% 0.43 
   Eastern 193 19.5% 0.40 
   Pacific 181 18.3% 0.39 
   Orinoquia-Amazonia  1 0.1% 0.03 
   Antioquia 105 10.6% 0.31 
   Valle del Cauca 58 5.9% 0.23 
   Bogotá 6 0.6% 0.08 
   Central 198 20.0% 0.40 
Additional Controls    Male 787 79.5% 0.40 
Age 990 44.31 11.06 
Age group 
   25–35 229 23.1% 0.42 
   35–45 279 28.2% 0.45 
   45–55 261 26.4% 0.44 
   55–65 221 22.3% 0.42 
Note: Heads of Household between 25 and 65 years old. Total Number of Observations: 990 
Source: 2010 Colombian LSSM Survey 
Table A.2: Summary Statistics: Rural Subsample
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A.2 Stochastic Dominance Test for Ordinal Variables and Its Ap-
plication to Inequality of Opportunity in Adult Health in
Colombia
A.2.1 Stochastic Dominance and Inequality of Opportunity
Roemer (1998) defines equality of opportunity as a situation where individuals with simi-
lar efforts reach similar outcomes, regardless of their circumstances. More formally, under
equality of opportunity, the probability distribution of health status H given effort e does
not depend on circumstances C or C’. That is,
∀C 6= C, ∀e, F(H | C, e) = F(H | C′, e) (A.1)
where F(H | C, e) denotes the cumulative probability function.
Lefranc, Pistolesi, and Trannoy (2009) suggest that different health-related outcomes
can be seen as alternative lotteries resulting from the effect of luck and other random fac-
tors that are equally distributed across individuals sharing the same efforts and circum-
stances.1These authors then show that a consistent definition of inequality of opportunity
formulates that different conditional distributions of health can be ordered according to
expected utility theory. In their paper, Lefranc, Trannoy and Pistolesi propose a criterion
to assess inequality of opportunity using stochastic dominance relationships. The authors
assume that health status is increasing in effort and that the relative effort can be inferred
from the observation of health status and circumstances. Thus, inequality of opportunity
is satisfied if and only if the distributions of health status conditional on different sets of
circumstances can be ordered by first-order stochastic dominance, such that
1The authors also note that luck could lead to differences in individual health outcomes as long as it
remains neutral with respect to circumstances.
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∀C 6= C′, F(H | C) FSD F(H | C′) (A.2)
A.2.2 A Stochastic Dominance Test for Ordinal Variables
Self-assessed health status is a categorical variable. In this case, the stochastic dominance
test is performed using a non-parametric test proposed by Yalonetzky (2013), as the more
familiar statistical tests for stochastic dominance such as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov or the
Davidson-Duclos cannot be directly applied to outcomes that are ordinal and lack any
cardinal meaning.
Anand, Roope, and Gray (2013) provide the univariate extension of the stochastic
dominance test proposed by Yalonetzky (2013). In this appendix, I follow closely Anand,
Roope and Gray’s notation.
Let A be the subgroup of individuals who share exposure to circumstance category
a (e.g., individuals whose mothers have incomplete primary education), and B the sub-
group who share exposure to circumstance category b (e.g., individuals whose mothers
have incomplete secondary education). The sample size of each group is denoted by nA
and nB, respectively. Each individual in each group g ∈ {A, B} reports a health status
which lies in one of S ∈N ordinal categories. Suppose there are Ng individuals in group
g ∈ {A, B}. Each individual indicates a health status which lies in one of S ∈ N ordinal
categories, in our case S = 3
Let hg ∈ NNg↑ be a vector of health status scores, where the ↑ subscript indicates that
the ordinal categories are ordered in terms of their desirability from the least to the most
desired one. The i-th element of hg is given by hig ∈ {1, . . . , S}
For k ∈ {1, . . . , S}, let Fg(k) ≡ Pr(hig ≤ k) denote the cumulative probability function.
Furthermore, the difference in cumulative probability functions is defined as 4F(·) ≡
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FA(·)− FB(·)
Now, let pkg be the probability that a randomly selected individual from G = {1, . . . , Ng}
has a health status in category k ∈ {1, . . . , S} , and pg ∈ [0, 1]S be the corresponding vec-
tor of probabilities. The empirical estimate of pkg from a random sample ng ≤ Ng is given
by
p̂kg =
1
ng
ng
∑
i=1
I(ki) (A.3)
where I(ki) is an indicator function that equals 1 when ki = k.
The empirical estimates for the probability that a randomly selected individual from
group g has a health status in category j ∈ {1, 2} are denoted by p̂jA and p̂jB , respectively.
Let p̂g be the vector of empirical estimates of pg. Formby, Smith and Zheng (2004) show
that the corresponding asymptotic result is given by
√
ng( p̂g − pg)→d N(0,Ωg) (A.4)
where Ωg is a S-dimensional covariance matrix whose (k,l)-th element is equal to pkg(1−
pkg) whenever k = l, and −pkg plg whenever k 6= l
Thus, under the null hypothesis that groups A and B are identically distributed, Ωg =
Ω for any g ∈ {A, B}, so that
( p̂A − p̂B)→d N(0, nA + nBnAnB Ω) (A.5)
The empirical estimate of Ωg has corresponding elements ̂pkg(1− pkg) whenever k = l,
and −̂pkg plg whenever k 6= l.
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Let 4̂F be the S-vector with k− th element given by 4̂F = ∑kj=1( p̂jA − p̂jB) and L be
a S-dimensional lower triangular matrix of ones. Under the assumption that A and B are
independent, the estimated covariance matrix of the empirical difference in cumulative
probability functions is given by
var(4̂F) = L( 1
nA
ΩA +
1
nB
ΩB)L′ (A.6)
Thus, for each k ∈ {A, . . . , B}, the corresponding z-statistic zlk is obtained by divid-
ing 4̂F by its respective standard error, which is given by the squared root of the k− th
diagonal element of var(4̂F). More formally, a test for the hypothesis that A does not
first-order-stochastic dominate B against the alternative that A first-order-stochastic dom-
inates B is given by
H0 = 4F(k) ≥ 0 f or some k ∈ {1, 2}
H1 = 4F(k) < 0 f or all k ∈ {1, 2}
(A.7)
The corresponding z-statistic, zlk, is given by
zlk =
∑kj=1(pjA − pjB)√
∑kj=1(
pjA(1−pjA)
nA
+
pjB(1−pjB)
nB
− pjAnA ∑kl=1,l 6=j p̂lA −
pjB
nB ∑
k
l=1,l 6=j p̂lB)
(A.8)
The rejection rule proposed by Howes (1996) suggests that H0 is rejected if and only
if zlk ≤ −z∗ < 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1}, where −z∗ is the left-tail critical value for a
desired level of statistical significance.
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A.2.3 Results
I perform
m!
[(m− 2)!] 2 pairwise tests for each circumstance variable c that has m response
categories. To assess the differences in inequality of opportunity between urban and rural
residents, I perform separate statistical tests for the sample of all individuals, the subsam-
ple of individuals residing in rural areas, and the subsample of individuals residing in
urban areas.
In this section, I empirically assess inequality of opportunity using the stochastic dom-
inance approach. I analyze one circumstance at a time. In what follows, I refer to the
group of individuals who share exposure to a particular circumstance category as “sub-
group” (in Roemer (1998), a subgroup is referred to as “type”).
In the LSSM data, health status is an ordinal variable which takes on values h =
1, 2, 3, 4. Most responses concentrate in categories 2 (fair) and 3 (good). Thus, for the
stochastic dominance analysis, I group the lower two categories together (1 and 2) to
define a new categorical variable which equals 1 if the respondent reports a poor or a fair
health status, and equals 2 and 3 if the respondent reports a good and an excellent health
status, respectively.
In the following subsections, I particularly focus on the following childhood circum-
stances: parental education and household socioeconomic status at age 10.
A.2.3.1 Parental Educational Attainment
To illustrate the application of the first-order stochastic dominance test in the context of
the LSSM data, I define three subgroups based on maternal educational attainment: 1.
Individuals whose mothers have incomplete primary school, 2. Mothers with complete
primary school or incomplete secondary school, and 3. Mothers with complete secondary
school or higher. Recall that higher values of the self-assessed health status denote a
134
better health status reported. I also define three subgroups based on paternal educational
attainment, following the same definitions given for maternal educational attainment.
I examine the ranking of the conditional distributions of self-assessed health status us-
ing the non-parametric test proposed by Yalonetzky (2013). Appendix Table A.3 displays
the test results for the comparison of health status across different maternal education
levels for all individuals in the sample. Comparing the distributions for the first two
subgroups shown in panel a of Appendix Table A1, at the 5 percent significance level and
with a value of −z∗ of -1.645, the test suggests that the distribution for complete primary
or incomplete secondary first-order-stochastically dominates the distribution for incom-
plete primary or no education in the LSSM sample. Regarding the first and the third
subgroups (see Appendix Table A.3, panel b), the distribution for complete secondary
or more dominates the distribution for primary education or less given the unanimously
negative values and the significance of the z-statistic. A similar conclusion is suggested
regarding the relationship between complete secondary or more and complete primary
or incomplete secondary given the results presented in panel c of Appendix Table A.3.
These results suggest that there is inequality of opportunity in adult health when a mother
attains more education relative to a mother who obtains no more than some primary ed-
ucation.
Regarding urban areas, I find that the health distribution for mothers having com-
pleted secondary school dominate the health distribution for mothers who did not com-
plete primary education. No dominance relationship can be established between the
distribution for complete primary and incomplete primary as the z-statistic is not statis-
tically significant for the first row, when I analyze the health category poor or fair. In
rural areas, I find that no dominance relationship, at the first order, can be derived for the
distributions of health status by each subgroup of maternal educational attainment (see
Appendix Table A.4)
The statistical test results for stochastic dominance using the subgroups defined by
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father’s education level (see Appendix Table A.5) suggest that each of the distributions
for complete primary and complete secondary dominates the distribution for incomplete
primary at the first order. From these results, the dominance relationship between the
distributions for complete primary and complete secondary is not clear. A similar result
is obtained for the sample of urban residents, whereas no dominance relationship can be
determined for rural residents (see Appendix Table A.6).
A.2.3.2 Household Socioeconomic Status in Childhood
I define five subgroups using the quintile groups of the socioeconomic status index cal-
culated using information on ownership of assets by the individual’s household at age
10. The non-parametric test results shown in Appendix Table A.7 suggest that the health
distribution for the fifth quintile group dominates the distribution for all but the first
quintile group, and that the fourth quintile group dominates the distribution for the first
and second socioeconomic status quintile groups.
Turning to the urban subsample (see Appendix Table A.8), I find that the health dis-
tribution for the fifth quintile dominates each of the distributions for the four remaining
quintile groups. These dominance relationships are statistically significant at the 5 per-
cent level. In contrast with the urban sample, the statistical tests results for rural areas
suggest that the only statistically significant dominance relationship is that of the health
distribution for quintile 5 relative to the first and second quintile groups (see Appendix
Table A.9).
The stochastic dominance analysis is limited in the sense that we cannot observe how
different circumstances are related to each other. I can only focus on one circumstance at
a time, and any potential conclusions derived from this analysis alone can be misleading.
The regression approach is potentially more useful and allows to control for how different
circumstances interact with each other.
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 Note: *** denote that the statistic is significant at the 5 percent significant level. Source: 2010 Colombian LSSM Survey 
Note for all tables in this section: The null hypothesis is given by !" = ∆%(') ≥ 0 for some ' ∈ {1,2} and the 
alternative is given by !1 = ∆%(') < 0 for all ' ∈ {1,2}. ∆%(') indicates the estimated difference between 
the cumulative probability functions, %3(')–%4('), where  %3(') indicates the cumulative probability 
function for the subgroup in the most-right panel and %4(') for the most-left panel, for row k. H" is rejected 
if and only if z78 ≤ −z∗ < 0 for all k ∈ {1,2}, where −z∗ = −1.645 is the left-tail critical value at the 5% 
significance level. No ordering can be established if the two values for ABC  do not have the same direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 379 28.17 28.17 76 16.99 16.99 -0.112 -5.179 ***2	=	Good 884 65.72 93.89 330 73.84 90.83 -0.031 -2.022 ***3	=	Excellent 82 6.11 100 41 9.17 100Total 1,345 100 447 100
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 379 28.17 28.17 14 8.02 8.02 -0.202 -8.354 ***2	=	Good 884 65.72 93.89 113 65.79 73.81 -0.201 -5.863 ***3	=	Excellent 82 6.11 100 45 26.2 100.01Total 1,345 100 171 100
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 76 16.99 16.99 14 8.02 8.02 -0.090 -3.282 ***2	=	Good 330 73.84 90.83 113 65.79 73.81 -0.170 -4.690 ***3	=	Excellent 41 9.17 100 45 26.2 100.01Total 447 100 171 100
All	individualsa.		Complete	Primary	vs.	Incomplete	Primary
b.	Complete	Secondary	vs.	Incomplete	Primary
c.	Complete	Secondary	vs.	Complete	Primary
Health	Status Incomplete	primary	school	or	none Complete	secondary	school	or	higher
Incomplete	primary	school	or	none Complete	primary	school	or	incomplete	secondary	schoolHealth	Status
Health	Status Complete	primary	school	or	incomplete	secondary	school Complete	secondary	school	or	higher
∆"# $
%&'
∆"# $
%&'
∆"# $
%&'
Table A.3: Distribution of Health Status by Mothers Education Level: Full Sample
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Note: *** denote that the statistic is significant at the 5% significant level.  Source: 2010 Colombian LSSM 
Survey 
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 174 26.91 26.91 53 15.96 15.96 -0.110 -4.119 ***2	=	Good 426 65.88 92.79 248 74.54 90.5 -0.023 -1.2043	=	Excellent 47 7.22 100.01 32 9.5 100Total 647 100.01 333 100
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 174 26.91 26.91 11 7.05 7.05 -0.199 -7.311 ***2	=	Good 426 65.88 92.79 99 65.65 72.7 -0.201 -5.336 ***3	=	Excellent 47 7.22 100.01 41 27.3 100Total 647 100.01 151 100
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 53 15.96 15.96 11 7.05 7.05 -0.089 -3.080 ***2	=	Good 248 74.54 90.5 99 65.65 72.7 -0.178 -4.489 ***3	=	Excellent 32 9.5 100 41 27.3 100Total 333 100 151 100
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 220 31.57 31.57 30 25.88 25.88 -0.057 -1.2752	=	Good 456 65.31 96.88 77 67.85 93.73 -0.032 -1.3333	=	Excellent 22 3.13 100.01 7 6.27 100Total 698 100.01 114 100
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 220 31.57 31.57 6 28.61 28.61 -0.030 -0.2892	=	Good 456 65.31 96.88 14 68.63 97.24 0.004 0.0973	=	Excellent 22 3.13 100.01 1 2.76 100Total 698 100.01 20 100
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 30 25.88 25.88 6 28.61 28.61 0.027 0.2502	=	Good 77 67.85 93.73 14 68.63 97.24 0.035 0.8143	=	Excellent 7 6.27 100 1 2.76 100Total 114 100 20 100
Residents	in	Urban	Areasa.		Complete	Primary	vs.	Incomplete	Primary
Health	Status Incomplete	primary	school	or	none Complete	primary	school	or	incomplete	secondary	school
b.	Complete	Secondary	vs.	Incomplete	PrimaryHealth	Status Incomplete	primary	school	or	none Complete	secondary	school	or	higher
c.	Complete	Secondary	vs.	Complete	Primary
Health	Status Complete	primary	school	or	incomplete	secondary	school Complete	secondary	school	or	higher
Residents	in	Rural	Areasa.		Complete	Primary	vs.	Incomplete	PrimaryHealth	Status Incomplete	primary	school	or	none Complete	primary	school	or	incomplete	secondary	school
b.	Complete	Secondary	vs.	Incomplete	PrimaryHealth	Status Incomplete	primary	school	or	none Complete	secondary	school	or	higher
c.	Complete	Secondary	vs.	Complete	Primary
Health	Status Complete	primary	school	or	incomplete	secondary	school Complete	secondary	school	or	higher
∆"# $ %&'
∆"# $ %&'
∆"# $ %&'
∆"# $ %&'
∆"# $ %&'
∆"# $ %&'
Table A.4: Distribution of Health Status by Mothers Education Level: Urban and Rural
Subsamples
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Note: *** denote that the statistic is significant at the 5% significant level. Source: 2010 Colombian LSSM 
Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 359 28.54 28.54 58 15.32 15.32 -0.132 -5.876 ***2	=	Good 829 65.87 94.41 281 74.52 89.84 -0.046 -2.711 ***3	=	Excellent 70 5.59 100 38 10.16 100Total 1,258 100 377 100
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 359 28.54 28.54 22 11.23 11.23 -0.173 -6.658 ***2	=	Good 829 65.87 94.41 123 63.23 74.46 -0.200 -6.240 ***3	=	Excellent 70 5.59 100 50 25.54 100Total 1,258 100 194 100
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 58 15.32 15.32 22 11.23 11.23 -0.041 -1.3962	=	Good 281 74.52 89.84 123 63.23 74.46 -0.154 -4.399 ***3	=	Excellent 38 10.16 100 50 25.54 100Total 377 100 194 100
All	individuals
Health	Status Complete	primary	school	or	incomplete	secondary	school Complete	secondary	school	or	higher
a.		Complete	Primary	vs.	Incomplete	Primary
b.	Complete	Secondary	vs.	Incomplete	Primary
c.	Complete	Secondary	vs.	Complete	Primary
Health	Status Incomplete	primary	school	or	none Complete	primary	school	or	incomplete	secondary	school
Health	Status Incomplete	primary	school	or	none Complete	secondary	school	or	higher
∆"# $ %&'
∆"# $ %&'
∆"# $ %&'
Table A.5: Distribution of Health Status by Fathers Education Level: Full Sample
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Note: *** denote that the statistic is significant at the 5% significant level.  Source: 2010 Colombian LSSM 
Survey. 
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 160 27.39 27.39 42 14.45 14.45 -0.129 -4.670 ***2	=	Good 387 66.11 93.5 216 74.88 89.33 -0.042 -2.002 ***3	=	Excellent 38 6.5 100 31 10.67 100Total 585 100 289 100
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 160 27.39 27.39 20 11.14 11.14 -0.163 -5.419 ***2	=	Good 387 66.11 93.5 111 62.65 73.79 -0.197 -5.698 ***3	=	Excellent 38 6.5 100 46 26.21 100Total 585 100 177 100
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 42 14.45 14.45 20 11.14 11.14 -0.033 -1.0542	=	Good 216 74.88 89.33 111 62.65 73.79 -0.155 -4.120 ***3	=	Excellent 31 10.67 100 46 26.21 100Total 289 100 177 100
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 212 31.44 31.44 21 23.78 23.78 -0.077 -1.5702	=	Good 439 65.26 96.7 62 71.02 94.8 -0.019 -0.7713	=	Excellent 22 3.3 100 5 5.21 100.01Total 673 100 88 100.01
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 212 31.44 31.44 2 13.57 13.57 -0.179 -2.103 ***2	=	Good 439 65.26 96.7 14 79.46 93.03 -0.037 -0.5913	=	Excellent 22 3.3 100 1 6.97 100Total 673 100 17 100
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 21 23.78 23.78 2 13.57 13.57 -0.102 -1.0792	=	Good 62 71.02 94.8 14 79.46 93.03 -0.018 -0.2683	=	Excellent 5 5.21 100.01 1 6.97 100Total 88 100.01 17 100
a.		Complete	Primary	vs.	Incomplete	Primary
Health	Status Incomplete	primary	school	or	none Complete	primary	school	or	incomplete	secondary	school
b.	Complete	Secondary	vs.	Incomplete	PrimaryHealth	Status Incomplete	primary	school	or	none Complete	secondary	school	or	higher
c.	Complete	Secondary	vs.	Complete	Primary
Health	Status Complete	primary	school	or	incomplete	secondary	school Complete	secondary	school	or	higher
Health	Status Incomplete	primary	school	or	none Complete	primary	school	or	incomplete	secondary	school
c.	Complete	Secondary	vs.	Complete	Primary
Health	Status Complete	primary	school	or	incomplete	secondary	school Complete	secondary	school	or	higher
b.	Complete	Secondary	vs.	Incomplete	PrimaryHealth	Status Incomplete	primary	school	or	none Complete	secondary	school	or	higher
Residents	in	Urban	Areas
Residents	in	Rural	Areasa.		Complete	Primary	vs.	Incomplete	Primary
!"#∆%& '
!"#∆%& '
!"#∆%& '
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Table A.6: Distribution of Health Status by Fathers Education Level: Urban and Rural
Subsamples
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     Note: *** denote that the statistic is significant at the 5% significant level. Source: 2010 Colombian LSSM Survey.  
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 207 36.5 36.5 37 11.8 11.8 -0.246 -0.246 162 30.3 30.3 37 11.8 11.8 -0.185 -6.873 ***2	=	Good 342 60.1 96.5 208 66.0 77.8 -0.188 -0.188 347 65.2 95.5 208 66.0 77.8 -0.178 -7.085 ***3	=	Excellent 20 3.5 100.0 70 22.3 100.0 24 4.5 100.0 70 22.3 100.0Total 569 100 316 100 533 100 316 100
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 94 21.4 21.4 37 11.8 11.8 -0.096 -3.600 *** 61 17.2 17.2 37 11.8 11.8 -0.054 -1.997 ***2	=	Good 313 71.0 92.4 208 66.0 77.8 -0.146 -5.508 *** 261 73.5 90.7 208 66.0 77.8 -0.129 -4.602 ***3	=	Excellent 34 7.6 100.0 70 22.3 100.0 33 9.3 100.0 70 22.3 100.0Total 441 100 316 100 355 100 316 100
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 207 36.5 36.5 61 17.21 17.21 -0.192 -6.767 *** 162 30.3 30.3 61 17.2 17.2 -0.131 -4.645 ***2	=	Good 342 60.1 96.5 261 73.45 90.66 -0.059 -3.411 *** 347 65.2 95.5 261 73.5 90.7 -0.049 -2.716 ***3	=	Excellent 20 3.5 100.0 33 9.34 100 24 4.5 100.0 33 9.3 100.0Total 569 100 355 100 533 100 355 100
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 94 21.4 21.4 76 17.2 17.2 -0.042 -1.501 207 36.5 36.5 94 21.4 21.4 -0.150 -0.2382	=	Good 313 71.0 92.4 252 73.5 90.7 -0.017 -0.872 342 60.1 96.5 313 71.0 92.4 -0.041 -0.1293	=	Excellent 34 7.6 100.0 27 9.3 100.0 20 3.5 100.0 34 7.6 100.0Total 441 100 355 100 569 100 441 100
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 162 30.3 30.3 94 21.4 21.4 -0.089 -3.198 *** 207 36.5 36.5 162 30.3 30.3 -0.061 -2.159 ***2	=	Good 347 65.2 95.5 313 71.0 92.4 -0.031 -2.009 *** 342 60.1 96.5 347 65.2 95.5 -0.010 -0.8733	=	Excellent 24 4.5 100.0 34 7.6 100.0 20 3.5 100.0 24 4.5 100.0Total 533 100 441 100 569 100 533 100
Quintile	1 Quntile	2Health	Status Quintile	2 Quintile	3i.		Quintile	3	vs.	Quintile	2
Health	Status Quintile	3 Quintile	4 Quintile	1 Quintile	3
j.		Quintile	2	vs.	Quintile	1
h.		Quintile	3	vs.	Quintile	1g.		Quintile	4	vs.	Quintile	3
Health	Status Quintile	1 Quintile	4 Quintile	2 Quintile	4f.		Quintile	4	vs.	Quintile	2e.		Quintile	4	vs.	Quintile	1
Health	Status Quintile	3 Quintile	5 Quintile	4 Quintile	5
a.		Quintile	5	vs.	Quintile	1 b.		Quintile	5	vs.	Quintile	2
d.		Quintile	5	vs.	Quintile	4c.		Quintile	5	vs.	Quintile	3
Health	Status Quintile	1 Quintile	5 Quintile	2 Quintile	5
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∆"# $ %&'∆"# $ %&'
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Table A.7: Distribution of Health Status by Household Socioeconomic Status in Childhood
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Note: *** denote that the statistic is significant at the 5% significant level. Source: 2010 Colombian LSSM Survey.  
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 86 32.5 32.5 20 8.5 8.5 -0.239 -7.041 *** 58 23.2 23.2 20 8.5 8.5 -0.147 -4.558 ***2	=	Good 164 62.0 94.5 157 66.2 74.8 -0.197 -6.256 *** 178 70.4 93.6 157 66.2 74.8 -0.189 -5.874 ***3	=	Excellent 15 5.5 100.0 60 25.3 100.0 16 6.4 100.0 60 25.3 100.0Total 265 100.0 237 100.0 252 100.0 237 100.0
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 55 21.7 21.7 20 8.5 8.5 -0.132 -4.175 *** 49 20.1 20.1 20 8.5 8.5 -0.116 -3.692 ***2	=	Good 178 70.3 92.0 157 66.2 74.8 -0.173 -5.243 *** 171 70.5 90.6 157 66.2 74.8 -0.159 -4.688 ***3	=	Excellent 20 8.0 100.0 60 25.3 100.0 23 9.4 100.0 60 25.3 100.0Total 253 100.0 237 100.0 243 100.0 237 100.0
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 86 32.5 32.5 49 20.14 20.14 -0.123 -3.193 *** 58 23.2 23.2 49 20.1 20.1 -0.031 -0.8242	=	Good 164 62.0 94.5 171 70.48 90.62 -0.038 -1.646 *** 178 70.4 93.6 171 70.5 90.6 -0.030 -1.2433	=	Excellent 15 5.5 100.0 23 9.38 100 16 6.4 100.0 23 9.4 100.0Total 265 100.0 243 100 252 100.0 243 100.0
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 55 21.7 21.7 53 20.1 20.1 -0.016 -0.435 86 32.5 32.5 55 21.7 21.7 -0.107 -0.1722	=	Good 178 70.3 92.0 171 70.5 90.6 -0.014 -0.557 164 62.0 94.5 178 70.3 92.0 -0.024 -0.0693	=	Excellent 20 8.0 100.0 19 9.4 100.0 15 5.5 100.0 20 8.0 100.0Total 253 100.0 243 100.0 265 100.0 253 100.0
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 58 23.2 23.2 55 21.7 21.7 -0.015 -0.393 86 32.5 32.5 58 23.2 23.2 -0.093 -2.367 ***2	=	Good 178 70.4 93.6 178 70.3 92.0 -0.016 -0.697 164 62.0 94.5 178 70.4 93.6 -0.008 -0.4033	=	Excellent 16 6.4 100.0 20 8.0 100.0 15 5.5 100.0 16 6.4 100.0Total 252 100.0 253 100.0 265 100.0 252 100.0
i.		Quintile	3	vs.	Quintile	2 j.		Quintile	2	vs.	Quintile	1Quintile	1 Quntile	2Health	Status Quintile	2 Quintile	3
e.		Quintile	4	vs.	Quintile	1 f.		Quintile	4	vs.	Quintile	2
Health	Status Quintile	3 Quintile	4 Quintile	1 Quintile	3g.		Quintile	4	vs.	Quintile	3 h.		Quintile	3	vs.	Quintile	1
Quintile	2 Quintile	4Health	Status Quintile	1 Quintile	4
a.		Quintile	5	vs.	Quintile	1 b.		Quintile	5	vs.	Quintile	2
Health	Status Quintile	3 Quintile	5 Quintile	4 Quintile	5c.		Quintile	5	vs.	Quintile	3 d.		Quintile	5	vs.	Quintile	4
Quintile	2 Quintile	5Health	Status Quintile	1 Quintile	5
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Table A.8: Distribution of Health Status by Household Socioeconomic Status in Childhood: Residents in Urban Areas
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Note: *** denote that the statistic is significant at the 5% significant level.  Source: 2010 Colombian LSSM Survey.
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 111 45.1 45.1 36 19.5 19.5 -0.256 -5.947 *** 59 37.4 37.4 36 19.5 19.5 -0.180 -3.726 ***2	=	Good 128 51.9 97.0 136 73.5 92.9 -0.040 -1.851 *** 95 60.3 97.7 136 73.5 92.9 -0.048 -2.169 ***3	=	Excellent 7 3.0 100.0 13 7.1 100.0 4 2.3 100.0 13 7.1 100.0Total 246 100.0 185 100.0 158 100.0 185 100.0
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 56 30.7 30.7 36 19.5 19.5 -0.113 -2.510 *** 47 24.1 24.1 36 19.5 19.5 -0.047 -1.1042	=	Good 118 65.2 95.9 136 73.5 92.9 -0.030 -1.253 141 72.7 96.8 136 73.5 92.9 -0.039 -1.729 ***3	=	Excellent 7 4.1 100.0 13 7.1 100.0 6 3.2 100.0 13 7.1 100.0Total 181 100.0 185 100.0 194 100.0 185 100.0
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 111 45.1 45.1 47 24.12 24.12 -0.209 -4.740 *** 59 37.4 37.4 47 24.1 24.1 -0.133 -2.702 ***2	=	Good 128 51.9 97.0 141 72.71 96.83 -0.001 -0.072 95 60.3 97.7 141 72.7 96.8 -0.009 -0.5273	=	Excellent 7 3.0 100.0 6 3.16 99.99 4 2.3 100.0 6 3.2 100.0Total 246 100.0 194 99.99 158 100.0 194 100.0
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 56 30.7 30.7 60 24.1 24.1 -0.066 -1.438 111 45.1 45.1 56 30.7 30.7 -0.143 -0.2112	=	Good 118 65.2 95.9 126 72.7 96.8 0.009 0.475 128 51.9 97.0 118 65.2 95.9 -0.010 -0.0403	=	Excellent 7 4.1 100.0 8 3.2 100.0 7 3.0 100.0 7 4.1 100.0Total 181 100.0 194 100.0 246 100.0 181 100.0
Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	% Freq. % Cumul.	%1	=	Poor/Fair 59 37.4 37.4 56 30.7 30.7 -0.067 -1.297 111 45.1 45.1 59 37.4 37.4 -0.076 -1.5272	=	Good 95 60.3 97.7 118 65.2 95.9 -0.018 -0.969 128 51.9 97.0 95 60.3 97.7 0.008 0.4903	=	Excellent 4 2.3 100.0 7 4.1 100.0 7 3.0 100.0 4 2.3 100.0Total 158 100.0 181 100.0 246 100.0 158 100.0
Quintile	2 Quintile	5Quintile	1 Quintile	5
f.		Quintile	4	vs.	Quintile	2
h.		Quintile	3	vs.	Quintile	1
j.		Quintile	2	vs.	Quintile	1
c.		Quintile	5	vs.	Quintile	3
e.		Quintile	4	vs.	Quintile	1
a.		Quintile	5	vs.	Quintile	1
Health	Status Quintile	3 Quintile	5 Quintile	4 Quintile	5
b.		Quintile	5	vs.	Quintile	2
d.		Quintile	5	vs.	Quintile	4
Health	Status
Health	Status Quintile	1 Quintile	4 Quintile	2 Quintile	4
Quintile	1 Quintile	3g.		Quintile	4	vs.	Quintile	3
Health	Status Quintile	2 Quintile	3
Health	Status Quintile	3 Quintile	4
i.		Quintile	3	vs.	Quintile	2 Quintile	1 Quntile	2 ∆"# $ %&'∆"# $ %&'
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Table A.9: Distribution of Health Status by Household Socioeconomic Status in Childhood: Residents in Rural Areas
A.3 Accounting for Health Conditions and Retrospective Recall
As a first additional estimation, I include variables for self-reported chronic illness and
self-reported disability as control variables (results are presented in Tables A.10 and A.11).
Self-reported chronic illness is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether the individ-
ual suffers from a chronic or long-standing illness like diabetes, heart disease or cancer.
Self-reported disability is a dichotomous variable that indicates the presence of a perma-
nent disability.
These objective measures of health status have a negative and significant effect on
the likelihood of reporting a good health status. This result is consistent across the full
sample and the subsamples of urban and rural areas. Following the results in table A.10,
the associations between circumstances and adult health status previously described do
not change after including these health variables in the estimations. The equation for
years of education (results available upon request) does not include the objective health
measures. Thus, by construction, the coefficients and standard errors for chronic illness
and permanent disability are the same in both the estimation of the non-linear model for
health status including years of education and the estimation including years of education
purged from the effect of circumstances. These objective measures of health status, how-
ever, highly depend on the respondents access to health care services. The distribution
of health services in the country is not necessarily random. For instance, the differential
health care use between urban and rural areas may reflect both a major difficulty in se-
curing the availability of health care providers in rural areas and a large concentration of
private health care providers in urban areas (Vargas-Lorenzo, 2009). Chronic illness and
permanent disability are not perfect indicators of health status on their own either. In-
dividuals may experience psychological adjustment and adaptation to permanent health
problems that, in turn, affect how they perceive and report their health status (Graham,
2008).
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Table A.11 shows the estimation of the inequality of opportunity indexes. The Gini-
opportunity index is below the index presented in the main document. The index now
ranges between 0.042 and 0.077, with rural areas exhibiting the lowest estimate, as in the
main results. Note here that the outcome of interest is the health status variable with four
categories. The dissimilarity indexes, on the other hand, are now larger than the indexes
reported in the main document.
Regarding the decomposition of the dissimilarity index, it can be observed that all
circumstances but own education, have a contribution of between 36% and 50%, with
socioeconomic status at age 10 and region of birth being the most important early life
circumstances. In urban areas, besides the aforementioned variables, paternal education
is perhaps the most important factor in inequality of opportunity, whereas in rural areas,
socioeconomic status at age 10 stands out as the most influential variable. Overall, it
can be argued that the results are robust to the inclusion of objective measures of health
status.
The use of self-reported and retrospective recall data could bias the results here ob-
tained. In order to gauge if there is a systematic bias in how health status is reported,
I examine how people perceive their health status based on their economic conditions,
after controlling for the set of circumstances and the presence of chronic illness and per-
manent disability. Self-reported health status and household income per capita (defined
in both levels and logs) are strongly correlated, but once I control for circumstances and
objective measures of health status this correlation attenuates at conventional significance
levels. Thus, the bias created by self-reported measures should be reduced as long as
more objective measures are included in the model.
To check for one conceivable source of bias induced by retrospective recall, I analyze
whether the age of an individual affects their recall of birth circumstances in a certain
direction. In particular, I estimate the logistic regression models for three age cohorts:
2535, 3650, and 5165 years old. The results suggest that self-reported health suffers from
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reporting bias in view of the substantial differences by age group. Reporting bias con-
stitutes a threat to the analysis in this study as it compromises the comparisons between
individuals with different socioeconomic characteristics.
The estimation results from the logit models for each age group are shown in Table
A.12. Being a male is positively associated with reporting a good health for all age-
groups. Note for the 2535 age-group that having a mother who completed primary but
not secondary education has a negative association with good health status. In contrast,
the opposite is true for the 5165 age-group. Higher quintile groups of household socioe-
conomic status at age 10 are only statistically significant and positively associated with a
good self-assessment of health for individuals between 36 and 50 years of age.
Table A.13 shows the estimation of the inequality of opportunity indexes. The Gini-
opportunity index ranges between 0.03 and 0.10, with the 5065 age-group exhibiting the
highest coefficient estimate. Note here that the outcome of interest is also the health status
variable with four categories. The dissimilarity indexes range between 0.04 and 0.10, with
the highest value in the 5065 group.
Regarding the decomposition of the dissimilarity index, all circumstances but own
education, have a contribution of between 59% and 78%. The contribution of each cir-
cumstance varies by age cohort. For instance, maternal education seems to be more
important for the 5065 group than for the 3550 group, for which socioeconomic status at
age 10 is the most prominent circumstance in inequality of opportunity. Region of birth
and ethnicity are more important for the 2535 age group than for any other
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Dependent variable: self-
reported health status (0=poor or 
fair, 1= good or excellent) 
All Individuals   Urban Areas   Rural Areas 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 
                
Any chronic illness (1=Yes) −1.9755*** −1.9755*** 
 
−2.0409*** −2.0409*** 
 
−1.7436*** −1.7436*** 
 
(0.1761) (0.1761) 
 
(0.2068) (0.2068) 
 
(0.2678) (0.2678) 
Any permanent disability (1=Yes) −1.4031*** −1.4031*** 
 
−1.5184*** −1.5184*** 
 
−1.2382** −1.2382** 
 
(0.3701) (0.3701) 
 
(0.5360) (0.5360) 
 
(0.5053) (0.5053) 
Male 0.4603*** 0.4863*** 
 
0.5621*** 0.6401*** 
 
0.4354** 0.3888* 
 
(0.1373) (0.1375) 
 
(0.1685) (0.1686) 
 
(0.2188) (0.2171) 
Age group (Ref. 25−35 years old):  
35−45 years old −0.5017** −0.5144** 
 
−0.4825* −0.4772 
 
−0.5309** −0.6043** 
 
(0.2094) (0.2093) 
 
(0.2914) (0.2914) 
 
(0.2540) (0.2535) 
45−55 years old −0.4342** −0.4619** 
 
−0.3978 −0.4357 
 
−0.6642** −0.7509*** 
 
(0.2071) (0.2072) 
 
(0.2857) (0.2859) 
 
(0.2588) (0.2600) 
55−65 years old −0.8310*** −0.9638*** 
 
−0.8056*** −0.9556*** 
 
−1.0912*** −1.2735*** 
 
(0.2108) (0.2108) 
 
(0.2921) (0.2924) 
 
(0.2767) (0.2772) 
Ethnicity (Ref. Not a minority):  
Indigenous −0.1588 −0.1663 
 
−0.4919 −0.4956 
 
0.4388 0.4555 
 
(0.3975) (0.3975) 
 
(0.5402) (0.5402) 
 
(0.4583) (0.4583) 
Black/mulato/raizal/palenquero −0.1288 −0.0927 
 
−0.2521 −0.2399 
 
−0.0422 −0.0178 
 
(0.2604) (0.2606) 
 
(0.3303) (0.3304) 
 
(0.3843) (0.3837) 
Region (Ref. Atlantic and San 
Andres islands): 
Eastern −0.1640 −0.1639 
 
−0.1203 −0.1590 
 
−0.4932* −0.5061** 
 
(0.1922) (0.1922) 
 
(0.2514) (0.2512) 
 
(0.2546) (0.2552) 
Pacific −0.5767** −0.5188** 
 
−0.6139* −0.4840 
 
−0.7038** −0.6838** 
 
(0.2287) (0.2277) 
 
(0.3561) (0.3534) 
 
(0.2801) (0.2790) 
Orinoquia and Amazonia 0.2593 0.1880 
 
0.7666 0.6341 
 
−0.7848 −0.8086 
 
(0.4692) (0.4690) 
 
(0.6800) (0.6798) 
 
(0.7630) (0.7633) 
Antioquia 0.1878 0.1788 
 
0.3785 0.3486 
 
−0.5712* −0.5727* 
 
(0.2334) (0.2334) 
 
(0.3046) (0.3047) 
 
(0.3144) (0.3145) 
Valle 0.3126 0.3842 
 
0.3487 0.4141 
 
−0.1455 −0.1129 
 
(0.3235) (0.3236) 
 
(0.3891) (0.3891) 
 
(0.4842) (0.4839) 
Bogota −0.5127* −0.5496* 
 
−0.4760 −0.5445* 
   
 
(0.2826) (0.2831) 
 
(0.3103) (0.3110) 
   Central −0.0846 −0.0201 
 
0.0448 0.1358 
 
−0.4093 −0.4044 
 
(0.2104) (0.2102) 
 
(0.2829) (0.2821) 
 
(0.2592) (0.2591) 
Born in urban area −0.1281 −0.0052 
 
−0.2701 −0.2159 
 
0.1596 0.1944 
 
(0.1451) (0.1434) 
 
(0.1928) (0.1924) 
 
(0.2469) (0.2465) 
Household socioeconomic status 
at age 10:  
Quintile Group 2 0.0974 0.1821 
 
0.0538 0.1812 
 
0.1404 0.1063 
 
(0.1696) (0.1682) 
 
(0.2357) (0.2323) 
 
(0.2598) (0.2598) 
Quintile Group 3 0.4048** 0.6455*** 
 
0.0342 0.2918 
 
0.8708*** 0.9125*** 
 
(0.1983) (0.1955) 
 
(0.2609) (0.2567) 
 
(0.2621) (0.2625) 
Quintile Group 4 0.2750 0.6830*** 
 
−0.0029 0.3738 
 
0.7075*** 0.7801*** 
 
(0.2261) (0.2180) 
 
(0.2850) (0.2712) 
 
(0.2688) (0.2674) 
Quintile Group 5 0.8770*** 1.4271*** 
 
0.7342* 1.2518*** 
 
0.9375*** 1.1488*** 
 
(0.3115) (0.2959) 
 
(0.3773) (0.3572) 
 
(0.3138) (0.3063) 
Paternal education level (Ref. 
None):  
Complete primary and incomplete 
secondary 0.3285 0.4428** 
 
0.5145* 0.6086** 
 
−0.2968 −0.1746 
 
(0.2219) (0.2219) 
 
(0.2646) (0.2657) 
 
(0.3712) (0.3693) 
Complete secondary or more −0.1788 0.0478 
 
−0.0889 0.0990 
 
0.0872 0.4411 
 
(0.3903) (0.3908) 
 
(0.4313) (0.4318) 
 
(0.7347) (0.7313) 
Unknown father's level of 
education 0.0902 0.0051 
 
0.3461 0.2562 
 
−0.3840 −0.4351* 
  (0.2038) (0.2033)   (0.2810) (0.2802)   (0.2546) (0.2528) 
 
  
Table A.10: Log-odds Ratios, controlling for presence of chronic illness or permanent
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Dependent variable: self-reported  
health status (0=poor or fair, 1= good 
or excellent) 
All Individuals   Urban Areas   Rural Areas 
(1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Maternal education level (Ref. None):  
Complete primary and incomplete 
secondary −0.1319 −0.0079 
 
−0.1069 0.0283 
 
−0.3793 −0.3155 
 
(0.2109) (0.2096) 
 
(0.2582) (0.2559) 
 
(0.3129) (0.3113) 
Complete secondary or more 0.4682 0.7693* 
 
0.6236 0.9324* 
 
−0.7971 −0.5783 
 
(0.4583) (0.4541) 
 
(0.5500) (0.5452) 
 
(0.6692) (0.6610) 
Unknown mother's level of education −0.1725 −0.2209 
 
−0.2442 −0.2641 
 
0.0170 −0.0030 
 
(0.2360) (0.2360) 
 
(0.3259) (0.3259) 
 
(0.2771) (0.2772) 
Years of education 0.1196*** 
  
0.1215*** 
  
0.0961*** 
 
 
(0.0182) 
  
(0.0231) 
  
(0.0278) 
 Years of education purged from 
circumstances 
 
0.1196*** 
  
0.1215*** 
  
0.0961*** 
  
(0.0182) 
  
(0.0231) 
  
(0.0278) 
Constant 0.7647*** 1.3154*** 
 
0.8864** 1.5622*** 
 
0.8300** 1.3060*** 
 
(0.2635) (0.2576) 
 
(0.3727) (0.3609) 
 
(0.3667) (0.3511) 
         Observations 2,204 2,204 
 
1,242 1,242 
 
956 956 
Region of Birth Dummy Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Log−likelihood −4.044e+06 −4.044e+06 
 
−2.964e+06 −2.964e+06 
 
−1.018e+06 −1.018e+06 
Pseudo R squared 0.211 0.211 
 
0.230 0.230 
 
0.168 0.168 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Own calculations. Source: 2010 Colombian LSSM Survey. 
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Gini-Opportunity	Index	(1) 0.0777 0.0735 0.0429Dissimilarity	Index	(2) 0.1033 0.1034 0.0990 0.0999 0.1227 0.1226Educational	Attainment 50.87 42.19 26.09Education	purged	from	circumstances 36.12 41.41 19.83Circumstances 49.13 63.88 57.81 58.59 73.91 80.17Early	Life	Circumstances 45.00 31.27 38.80 38.76 53.70 58.94Mother's	Education 8.99 6.15 10.43 11.96 4.16 3.05Father's	Education 10.14 7.74 12.71 13.56 8.57 9.35Household	Socioeconomic	Status	at	age	10 25.86 17.38 15.65 13.24 40.97 46.54Demographics 18.89 17.85 19.01 19.82 20.21 21.22Region	of	Birth 13.46 13.14 16.35 17.07 17.33 17.86Born	in	Urban	Area 4.32 3.64 0.56 0.90 1.82 2.26Ethnicity 1.11 1.07 2.11 1.85 1.06 1.11ObservationsBootstrapped	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	100	replications.Own	calculations.	Source:	2010	Colombian	LSSMNotes:	(1)	The	Gini-opportunity	index	is	calculated	using	a	self-assessed	health	status	variable	in	which	1=poor,	2=fair,	3=good,	and	4=excellent.	A	categorical	variable	for	the	individual's	years	of	education	has	also	been	used	in	this	calculation.	Gender	and	age	group	are	not	included.(2)	The	index	in	the	first,	third	and	fifth	columns	include	years	of	education	as	a	circumstance,	whereas	the	second,	fourth,	and	sixth	columns	include	years	of	education	purged	from	circumstances.
All	individuals Residents	in	Urban	Areas Residents	in	Rural	Areas
Decomposition	of	the	Dissimilarity	Index	(in	%)
2,204 1,242 962
Table A.11: Gini-Opportunity index and Dissimilarity Index of Inequality of Opportunity,
with its Decomposition, controlling for presence of chronic illness or permanent disability
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Dependent variable: self-
reported health status  
(0=poor or fair, 1= good or 
excellent) 
Age group: 25−35   36−50   51−65 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
                  
Male 0.7924** 0.7271** 
 
0.5218*** 0.5611*** 
 
0.5171*** 0.5651*** 
 
(0.3150) (0.3162) 
 
(0.1979) (0.1990) 
 
(0.2003) (0.2018) 
Ethnicity (Ref. Not a minority):  
Indigenous −1.2907 −1.2854 
 
0.1894 0.2864 
 
0.0161 −0.1839 
 
(0.7920) (0.7921) 
 
(0.5639) (0.5636) 
 
(0.7473) (0.7466) 
Black/mulato/raizal/palenquero −0.4458 −0.4976 
 
−0.4391 −0.3624 
 
0.1345 0.1635 
 
(0.4735) (0.4720) 
 
(0.3821) (0.3827) 
 
(0.4120) (0.4118) 
Region (Ref. Atlantic and San 
Andres islands): 
Eastern −0.3581 −0.3333 
 
−0.2892 −0.3258 
 
−0.1536 −0.0746 
 
(0.5251) (0.5248) 
 
(0.2749) (0.2757) 
 
(0.2780) (0.2771) 
Pacific −0.9042* −0.8942* 
 
−0.6281* −0.5816* 
 
−0.7038** −0.6137* 
 
(0.4620) (0.4616) 
 
(0.3425) (0.3406) 
 
(0.3515) (0.3490) 
Orinoquia and Amazonia 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.2286 0.0964 
 
−0.0296 −0.2552 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
(0.6933) (0.6922) 
 
(0.9000) (0.8989) 
Antioquia 0.6988 0.7516 
 
−0.0448 −0.0612 
 
−0.0082 0.0004 
 
(0.6109) (0.6142) 
 
(0.3545) (0.3551) 
 
(0.3351) (0.3349) 
Valle −0.5004 −0.4549 
 
0.6391 0.6139 
 
−0.1454 0.0859 
 
(0.7554) (0.7549) 
 
(0.5005) (0.5008) 
 
(0.4494) (0.4488) 
Bogota −0.4951 −0.6110 
 
−0.4700 −0.4831 
 
−0.4874 −0.4970 
 
(0.6106) (0.6154) 
 
(0.4525) (0.4526) 
 
(0.4520) (0.4521) 
Central 0.0089 0.0556 
 
−0.1130 −0.0816 
 
−0.4387 −0.3035 
 
(0.5189) (0.5184) 
 
(0.3295) (0.3291) 
 
(0.3021) (0.2990) 
Born in urban area 0.1192 0.2132 
 
−0.2122 −0.0309 
 
0.0884 0.1610 
 
(0.4015) (0.3989) 
 
(0.2100) (0.2057) 
 
(0.2100) (0.2093) 
Household socioeconomic status 
at age 10:  
Quintile Group 2 0.9255* 0.9853* 
 
0.2990 0.4309* 
 
−0.2145 −0.1829 
 
(0.5268) (0.5236) 
 
(0.2433) (0.2407) 
 
(0.2479) (0.2469) 
Quintile Group 3 0.1625 0.5102 
 
0.8799*** 1.1013*** 
 
−0.0481 0.1371 
 
(0.4791) (0.4726) 
 
(0.2919) (0.2902) 
 
(0.2784) (0.2701) 
Quintile Group 4 −0.1975 0.2942 
 
0.5725* 0.9566*** 
 
−0.0799 0.2757 
 
(0.5514) (0.5258) 
 
(0.3080) (0.2996) 
 
(0.3666) (0.3514) 
Quintile Group 5 0.4275 1.0926* 
 
0.9503** 1.4916*** 
 
0.0380 0.5081 
 
(0.6903) (0.6312) 
 
(0.4699) (0.4481) 
 
(0.4653) (0.4386) 
Paternal education level (Ref. 
None):  
Complete primary and 
incomplete secondary 0.3920 0.5783 
 
0.4352 0.4840 
 
0.0960 0.2276 
 
(0.4682) (0.4693) 
 
(0.3598) (0.3595) 
 
(0.3887) (0.3890) 
Complete secondary or more 0.4664 0.8151 
 
0.3590 0.4415 
 
−0.6995 −0.3575 
 
(0.6931) (0.6845) 
 
(0.5559) (0.5554) 
 
(0.6188) (0.6162) 
Unknown father's level of 
education −0.3563 −0.3242 
 
0.3718 0.2627 
 
0.2458 0.1583 
  (0.4181) (0.4205)  (0.3394) (0.3375)   (0.2855) (0.2850) 
Table A.12: Log-odds Ratios for the Correlates of Self-Assessed Health Status by Age
Group
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Dependent variable: self-
reported health status 
(0=poor or fair, 1= good or 
excellent) 
Age group: 25−35   36−50   51−65 
(1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Maternal education level 
(Ref. None):  
Complete primary and 
incomplete secondary −0.9342** −0.8795* 
 
−0.1845 −0.0424 
 
0.7081* 0.8547** 
 
(0.4580) (0.4582) 
 
(0.3050) (0.3055) 
 
(0.3920) (0.3913) 
Complete secondary or more 1.2847 1.5335 
 
−0.2113 0.1268 
 
1.0861 1.4160* 
 
(1.0338) (1.0314) 
 
(0.6177) (0.6086) 
 
(0.7485) (0.7471) 
Unknown mother's level of 
education 0.4241 0.4291 
 
−0.5432 −0.7347* 
 
0.1256 0.1816 
 
(0.5115) (0.5113) 
 
(0.3760) (0.3779) 
 
(0.3222) (0.3224) 
Years of education 0.1433*** 
  
0.1158*** 
  
0.1042*** 
 
 
(0.0461) 
  
(0.0259) 
  
(0.0264) 
 Years of education purged 
from circumstances 
 
0.1433*** 
  
0.1158*** 
  
0.1042*** 
  
(0.0461) 
  
(0.0259) 
  
(0.0264) 
Constant 0.4941 1.2478** 
 
−0.0921 0.4363 
 
−0.4141 −0.1043 
 
(0.5416) (0.5181) 
 
(0.2871) (0.2748) 
 
(0.2963) (0.2885) 
         Observations 541 541 
 
918 918 
 
735 735 
Region of Birth Dummy Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Log−likelihood −716710 −716710 
 
−1.823e+06 −1.823e+06 
 
−1.816e+06 −1.816e+06 
Pseudo R squared 0.151 0.151   0.113 0.113   0.0817 0.0817 
 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Own calculations. Source: 2010 Colombian LSSM Survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.12: Log-odds Ratios for the Correlates of Self-Assessed Health Status by Age
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Gini-Opportunity	Index	(1) 0.0331 0.0920 0.1029Dissimilarity	Index	(2) 0.0473 0.0473 0.0720 0.0720 0.1018 0.1018Educational	Attainment 21.97 22.88 28.38Education	purged	from	circumstances 28.60 38.14 41.30Circumstances 78.03 71.40 77.12 61.86 71.62 58.70Early	Life	Circumstances 50.32 45.51 55.52 42.12 58.42 46.80Mother's	Education 20.47 19.43 9.53 6.86 26.24 21.08Father's	Education 8.78 6.85 9.62 7.61 13.73 12.50Household	Socioeconomic	Status	at	age	10 21.07 19.23 36.37 27.64 18.44 13.23Demographics 27.71 25.89 21.60 19.74 13.20 11.89Region	of	Birth 19.32 18.53 14.88 13.99 6.59 6.71Born	in	Urban	Area 0.80 0.31 5.54 4.42 6.04 4.76Ethnicity 7.59 7.04 1.18 1.34 0.58 0.42ObservationsBootstrapped	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	100	replications.Own	calculations.	Source:	2010	Colombian	LSSMNotes:	(1)	The	Gini-opportunity	index	is	calculated	using	a	self-assessed	health	status	variable	in	which	1=poor,	2=fair,	3=good,	and	4=excellent.	A	categorical	variable	for	the	individual's	years	of	education	has	also	been	used	in	this	calculation.	Gender	and	age	group	are	not	included.(2)	The	index	in	the	first,	third	and	fifth	columns	include	years	of	education	as	a	circumstance,	whereas	the	second,	fourth,	and	sixth	columns	include	years	of	education	purged	from	circumstances.
Age	group:	25-35 35-50 50-65
Decomposition	of	the	Dissimilarity	Index	(in	%)
541 918 735
Table A.13: Gini-Opportunity index and Dissimilarity Index of Inequality of Opportunity,
with its Decomposition, by Age Group
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